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
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ESPRIT DE CORPS (PRIZE ESSAY)

BY CAPTAIN GEORGE B. LOCKHART, U.S.M.C.

IT has been said that a definition is a very dangerous thing and that the larger and more vital a thing is, the more dangerous it is to define. For to define a thing is to put a fence around it, to fix its limitations. Therefore, an attempt to define esprit de corps is exceedingly dangerous because it amounts almost to the impossible—the limiting of the illimitable.

However, in order to intelligently discuss a subject it must be intelligently defined; and this subject must be defined regardless of the danger. Esprit de corps is a French expression which has been accepted without translation, or modification, by English-speaking peoples. There is no English equivalent to the term, and it has been adopted directly from the French because of the inability of the English language to express the great meaning which it conveys. It is an expression of common usage, but it is used by a great many people who have only a very vague idea of its full meaning. Also it is used by a great many people who have a very good idea of what they wish to convey; but yet, if they were called upon for an explicit definition, they would be unable to define it satisfactorily.

Literally translated, this expression means "spirit of (the) corps." A standard French-English dictionary also translates the combination as "brotherly feeling: brotherhood." Both of these renditions are excellent as far as they go, but they are not sufficiently expressive to convey the grand meaning of the words. And the necessary English equivalents are lacking to give a better translation.

When we speak of the spirit of a corps, or of any body of men in the sense of this term, we do not use the word "spirit" in the sense of a supernatural being, or of a ghost; neither is it used in the transitory or temporary sense which is implied in such expressions as "a spirit of fun," or "a spirit of mischief." It

means a more or less permanent moral quality possessed in common by a number of individuals who are united in some mutual employment, or enterprise; and the word "spirit" fails to adequately express this meaning.

A standard English dictionary defines spirit as: "an immaterial substance invisible to the corporeal senses; soul; life; ardor; vigor; excitement et cetera." If the word "soul" is substituted for "spirit" the expression becomes "soul of the corps," and more meaning is conveyed. But in the ordinary sense of the word "soul" an immaterial, immortal quality possessed by an individual is implied, and it is difficult to think of a soul as something possessed in common by a large number of people, or which animates a number of people of distinctively different individual characteristics.

This domination of a group by a spirit different from the individual spirit of the persons forming the group may be illustrated by a common example. When the term "mob spirit" is used, one readily visualizes a mass of humanity attempting to gain some end by means of violence and the overthrow of established law and order. By this term one means the psychological and mental forces which animate this group; and the meaning is clear to the average citizen. He visualizes the meaning of the words, and no lengthy explanation is necessary. No one would think of referring to this spirit as the esprit de corps; because "mob spirit" denotes a temporary and malevolent characteristic, while esprit de corps denotes a permanent and a beneficial quality.

To appreciate fully the meaning of this expression it is necessary to be able to visualize the meaning as one unconsciously does when he refers to mob spirit. It is not so difficult to imagine a military organization animated and dominated by an immaterial, invisible force which is generated by the union and the fusion of mental and moral waves emanating from the individual minds and souls of the members of the organization. In general these individual contributions are unconsciously made by the individuals concerned; but nevertheless, each man contributes, and each man is dominated by this composite soul.

If a clear mental picture of this psychological soul of a group can be found, it can then be concluded that the esprit de corps, or soul of the corps, of an organization is an intangible, immaterial, moral and mental attribute, which is created by the dis-

solution of the individual souls of the men forming the organization into the composite soul of the entire organization.

It is clear that the term esprit de corps cannot be confined within narrow limits. It should not be confused with such terms as "morale," which means the condition of a body of troops with respect to courage and confidence; nor with discipline with its mechanical inference; nor with patriotism with its varying pitch of enthusiasm and intensity. All of these qualities are attributes of esprit de corps, but they are not synonymous with it, although the expression is often defined in these terms. Neither the recklessness of despair, nor the courage of a forlorn hope, nor the daring of enthusiasm, nor the fire of patriotism, nor the mechanical precision of an iron discipline necessarily indicates esprit de corps; and the term should not be indiscriminately applied to an organization merely because it has shown one of these transient characteristics under certain conditions.

The story of mankind is rich with illustrations of the immensity of the power and of the value of this spirit. History also teaches that it is an attribute which has been common to all ages, to all races and colors and to all degrees of civilization. Perhaps under another name, perhaps unnamed, it has operated to pen the most glorious pages in the history of man. The ability to create this moral force is that which lifts man from the level of the beast. It is not necessarily confined to military organizations, but in that line of endeavor it has found its greatest expression, and in this paper it is discussed only in that phase.

A glance at the pages of history reveals numerous striking examples. One of the most marvelous of these was the campaigns of Alexander the Great. The force led by this conqueror into Asia was originally thirty-five thousand men, but, in the course of its campaigns, it dwindled to less than fifteen thousand. Yet, in the course of eleven years, it covered twenty-two thousand miles of hostile and unknown territory, defeated armies aggregating over three millions of men and never lost a battle. Thus in one sentence is summarized one of the greatest achievements recorded in history.

Perhaps it was an iron discipline and a genius for organization that perfected the Macedonian phalanx which enabled Alexander to conquer the other more highly civilized Grecian states. Perhaps it was this same iron discipline, combined with racial hatred,

patriotism, desire for revenge and hope of reward, that led to the initial conquest of Persia. But after the downfall of Persia, Alexander proceeded into an unknown world. His forces dwindled; no reinforcements could be hoped for; conquered cities could not be garrisoned; enemies were on all sides; home and loved ones were far away; hope of reward was slight, and death was ever present. Only a most remarkable degree of esprit de corps, of which the prestige of Alexander and the discipline of his troops were the most important factors, could have made this stupendous conquest possible.

Yet more remarkable in many ways was the Italian campaign of Hannibal. It was the genius of Hannibal that conceived this project and the Carthaginian discipline that organized the army and embarked it on the campaign. But could that discipline have led the army to accomplish the theretofore undreamed-of feat of crossing the Alps in the dead of winter? These troops were from a tropical climate and not inured to the hardships of snow and ice and bitter cold. The expedition suffered daily from the savage attacks of the Gauls and it dwindled from an initial strength of one hundred thousand to a pitiful handful of twenty-five thousand. Their homes and loved ones were far away; there was but little prospect of victory and an evergrowing prospect for an ignominious death. Discipline—could it have survived the physical hardships? Patriotism—could it have been the motive force? Many of the troops were levies from subject provinces of Carthage; and at this very time their kinsmen at home were in revolt against their oppressor. Yet the deed was accomplished, the Alps were traversed; and this remnant of a proud army, in the heart of a highly civilized and intensely patriotic country, successfully waged war for fifteen long years. During this period it defeated again and again the prize armies of Rome, and all this without the aid and moral support of their country. It hammered at the very walls of Rome, and the expedition was only abandoned in order to return to Africa to the defense of the ungrateful mother city. The more that the various factors that entered into this campaign are studied, the more marvelous appears the power of the remarkable esprit de corps that alone made it possible.

History is full of stories of the wonderful spirit exhibited by both victorious and vanquished armies. The legions of Cæsar; the army of Gustavus Adolphus; the Old Guard of Napoleon; the

loyal forces of Robert Bruce; the crew of the *Bon Homme Richard*; the army of Washington at Valley Forge; the impas of Chaka, the Napoleon of the Zulus; and Stonewall Jackson's Brigade are instances, each a history in itself, chosen at random from thousands of others.

But by these historical examples it is not intended to convey the impression that a remarkable degree of esprit de corps is an essential factor to a great military success. Too many elements enter into the factors that determine eventual success. Probably the most common is a great preponderance of numbers, such as characterized the conquests of Genghis Khan, the great Eastern Potentate, who in the bloody campaigns that marked his career, sacrificed more than four and one-half millions of human lives. History does not record any evidence of his vast hordes having been embodied with any marked degree of spirit or of discipline; only a sheer weight of numbers and a lust for loot enabled it to conquer the entire East. In this category can also be included the barbarian conquests of Rome and the Moorish conquest of Spain. Also we have numerous examples of success attending the desperate efforts of a people fighting for their homes and their very lives, as the Greeks against the Persians, and the Montenegrins against the Turks. Also history shows that a civilized force, animated with greed and equipped with superior armament, can conquer a less civilized and more poorly equipped people, however rich the latter may be in spirit, as was shown in the conquests of Peru and Mexico. Likewise we have cases of a people fighting for their liberty, and having their spirit retarded because of the distrust that each man had for his neighbor due to the prevalence of treason, such as the Swiss and the Dutch. Other cases are a people fighting to expel invaders, as the Spaniards against the Moors; a people influenced by religious fanaticism, as in the Crusades; and a people animated by racial hatred or a spirit of revenge. True, in any of these cases, esprit de corps may have, and probably did, figure to an extent undetermined by history, but it was not the chief motive, and it did not decide the result.

The historical examples of the great power of esprit de corps teaches the lesson that numerical strength should not be overestimated. In the study of military tactics, and the art of war, it is a common practice to assume, that under normal conditions, one hundred men are equal to one hundred men. This is a great

fallacy unless the assumption is made that all the factors, both mental and moral, are equal. The usual assumption is that with an equal discipline and armament, and with leaders of equal skill, the two units are equal. But the unit with the greater degree of esprit de corps is far superior to the other. In fact one hundred men with a highly developed esprit de corps are superior to more than three hundred without it, and the equal of a much larger number. These all-important moral factors cannot be neglected in either the actual training of troops, or in problems of tactics.

Concerning the value of these moral factors, the French Drill Regulations state:

"The moral forces constitute the most powerful factors of success; they give life to all material efforts, and dominate the leader's decision with regard to the troops' every act."

Napoleon more succinctly stated the same principle when he said:

"In war the moral is to the physical as three to one."

If these principles of a high valuation on the power of the moral forces are accepted, both in the training of men in time of peace, and in actual warfare, it follows that the methods of application of the basic principles governing their development should be carefully studied by every leader. The first paragraph of the introduction to the Landing Force Manual, United States Navy, includes this principle in stating:

"Success in battle is the ultimate object of all military training: success may be looked for only when the training is intelligent and thorough."

It is a recognized principle that the drill regulations for the training of troops are only a guide, a tool to work with, in the development of the material. A leader who fails to grasp the spirit, fails also to train intelligently and thoroughly. Mechanical precision does not constitute thoroughness, nor will mechanical training attain success against other troops equally well trained. The moral forces of a unit must be developed with the physical, if success is to be expected.

It is then reasonable to assume that the leader who realizes the value of the moral factors, and who strives in every way to inculcate them in his subordinate leaders and in his men, also realizes

that the beliefs and actions of men engaged in the deadly business of war are materially affected by the moral forces engendered and engrained in time of peace. The leader who realizes this fundamental principle, and who incorporates it in his work of training, is on the road to ultimate success.

Thus the question of how to instill these moral forces into an organization naturally arises. There is no set of rules that can be formulated to gain this end. To write a rule one must know the material with which, and the conditions under which, the work must be done. Each man presents a separate problem and no rules can be devised that will apply to every man. The leader, by close application to the general principles, must formulate the specific rules that apply to the separate individuals of his command.

Every individual in an organization exerts an influence, be it good or bad, positive, or negative, on the common spirit of the organization. It will be necessary to develop one quality in one man, and another in the next. One man may have any one moral characteristic in a marked degree and the man beside him may be very deficient in the same quality. And that which will influence one man and create good qualities in him, will perhaps leave another man unmoved. These exigencies are particularly important in the Marine Corps, because its composition is such that it is impossible to choose a type, and to use this typical man as an example and to formulate a set of rules for his training. In the Marine Corps the leader has to contend with racial, religious and political prejudices, and with all kinds of home training and different degrees of education. Therefore, in the final analysis, the proper training of a unit resolves itself into the study and training of the individuals forming the unit, and the reconciliation of all the conflicting influences.

One suggestion as to the method to follow in the development of the esprit de corps of an organization, is to study the most important components of this spirit, and then to devise ways and means of instilling these components. If the component factors are assimilated by the individual, the esprit de corps of the unit will take care of itself. Practically all of these factors are moral qualities. The physical qualities are not considered because they are in general only temporary in nature; and, in the end, the moral will rise above the physical, and esprit de corps will triumph over all adverse physical conditions.

It is impossible to enumerate all of the factors that enter into the development, and that influence the power, of esprit de corps. Nor is it possible to arrange a partial enumeration of the order of importance, because importance is only a relative term; and that which may be of the utmost importance in one case, will not be so important in another.

But among the generally more important attributes of esprit de corps may be numbered the following: tradition; patriotism; discipline; a sense of the value of discipline; confidence in self, in comrade and in leader; solidarity; self respect; self sacrifice; a sense of honor; pride in self, in country, in uniform and in organization; contentment and willingness.

The importance of each of these qualities is apparent, and it is readily seen that a detailed study of either would require a volume. Even a most cursory study of all of them is beyond the scope of a paper of this nature. Besides, practically all textbooks dealing with military science and the art of war, devote considerable space to the study of these factors; and the general principles applicable to them are familiar to all students of works of this nature. Therefore, in this paper only a brief glimpse will be taken at the most important, and no attempt can be made to weigh the relative importance. That is a problem which the leader must solve after he has made a thorough study of the individuals in his command.

The first factor mentioned is tradition. This is undoubtedly a potent factor in the development of esprit de corps, and one that is largely left to look after itself. Tradition manifests itself in the reverence and admiration of the noble and glorious history of the organization; and creates the desire to cherish this history and to live up to the ideals established by it. The average man, plunged into an environment rich in tradition, will very shortly feel its subtle influence and respond to it. He may not be conscious of the nature of the influence, nor of his response to it, but he will respond. The influence of tradition is very often unconscious, and when it is conscious, it is usually secret. The man who knows that he is wearing the uniform of an organization that has behind it a history of hundreds of years of glory, will feel a secret pride in wearing this uniform, and will bask in the reflected glory that it brings to him. He will strive in every way to live up to the standards required by this tradition, and will not lower or debase in any way the reputation of his organization. The

Marine Corps is very fortunate in the wealth of its tradition, and the leader should do everything in his power to create pride in these traditions and to add to the already rich store. Great achievements in time of peace create tradition as well as glorious deeds in battle; and every organization should be inflamed with an ardor to establish traditions.

Patriotism is another very important factor in esprit de corps, and it is particularly so in time of war. The inculcation of patriotism into American military organizations in time of peace sometimes presents a rather difficult problem because of the fact that they are composed of men from every walk of life, of every degree of education, of all nationalities, and of all religious and political beliefs.

For the purpose of contrast consider a typical French regiment. A French regiment, or any other unit, is composed of men from the same section of France; men of practically the same degree of education, of the same religious belief, of the same political belief and each man is a Frenchman. In addition to this, his father, and his grandfathers before him, probably served in the same regiment and he has been brought up in its atmosphere. This environment of tradition, and the native patriotism of every Frenchman, tend to the development of an esprit de corps which gives a French regiment a solidarity and unity that is unsurpassed.

Patriotism is a moral quality that is chiefly engendered in the home and in the church and school. In this respect the schools of the United States are sadly deficient. The churches also are neglecting this important work. There are many native-born Americans who have never had a love of their country instilled in them in their youth; and who have never heard any sentiments of patriotism expressed except by professional politicians, or other speakers, on Fourth of July and other holiday celebrations. And the same politicians that utter these high-sounding speeches on these occasions, spend their ordinary days in fleecing their auditors. Naturally such men are shy of such sentiments as love for, and duty to, one's country. Also in the military service there are large numbers of men of foreign birth who, perhaps, have been forced from their own country by religious, or political, or economic oppression. Very naturally national honor, national prestige, national pride and love of country find no expression in them.

Therefore the difficulties of awakening in time of peace the latent

spirit of patriotism of the men of the Marine Corps are enormous, but these difficulties can be overcome by patient and thorough effort. If the soldier is taught the proper reverence for the national colors and the national hymn, and is taught to have pride in his uniform and all that it represents; taught to conduct himself at all times so that the mass of population will have pride in him; if a feeling of self respect and self confidence, a respect and confidence in his comrades and in his leaders is engendered in him, his patriotism will automatically be aroused and the man will glory in wearing the uniform of his country and in serving its colors.

Discipline is perhaps the most important factor of esprit de corps. Many volumes have been written on this all-important subject; and numerous rules have been promulgated for its attainment. The relation between discipline and esprit de corps is very close. In itself, discipline does not constitute esprit de corps, but esprit de corps cannot exist without discipline. It is one of the few indispensable constituents.

The first quality of a good soldier is discipline. The next is a thorough knowledge of his weapon. The application of these principles to the leader means that he must first discipline himself, and then gain a thorough knowledge of his first weapon—which is man. A high state of discipline cannot be attained unless these fundamental rules are recognized and applied.

The first step in the attainment of discipline is to teach men to appreciate the meaning of discipline, and to learn its value. To the lay mind discipline often conveys a meaning somewhat synonymous with bondage, or servitude, and all men should be disillusioned of this idea as soon as possible. The American soldier cannot be handled with a glove, nor can he be stirred very deeply by oratory. He is essentially material and matter of fact and he wants to know why a thing is required. In order to acquire and to appreciate discipline he must know what it is.

Discipline does not mean merely a faultless mechanical machine on the drill field. This is only one of the outward demonstrations. However, through discipline the outward aspects which indicate an inward esprit de corps are obtained. An organization in which the members at all times keep themselves neatly dressed, in the proper uniform, cleanly shaven, shoes shined, and who salute snappily and carry themselves with an air of pride and self confidence, is an organization which possesses

discipline, and in which esprit de corps exists. When men are brought to the state where they strive to obtain these appearances without any compulsion, they have acquired a pride in themselves and in their organization. A man will not easily lose this pride, and when he goes on furlough he will be as punctilious in his appearance as if he were on parade ground. His pride in his organization will accompany him, and he will take pride in demonstrating its efficiency.

The habits of obedience, neatness, respect, courtesy and soldierly bearing must be initiated in the recruit camp, and, if properly instilled, they will gradually change from habits of compulsion to habits of desire, and will finally become an innate part of the man. An equally strong opposite effort will have to be brought to bear on the man to cause him to lose them.

Still another important attribute of organization spirit is confidence—self confidence, confidence in one's comrades and confidence in one's leader. All are important and they depend upon each other. All are essential to esprit de corps, for a man cannot contribute to, and share in, the common spirit unless he has confidence in himself and in the other individuals of the unit. Self confidence is a man's belief in himself. To be able to believe in others he must first believe in himself. He must believe himself capable of taking care of himself in any situation, and the only way to teach him this is to require him to take care of himself. This ability must always be required of him. He should be told as many times as necessary how to properly execute the routine duties of his profession, but they should not be done for him. Insist that he do it himself and that he do it properly. Arouse his spirit of pride by pointing out a man that can do his task properly. One difficult task overcome, and a man begins to develop self confidence; one difficult task done for him, and the first step has been taken in making him dependent upon others.

Men must also have confidence in each other. If a man believes that the man next to him is shirking, he will also shirk; if he believes that his neighbor will flee in battle, he will also be prepared to flee. Such qualities as courage, confidence, fright and enthusiasm are contagious. Therefore men must be required to do their full share of every task, and shirking must be severely punished. It must be eradicated from an organization if esprit de corps is to be obtained. Not only is this mutual confidence

necessary in the physical performance of duty but it is necessary in the barracks and mess hall—in matters involving moral qualities as well as physical.

Theft is perhaps one of the greatest enemies of mutual confidence. Men cannot trust each other when it is known that a thief is present. Every possible effort must be made to detect and apprehend a thief, and no member of the organization should rest until he is found. Then, punishment must be swift and severe. The Marine Corps is no place for a thief, petty or otherwise. And the ancient theory that stealing is all right as long as one steals outside his own organization, is decidedly erroneous, and the practice of it will destroy inter-organization spirit. And the man who begins by stealing an article of equipment from another company will end by stealing from his comrade.

Either in peace or in war, confidence in the leader is absolutely essential to success. This is applicable to all leaders. Trust begets trust, and a leader cannot gain the confidence and trust of his men unless he reposes trust in them. If an organization knows that their leader trusts them fully, they will strive in every way to merit this trust. And if the leader merits their trust, they will willingly place it in him. Nothing is more serious than a breach of trust. It is the unpardonable sin. Faith and confidence once gained can only be lost by a breach of trust, and, once lost, it is well nigh impossible to regain. An officer should never make a promise to a subordinate, either binding himself or his superiors, unless he is absolutely sure that he can fulfill it.

The question of confidence has an important bearing on the selection of non-commissioned officers. A non-commissioned officer is a liability to an organization unless he merits and can hold the confidence of his subordinates. This is a factor that is often partly, or wholly, neglected; and it tells heavily in the efficiency of the organization. Inspiration and teamwork are essentials to efficiency, and these cannot be secured if the non-commissioned officers do not possess the confidence of the men and can inspire them to develop teamwork.

As an example, consider a football or other highly trained athletic team. Teamwork is an absolute essential to success. But this teamwork cannot be gained and success cannot be attained if the captain does not possess the confidence of his men. A competent coach would not retain for a moment a captain who

did not possess the confidence of his team. Yet, in the military service it is often the case that non-commissioned officers are retained when it is known that they do not possess the confidence of their men.

Another important factor of esprit de corps, and one that is often underrated, is the personal prestige of the leader. Prestige fills the dual rôle of being an essential factor in the attainment of the proper discipline, and of also being a vital component of esprit de corps. To engender the blind confidence, the instinctive obedience and the susceptibility to suggestion which is necessary to thorough discipline, the leader must possess personal prestige. Prestige is either natural or acquired. Admiration is the first element in prestige; and admiration without fear is the best kind. Soldiers must admire the soldierlike qualities and the ability and the character of their leader. In order to gain this admiration the leader must excel in all the qualities which he demands of his men. If one of his subordinates fills this position, the subordinate will have the prestige and the titular leader will be leader in name only.

Close attention to detail is essential in the acquisition of prestige. The officer who salutes carelessly, or indifferently, will soon find his men saluting in the same manner. If he dresses himself, or bears himself, in a slovenly manner his men will do likewise. It is a human failing to imitate; and what is more natural than for a man to follow his leader?

Still another of the initial factors in the fostering and development of esprit de corps is contentment. Nothing good or pure can breed in an atmosphere of discontent. Some factors affecting the contentment of a command, such as location, climate and nature of duty performed, are such that the leader has no control over them, but any unfavorable influences created by these conditions must be off-set. Irksome confinement induces discontent, the men must not be limited to too narrow confines. The leader must realize that they will escape from all artificial bonds in time of war; and that a sense of responsible freedom must be cultivated in time of peace. The men should be given every freedom and privilege consistent with discipline and the proper performance of duty.

A leader must never show favoritism. The leader who is as quick to reward merit as he is to punish dereliction of duty, is the

one who is most admired. A man does not bear a grudge if he knows that he has been justly punished; but he will nourish a deep resentment if he has been unjustly punished, or if he is not rewarded for merit and the faithful performance of duty. The reward may be only a word of praise, but it should be forthcoming. Unspoken resentment is a flame very difficult to extinguish and which is liable to ignite other and more dangerous fires.

The leader must take a personal interest in the work and in the welfare of his command. He must know what is going on, and must create an interest in the work. He should be available at all times to hear complaints. He should personally investigate every complaint and do all in his power to remedy the cause for just complaints. If the complaint is unjust or unreasonable, it should be pointed out to the man; if it is malicious and deliberately harmful, the instigator must be punished. Man is quick to resent a real or fancied injury; and, he being taught to look to his commander to redress all his wrongs, the failure on the part of the commander to do so constitutes a breach of faith.

The mess hall is the most important factor in contentment. Napoleon said that an army marches on its stomach. The organization mess is the keystone of the organization contentment; and contentment is one of the most important stones in the foundation of esprit de corps. Therefore, as a house is only as strong as its foundation, and the arch only as strong as its keystone, it follows that the mess is a direct and an important factor in esprit de corps. The quantity, the variety, and sometimes even the quality of the food, is often beyond the control of the commander; but he can see to the cleanliness, to the proper preparation of food and to the many little details in connection with the mess hall.

Likewise a certain amount of recreation and amusement is necessary to the contentment, the proper performance of duty and the health of the command. Routine duty of any kind is very trying, and there must be a break in the monotony. Here again conditions are often beyond the control of the leader in respect to athletic equipment, suitable grounds and other equipment for amusements, but simple games of rivalry and physical exercise can always be devised. Amusement and recreation are the chief

precautions against staleness and other harmful influences, and the leader must provide for them.

Another quality that is often underrated is willingness, both as a subordinate factor of contentment, and as an asset to discipline. Each man must be required to do his full share whether he be willing or not, but it is decidedly the poorer policy to rely upon force alone, and to make no effort to obtain willing coöperation. Much more can be accomplished by a willing effort than by a forced one, and the former will not break down in battle, or under other conditions where force cannot be applied.

Willingness is obtained by the encouragement of initiative, judicious praise, personal interest of the commander, the placing of trust in subordinates and the creation of interest in the work at hand. A leader who continually finds fault, and who never praises, will not develop willingness. If a leader pursues the policy of inspection merely for the purpose of finding fault, he will not meet with willing efforts to please. It is just as easy first to judiciously praise the appearance of a man, or of a barracks room, and then to suggest an improvement in a certain detail, or to point out a defect, as it is to criticize the defect and never praise the good, and it is decidedly more efficacious. The next time the men will voluntarily exert themselves to remedy the defect noted and will look forward to a word of praise. If it is not forthcoming when merited, a distinct sense of disappointment will follow, and a corresponding decrease in willingness.

The foregoing remarks concerning a few of the fundamental qualities that tend to the development of esprit de corps during the period of training, are, in the main, repetitions of time-honored principles that have been enunciated in the past by renowned leaders in the discussion of various subjects, and which have been proven by the impartial test of time. Experience has shown that the proper application of these principles leads to success, and that neglect to do so leads to failure. Success and failure are relative terms, but in military service mediocrity is regarded as failure, and a leader must rise above mediocrity if he would attain success.

The leader who desires to consciously apply the principles which foster esprit de corps, will do well to apply himself to the often neglected subject of psychology. The essential principles of psychology are directly applicable to the training of men in

the time of peace, and are invaluable in studying the actions of men in time of war. They are also directly applicable to the inculcation of these powerful moral forces which we generalize in the term *esprit de corps*.

Esprit de corps engendered in time of peace will prove a powerful ally under any conditions, and on any duty, in time of war. In battle man descends to the primitive; the conventional and artificial bonds imposed upon the soldier in the barracks are shed, the *esprit de corps* is the medium which preserves the unity of the command, and which counteracts the primitive instincts of self preservation that dictates each man for himself and the devil take the hindmost. With *esprit de corps* the preservation and success of the unit is placed before that of the individual, and there is no tendency to shirk a full and powerful performance of duty.

No man possesses absolute courage, and men in general do not possess uniform courage. Fear is ever present in situations involving physical danger, and the power of will is the force that overcomes physical fear. *Esprit de corps*, as manifested in a general sense of duty to the organization on the part of each individual, is the most potent factor in the control of the common fear of the organization. It enables the strong-willed man to overcome his fear rapidly and to gain courage; and his courage is imparted to his weaker-willed comrade. The common courage of an organization is superior to, and much more intelligent than the individual courage of the men composing it.

The supreme fear of the leader is the fear of a panic. Fear, like courage, is highly contagious and extreme fear manifests itself in a man in unreasoning panic. A very slight influence, or suggestion, or example, can change supreme courage into abject panic. This is the dread fear that continually haunts the leader. Balck says: "The spectre of panic stalks by the side of enthusiasm." *Esprit de corps* is the best precaution against panic. Troops possessing a high degree of *esprit de corps* seldom, if ever, yield to panic. At Waterloo when the French army was in mad riot, the Old Guard of Napoleon was unaffected.

Physical hardship is an unavoidable circumstance to warfare. This constitutes one of the most powerful agents of demoralization, and the strictest discipline crumbles rapidly beneath its attacks. (Mere discipline is the welding together of a unit by the

application of exterior forces, and is therefore exposed to the attacks of counter forces. On the other hand, esprit de corps is the welding together by inner influences; and such a fusion is impervious to the ravages of physical hardship, or to the onslaught of other forces.

The United States Marine Corps is now passing through a very critical period in its history. It has not yet fully recovered from the relaxation caused by the lessening of the tension created by the World War and from the changes resulting therefrom. Now is a very favorable period to begin building in the new Corps the esprit de corps for which the old Corps was justly famed. The new relation between the leader and the man makes the task more easy; but it also opens up new pitfalls in which the unwary may fall. The Corps has also reached a period where the subordinate is allowed more freedom for the display of initiative than ever before, and he must prove himself worthy of the trust. Each leader must solve his own problems and his results will be his judge.

On every side is betrayed a tendency to bewail the efficiency of the past at the expense of very little effort expended to improve the present or to work for the future. History shows that a similar period of inaction and uncertainty follows practically every war, and that the duration of this malevolent influence depends upon the ability of the leaders and the spirit of the organization as a whole.

THE THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUN

By MAJOR P. H. TORREY, U.S.M.C.

EVERY scientific advance in the development of small arms is of keenest professional interest to the Marine Corps. The Thompson Submachine Gun unquestionably marks such an advance.

In the October, 1920, issue of the *Infantry Journal* there appears a very excellent article on this subject by Major A. B. Richeson, Reserve Corps, U. S. Army. It is believed that this article has come to the attention of but few officers and men of the Corps. It is therefore my desire to submit to our Service, through the medium of the *GAZETTE*, a short description of this gun, based upon personal observation, in what is believed to be a little more detail than that which appears in the article referred to above.

In the late summer of 1920, while the writer was stationed at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., there came under his observation this very latest, most interesting and unique of all fire arms: interesting because it embodies an entirely new principle in breech closure; unique because of its peculiar and unfamiliar shape, which at first glance would seem to classify it as an oversized automatic pistol designed to be fired from the waist-line or hip and directed by a sense of feel and direction rather than by deliberate pointing. Unique again, in that its character may be changed into an automatic rifle by the application of a stock. This requires but a few seconds, enabling it to be fired from the shoulder with the same ease and precision within its effective range, as is found in other automatic rifles.

That it possesses no end of possibilities and has a wide field of usefulness there can be little doubt. Even upon slight acquaintance one is immediately interested and impressed, not only with the rapidity with which it may be fired (1500 rounds per minute) and its apparently perfect functioning, but also by its simplicity, and the ease and safety with which it may be handled in delivering its fire.

It may be of interest to note that this latest achievement in

the gun maker's art is an accomplishment which belongs to the Army and Navy of the United States. In 1915, Commander Blish, of the Navy, submitted to a Special Navy Board of Ordnance his patent claims embodying the principle of adhesion upon which this gun is enabled to function. There then remained the problem of successfully applying this principle to the small bore automatic arm and its successful application in the Submachine Gun marks the first innovation and places the gun in a class by itself. The inventor was both wise and fortunate indeed, in his alliance with General J. T. Thompson, U. S. Army, retired, whom we may recall was Chief of the Small Arms Division, and directed America's small arm production during the late war, and through whose efforts and under whose careful observation and direction the gun in its present state was developed and produced.

For those of us who have during the last few years given more or less thought and study to automatic rifle and machine guns, there is both a professional desire and a curiosity to know and understand a little something of the theory of adhesion and its application to breech locking. The writer has made numerous inquiries in regard to this theory. Unfortunately, no answers to them have been an improvement upon, nor has it been explained in any simpler language than is found in the report of the Ordnance Board previously referred to, extracts of which he will take the liberty of quoting:

" * * * Gathers that the basic claim of Commander Blish's invention is— That in any breech closure consisting of a breech plug housed in a suitable housing, and having two pressure-resisting surfaces, the forward surface disposed normally to the axis of the bore and the rear surface inclined thereto and bearing upon a suitable surface of the housing, the force of adhesion will immovably fix or clamp the breech block under heavy pressure, but at a comparatively small pressure whose value depends upon the inclination of the two surfaces referred to, the force of adhesion ceases to act and the breech block is rendered free to move under the influence of the forces then existing.

" It is readily seen that this claim is a very broad one and brings within its scope practically every known type of breech closure, whether it be of the wedge or screw type.

" The inventor has experimented with a simple wedge type of a breech closure and the models submitted to the Board were of this type. He has varied the angle of inclination of the surfaces of the wedge and has found that the smaller the inclination, the smaller the pressure at which the adhesion ceases, but has not attempted to formulate the relation existing

between these quantities. He also states that this cessation of adhesion under diminishing pressures apparently is very abrupt, and it is logical to infer that under increasing pressure this force of adhesion is called into existence in an equally abrupt manner.

"On the subject of adhesion, the Board finds the literature scant. In every day life this force manifests itself chiefly in the adherence of liquids to solids, especially when such liquids "wet" the solids, for example, water and glass. It may be noted, however, that the efficiency of all glues and cements depend largely upon the force of adhesion. Occasionally it manifests itself in two solids such as when two plates of polished glass adhere with sufficient force to render it difficult to separate them without breaking them.

"Adhesion is a molecular force which binds together the surface of molecules of two bodies at the common surface of contact. Everything goes to show that intimacy of contact conduces to the existence of adhesion. If two bodies are pressed together, the pressure increases the intimacy of contact, especially if the pressure be great, and thus indirectly causes the surfaces to adhere. If the pressure be gradually reduced the contact becomes less perfect and a point is reached where the contact is not sufficiently perfect for the surface to adhere—adhesion ceases and the surfaces are free to move under the influence of such other forces as may exist at the time.

"So long as the surfaces do adhere they are locked together by the force of adhesion, and resist any sliding upon each other much as the force of cohesion resists the sliding of the molecules of a continuous body under the influence of a shearing force.

"Commander Blish has experimented with wedge breech blocks having wedge angles varying from slightly over 4 degrees to about 25 degrees. All these breech blocks when the force of adhesion ceased opened under pressure of the pressure component lying along the direction of the rear face of the block. At 4 degrees the block did not open, although it showed a tendency to do so.

"Two remarkable facts were made manifest by these experiments: (1) The breech opened when the wedge angle was considerably below the angle of repose, when friction might have been expected to hold the block after the adhesion ceased. (2) With the larger wedge angles considerable pressure in the bore still compressed the wedge between the cartridge case and the wedge housing with considerable force. Under such circumstances one would expect abrasion of the contact surfaces when movement took place, but no such abrasion was discernible.

"The explanation of these two phenomena apparently lies in vibrations set up in the mechanism by the rapidly varying bore pressure.

"The model mechanisms were tested by the Board. One was a crude pistol mechanism having a sliding wedge breech block with a wedge angle of about 16 degrees. The other was an application to the breech mechanism of the Springfield rifle. In this model the wedge angle was about $5\frac{3}{4}$ degrees. Both mechanisms, so far as the breech closure was concerned, functioned perfectly.

"The rifle mechanism was especially interesting for several reasons viz: (1) The wedge angle was considerably less than the angle of friction. (2) Sufficient pressure remained in the bore when the wedge opened for the empty cartridge case to be blown to the rear, carrying the bolt (containing the firing pin and firing spring) before it with sufficient velocity to cock the firing pin when the bolt brought up against the rear buffer, and causing the empty cartridge case to rebound and to be ejected to the front. This movement of the bolt to the rear was against the force of compression of a spring designed to reload the piece.

"From what has been said it is evident that in practically every breech mechanism in existence, the force of adhesion must come into play; that there is no tendency for the mechanisms to open under heavy pressure, and that the so-called safety locks or latches serve only to restrain the tendency of these mechanisms to open after the adhesion has ceased.

"Where an early opening of the breech is desirable, the propriety of removing these locks or latches naturally suggests itself, so that the breech might open of its own accord as soon as this might be accomplished with safety. In order to do this one must know accurately the force being dealt with.

"It will, therefore, be necessary to determine with a model apparatus the bore pressure, for various wedge and angle, at which the adhesion ceases. A simple apparatus in which the cartridge case is replaced by a pneumatic piston fitted so that the pressure may be rapidly varied, should suffice to give approximate values of this pressure. It will remain, however, to determine how far these values are affected by the vibrations set up by discharge of the piece.

"Commander Blish's system of breech closure lends itself naturally for use in automatic or semi-automatic small arms, machine guns and guns using fixed ammunition. As the caliber is increased, however, other considerations enter which may make it undesirable to install a self opening breech mechanism. One of the most important of these is the danger of flare back. While this danger is slight in guns using cartridge cases, it is of such importance in big guns as practically to preclude the adoption of any self opening breech mechanism. Even in the case of the larger caliber cartridge case guns the escape of a considerable quantity of highly heated gas to the rear, incident to a too early opening of the breech and ejection of the cartridge case, would be highly objectionable, even if there were no accompanying danger of ignition of the next charge.

"These considerations appear to limit the application of Commander Blish's system of breech closure to small arms, machine guns and cartridge case guns of a caliber not greater than 5 inches. For small arms and machine guns it appears to furnish an almost ideal breech mechanism, but before it can be applied to anything, larger experiments with the model apparatus must be performed, and it is recommended that this apparatus be constructed and the experiments be performed as soon as practicable."

In the Submachine Gun the positive locking and automatic release is attained by the wedge or lock, housed in the bolt and

bearing on the receiver. To quote the words of those having charge of the development and production of the gun: "By the use of this little wedge, weighing only a few ounces, a saving in weight of several pounds is made, taking the place, as it does in gas operated guns, of cylinders, piston rods, piston heads, arm links, etc., and in recoil operated guns, the heavy moving parts such as barrels, etc."


The second startling innovation in the Submachine Gun is the oiling system. It would appear that those who have the development of this gun in hand came pretty near the right conclusion when they broke away from the field and considered their gun as a type of gas engine. Who will make the assertion that an ordinary gas engine will run efficiently without oil? Why then may we expect a gas engine of another type to function reliably without proper lubrication? Any machine gunner or automatic rifleman of experience, will testify that in action he was living in constant fear of a jam or stoppage at the time he most needed his weapon. Why not then lubricate the machine gun and automatic rifle and reduce the stoppages and jams and give your gunner some peace of mind? To accomplish this, felt pads are placed in the housing of the Submachine Gun and protected against dirt and grit, the pads being saturated when necessary. To this feature it may be said, is due that smoothness and rapidity of action, found in no other automatic arm yet produced.

The Submachine Gun may be described as a gun operated on the automatic principle, magazine fed, recoil operated, air cooled, and capable of being adjusted for semi-automatic (single shots) or automatic fire.

Referring now to Fig. 1, the more important parts of the gun dis-assembled would appear to be:

- Barrel
- Receiver
- Frame
- Bolt
- Recoil Spring (Main Spring)
- Wedge-lock

The feeding is accomplished from a magazine holding twenty (20) staggered cartridges, service pistol, calibre .45. This magazine fits into a slot on the frame just forward of the trigger guard and is pushed up flush to the bottom of the receiver,



THE NEW WAY TO SHOOT

THE THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUN PROVIDES ACCURATE FULL AUTOMATIC FIRE FROM THE SHOULDER BY FIRING FIFTY SHOTS IN LESS THAN THREE SECONDS




where it is held in place by a spring catch. The magazine is a rectangular tube, with the usual spring and follower which force the cartridges up against the lip of the magazine until stripped out by the lower front face of the bolt in its movement forward under the impulse of the main spring. It is understood that disk magazines holding fifty (50) and one hundred (100) cartridges are provided; these, however, the writer has never inspected.

As stated above, the operation of the gun is effected by recoil. By an ingenious installation of the peculiarly shaped wedge or lock within the bolt, having a certain area bearing upon the surface of an inclined slot cut on the interior faces of the receiver, the principle of adhesive locking of breech is effected. This perhaps may be more clearly understood by a very simple and convincing example: when the bolt is as far forward as it can go, (normal position) it may be drawn to the rear by hand with little or no effort; this in fact is done in initially loading the gun. On the other hand, strike the actuator handle or knob a sharp, heavy blow and there will be no rearward motion of the bolt. This is precisely what occurs at the instant of discharge; adhesion, through the medium of the wedge, rigidly holds the movable and non-movable elements of the breech mechanism together. As the recoil diminishes a point is reached at which adhesion ceases, the lock or wedge then is free to move normally, effecting an unlocking of the actuator, and under the remaining impulse of recoil it is now free to move, and is forced to the rear against the main spring. The motion rearward of the movable parts is arrested by the main spring (and the action of the buffer) and they are now ready to be returned to battery, so to speak, unless arrested. This is the case where the adjustment is set for single shot or the trigger is very quickly released after firing. If not so adjusted and if pressure is maintained on the trigger, the bolt will move forward, strip and load a cartridge into the chamber and the discharge will occur by the action of the hammer on the striker at the precise instant the wedge is in place for positive locking. By referring to section view of the gun, Fig. II, one may readily understand the methods of extraction and ejection; also the action of the trigger, sear, pivot plate, and their relation one to the other.

The gun is air cooled. Increased radiation is effected by circular serrations on the barrel decreasing in radii from the

breech forward about one-half its length. The writer witnessed a demonstration during which approximately five hundred (500) rounds were fired as rapidly as magazines could be released from and replaced on the gun, without a single malfunction. His conclusions were confirmed when his attention was later called to the report of the Army Ordnance Board at Springfield Armory on April 27, 1920: "Although the gun was fired as rapidly as magazines could be loaded for each 1000 rounds, the gun did not heat sufficiently to cause trouble, and the action of the gun appeared strong enough to stand continuous pounding, and functioned remarkably during the test."

During the writer's observation of the demonstration, some three thousand rounds were fired automatically in bursts of twenty shots, and singly, at ranges from 100 to 400 yards. During the entire demonstration not a malfunction occurred. The gun functioned perfectly at any angle of elevation or depression, canted right, left, or upside down. The time for firing several full magazines of twenty shots was taken. No little difficulty was experienced in catching the exact time due to the rapidity of fire, which varied from $4/5$ to $1-1/5$ seconds per string. This appears to bear out the claim of the inventors that the gun is capable of firing 1500 shots per minute. At 100 yards, firing single shots at a "B" target, in the prone position, with stock attached, no trouble was experienced in making perfect scores. At this range, using automatic fire, one could without difficulty group five shots on a 6' x 6' target, after becoming somewhat familiar with the action. At 200 and 300 yards remarkable scores were made from the prone, kneeling and sitting positions, semi-automatically, at the rate of ninety shots per minute. Firing automatically the dispersion increased considerably. What appeared to be the first few shots hit the target and occasionally others. All the shots appeared however, to be striking in the vicinity of the target as the splashes at this distance were clearly visible. The demonstration was concluded with firing at 400 yards, by an experienced shot, slow fire, prone. Some difficulty was experienced at first in getting on the target. After this was accomplished several strings of ten shots were fired which resulted in very good groups. When one considers the remaining velocity of a .45 calibre bullet at this range; that the gun used was fitted with a very crude rear sight, and that there was a tricky fish-tail wind blowing from six



TARGET SHOWING EFFECT OF FIFTY SHOTS, FULL AUTOMATIC FROM
THE SHOULDER AT ONE HUNDRED YARDS. TIME THREE SECONDS



o'clock during the entire time, the performance might well be considered remarkable.

The recoil appears to be about one-half that found in the automatic pistol, and in firing automatically in the standing position from the hip there is no difficulty in at least keeping the muzzle of the gun pointed in the general direction of the target during long bursts, which cannot be said, as some of us can testify, when operating our regulation automatic rifle.

At Camp Perry, Ohio, last fall, the gun was on exhibition and demonstrated during the National Matches. That it created somewhat of a sensation there can be no doubt, if reports appearing shortly afterwards in most of our prominent military and scientific journals are taken as an index. From a careful consideration of these reports and from personal observation, it would appear pretty conclusive that the gun from a mechanical standpoint is the nearest approach to the ideal yet developed. It combines the elements of safety, simplicity, rapidity and sureness of action to a greater degree than other automatic arms designed for military use.

In beginning this article it was never intended to touch upon any but the mechanical features of the gun. It has occurred, however, that it might be of interest to glance at some of its possibilities from a tactical viewpoint. Such, for instance, as its use on the defensive and in so-called trench warfare; as a cavalry weapon; as a substitute for the rifle in the Coast Artillery; and its use by a force engaged in bush warfare.

Let us then look first into the uses to which a gun of this type might be applied in purely defensive operations and in stabilized warfare. While it is well known that the American Doctrine is not a defensive doctrine, it is possible, in fact quite probable, that situations will arise in future wars when the opposing forces will find themselves in a position resembling that which confronted the forces in all but the final stages of the late war on the Western Front. It is believed that a gun of this type has an important place in the lines of observation, well forward of the main defensive positions, that every man in such a position should be so armed, as there would be no surer way of breaking up formations and demoralizing the attack than a volume of fire such as a gun of this type is capable of delivering at close range at this stage of the game. All things being considered: rapidity of fire, absolute reliability, effective range, size, weight, stopping power, etc., it

would appear to be superior to either the service automatic or a sawed off shotgun. In a trench to trench attack, in the hands of troops in the assaulting echelons and with the moppers-up in cleaning out trenches and machine gun nests, such an arm would not be out of place. A bayonet could be readily attached for the moral effect of cold steel and for subsequent use for those who prefer engaging in a bayonet duel in preference to an "unsportsmanlike" well-directed shot at point blank range.

Coming to the Cavalryman—take a troop for example. We find the troopers are armed with rifle, sabre, pistol and "each platoon of a troop is assigned an automatic rifle squad; the fourth is held in reserve and employed as directed by the troop commander." Now it is only suggested, bear in mind, not advocated, that an arm similar to the one in question might be substituted for the rifle, pistol, and automatic rifle. It would eliminate considerable weight, simplify the ammunition question, and might render the force so armed less tempting, from the standpoint of a higher command, for use as an infantry force and leave it free to perform the duties it is cut out for and trained to do. The loss in effective range suffered by such a substitution would, it is believed, be more than compensated by the increased volume of fire which would be acquired, and the situations which will confront cavalry either immediately before or during combat would hardly involve a long-range fire fight. The suggestion in regard to its substitution for the pistol may not, upon further investigation, appear as radical as it may seem. Accurate snap shooting of the Tom Mix brand is an accomplishment possessed by but few. The New York City Police Commissioner and his advisers recently arrived at this conclusion and have placed in the hands of some of the police the Submachine Gun. In other words they have confessed their inability to teach men, especially selected for their physique and intelligence, how to *hit* with a pistol or revolver under actual conditions. The point might well be further looked into from a military standpoint.

In the past, there would appear to be some good and sufficient reasons for arming the Coast Artilleryman with a rifle. This was before the days of the automatic. He was, on occasions in the past, organized into provisional infantry units and sent miles away from his guns and there he experienced somewhat of a transformation. Then again, in the past, it is believed he was

supposed to defend himself from all sides. A hostile fleet was to coördinate its attack with that from the shore so as to withdraw at the proper time, enabling the gunners, plotters, range finders, etc., and other specialists to drop their work and proceed to repel the land attack with rifle, bayonet and machine gun. Happily these conditions no longer exist; at least some provision has been made for the adequate protection of our sea coast defences against this contingency by troops appropriate to the mission, leaving the Artilleryman to the performance of his own important and highly technical duties. Why then, the necessity for the rifle? Occasions there may be when he might be called upon in a sudden emergency, to defend himself. A successful landing under cover of darkness of an enemy raiding force would be a good example. *An automatic rifle*, reliable, effective at short range, capable of a high rate of sustained fire would be far more desirable, it is believed, than a rifle. Comparatively few men so armed could do the work of the entire garrison armed with rifles.

There comes to mind other uses to which a gun of this type might well be adapted, but, as has been previously stated, it is not intended to discuss at any length the tactical uses to which the Submachine Gun might be put, but to describe in some detail its individuality.

There are those who will forever discredit any type of quick-firing or automatic gun on the ground that it cannot be supplied with ammunition. They appeared when our first magazine rifle was adopted. They again sprang up in increasing numbers when it was suggested that infantry be armed with automatic rifles. Their noise has been quieted somewhat by experience and lessons learned in Europe. The day of the self-loader and the automatic is at hand—only an intelligent discipline, skilfully applied, will enable us to realize their maximum power.

JUNIOR MARINES IN MINOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

BY CAPTAIN G. A. JOHNSON, U.S.M.C.

WAR DIARIES and Reports of Operations as contained in the Marine Corps Headquarters' files, together with numerous publications (for the most part printed in England), have been the source of the data here collated.

No attempt has been made to cover the big subject of Minor Irregular Warfare in a necessarily brief article. The purpose has been rather to list, in the form of generalities, certain of the methods and expedients that have proved successful in past operations which may serve as a guide to the end that the Junior Officers of the Corps who have yet to see their first tropical expeditionary duty may, by unhesitating, positive action, best aid their commanders.

Irregular Warfare consists in the main of campaigns against nature, surprise, treachery, inferior weapons, tactics, and people.

The enemy, if he has any tactics at all, usually soon descends to mere bushwhacking.

Advantages that the regular has against such an enemy briefly are:

(a) Knowledge and training in modern tactics, troop leadership, communication, and sanitation.

(b) Superior weapons, rifles, grenades, automatic rifles, machine guns, 37 M.M. guns, artillery, and pyrotechnics.

(c) Individually, the courage, discipline and steadfast determination of the white man, together with his ability to shoot quicker and straighter.

Troops operating against irregulars usually operate over wide areas, in small units, companies, platoons, officers' patrols and once again we see the junior officers carrying command responsibility.

While special service ordinarily entails special training, practice, and equipment, even to the extent of adopting certain of the enemy's peculiar tactics, the courses at the Company Officers' School at Quantico furnish the basic principles which if mastered, provide for the natural application as to details.

In addition to the standard text books used at the Marine Corps school, the books mentioned in the bibliography on the last page of this article will prove useful in looking further into the subject of Irregular Warfare.

GETTING ASHORE

Personal Reconnaissance is as essential prior to beginning the movement as in operations ashore.

A careful estimate of the situation following the usual form is as essential as for shore operations. This includes numerous special phases: choices of landing, covering forces, tides, etc., etc.

The speediest boats are best used to act independently to cover the landing or to divert the enemy. The senior officer, particularly in order to quickly meet emergencies, usually commands from the fastest boat. Machine guns or one-pounders mounted in the bow and stern provide the most efficacious method of effective fire from small boats.

Boats in tow should be arranged in such manner as to separate instantly, and provision should be made for instant operation under their own power.

Men should be in the lightest equipment during passage, especially if landing through a surf. This applies to embarking and disembarking at all times, men carrying their packs in one hand and their rifle in the other.

Rockets have been used to fire towns and to divert the enemy from the real landing point.

Bayonets ordinarily are fixed in boats when the landing is likely to be opposed.

Sufficient boat crews specifically detailed are essential, particularly in order to cover the boats, to prevent their getting beached on a falling tide, or to get the boats back to the ship quickly for further contingents.

Communication between the covering ships and landing force is vital, and must be carefully prearranged to cover all contingencies.

As an example of a particularly successful landing which, although unopposed, was carried out under difficult surf conditions, the following may be cited:

Through heavy surf off Santo Domingo a sailing launch was anchored clear of the breakers and a line from it was drifted in to shore and secured to a tree. A life boat was worked along

this line continuously and 600 men, all stores, and several 3-inch field pieces were landed without a boating casualty.

PLACES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE AND WHEN IRREGULARS
USUALLY FIGHT

- (a) Approaches near and in defense of their towns, and to prevent landing.
- (b) To protect their crops, cattle, etc.
- (c) To protect their water supply.
- (d) Historical points (where they or their ancestors have fought before).
- (e) Defiles, river crossings, etc.
- (f) As to numbers—when they have prepondering numbers, or against stragglers.
- (g) As to time—varies, depending on country in which operating.
- (h) As to morale—when their forces have had any success at all, real or imagined.

SIGNS OR INDICATIONS OF TROUBLE

- (a) Indications of close approach to towns, supplies, etc.
- (b) Unusual distribution of population, stock, etc.
- (c) Observation stations—ladders to, or notches in trees, etc.
- (d) Trampled sentry posts, hurriedly abandoned camps.
- (e) Signals, smoke, sound, etc., peculiar to country in which operating.
- (f) Threats, boasting, etc. The enemy often actually sends word where and when he will fight.
- (g) The enemy's fire (not properly withheld) is often the first sign of a hurriedly taken defensive position, or that he has been surprised.

Knowing (1) the enemy's usual fighting places, and (2) having reports or indications that one of these is being approached, the enemy unquestionably also having observation and warning, the usual daylight procedure has been to slow down, rectify the column, at the same time increasing the reconnoissance in order to prevent surprise, but mainly to discover the exact location of the enemy defenses or his main force. Then contain and envelope,

or if close in, execute a rapid advance which, while it may not surprise the enemy, may find him unprepared.

FORTIFICATIONS ON TRAILS OR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

Fortifications have been found to be of two general classes ordinarily designed with ambush in view.

- (a) Frontal—perpendicular across the trail or road.
- (b) Parallel to and often on both sides of the trail.

These usually have taken the nature of a bullet-proof stockade, crude blockhouse, often of stone and loopholed, earth works or combinations.

There is a third class of defensive works, the Historic Strongholds, usually considered by the irregulars to be impregnable, such as were Fort Riviere, in Hayti, and Coyotepe Hill, in Nicaragua. The operations against these are usually deliberately planned and the larger the garrison allowed to assemble in them the greater the success, as a complete campaign may be terminated in one surrounding action.

Fortifications, particularly standing works, are destroyed, following capture, by means of explosives, fire or the labor of prisoners.

AMBUSH TACTICS

Irregulars make use of their fortifications in the preparation of two general classes of ambush.

- (a) Defensive Ambush.
- (b) Offensive-Defensive Ambush.

In the Defensive Ambush, numerous signs of the enemy and his premature firing usually prevent the surprise element on his part.

Once the main position is located the tactics that have proved successful on numerous occasions are:

(a) *Against Defensive Ambush with Frontal Defenses.* Contain the enemy with the advance guard, automatics, machine guns, etc., while flank columns swing by routes far enough into the bush so as not to come under the enemy's fire; to assault positions. The assault may be made from as many directions as possible at a prearranged signal (pyrotechnics, bugles, etc.).

(b) *Against Defensive Ambush with Parallel Defense Works.*

These are doomed if discovered in time, as enfilade fire is at once possible. If the column is abreast of or between the works, rush; or contain and enfilade, depending to what extent the enemy's surprise is resulting in casualties.

(c) *Against Offensive-Defensive Ambush.* Here the enemy attempts to hold the column under his defense while he sends or has ready, details to strike in the flank, with the purpose of cutting the column, particularly attempting to cut off the rear, stragglers, baggage, etc. In the bush or rough country this is a difficult situation. The following tactics have been successfully used on several occasions:

A spearhead formation is taken and extended as follows: The automatics, machine guns, at the apex, contain the enemy defensive garrison. Companies or platoons move successively to the right and left to form and extend the flanks. Meanwhile, the column rapidly shortens, supplies, reserve, etc., marching in towards the apex. At signal (pyrotechnics) the flanks are wheeled out, thus forcing the enemy into a contracted space.

Reserve platoons then charge through the apex, or a wing charges.

In this manoeuvre, in thick country (for which, like all formations, training is necessary), companies or platoons sent successively to flanks do not open fire until they have contact with the unit next preceding them.

A method that has proved satisfactory against ambuscade where the enemy has no defenses is as follows:

Supposing the fire of the enemy to be suddenly delivered from the right—a platoon moves promptly into the bush to hold off the snipers. Meanwhile, and instantly, a portion of the force dashes along the trail for a hundred yards or so until some opening offers, then turns to the right and switches round and intercepts the enemy in his flight or takes him in the rear. This manoeuvre requires training and plan, but provides out-surprising the enemy and inflicts maximum punishment.

In thick country ambush or sniping is the greatest danger.

Proper formation point, advance guard, etc., with patrols or scouts out to right and left a definite *number of paces*, cutting trail if necessary, are the best guard. Frequent reliefs for the flankers are necessary or the rate of march cannot be maintained.

For long columns or sub-divisions of a column, the whole

must be so protected, rear flankers following the path cut by the leaders.

An officer or N.C.O. must be assigned to signal changes of direction of the trail to flankers by call, whistle, etc., otherwise they will lose the column.

TRAIL AND PATROL FORMATIONS

The object in all formations in bush warfare, whatever their names, is to have ready a formed body of troops to bar the way to the enemy, no matter whether his attacks be from the front, rear, or flank, at the same time providing the continuation of the advance in the desired direction.

The following extract from "Bush Brigades," March issue MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, 1921, by Major Earl Ellis, U.S.M.C., is quoted in full at this point, as it incorporates the basic principle for all forces as to march disposition no matter what the size of the organization operating in hostile country.

"The conditions under which flying columns or groups operate, as set forth, naturally force the adoption of a formation of the mobile square type. This may be described as a formation organized so as to be able to immediately and automatically exert fighting power in any direction. For instance, a company of infantry is marching through thick jungle and is ambushed from the front and both flanks; an advanced group exerts rifle, automatic rifle, and grenade fire to the front and both flanks and advances. A second group (of the company) marching only a short distance in rear, projects itself into the bush on the right and rolls up the enemy flank; a third group marching directly in the rear of the second group, operates similarly on the left; a fourth (rear) group marching a short distance in rear of the two flank groups, protects the rear and advances with the attack."

Two types of *Moving Square Formation* providing the above and permitting quick shift into or from march formation have proved successful in all-around offensive operations. These formations permit of constant movement in the desired direction that the enemy can neither understand or withstand. They are:

- (a) Rigid Square—Shoulder to shoulder against overwhelming enemy, or one who charges fearlessly. Movement in desired direction is maintained slowly but surely.

- (b) Elastic Square—Intervals are as desired, and shift into march formation or to extend the flanks is natural. In the bush the enemy usually uses fire tactics only, hence, even when the attack or sniping is persistent from all directions, the elastic (mobile) square will ordinarily serve all purposes.

In both cases, particularly in the rigid square, a central reserve adds to the mobility.

On narrow trails the necessity for correct arrangement of units and arms in the column is particularly important at all times. Even commanders will have difficulty in moving forward in an emergency. Leaders of patrols, whether combat or reconnaissance, ordinarily march at the head covered only by the native scouts and one or two of their own riflemen.

MARCHING

Keeping direction, ever a difficult task, becomes doubly so in close country and on night marches. Constant checking of guides on a movement sketch controlled by compass is essential. Maps of tropical areas, with many other weaknesses, usually are lacking in orientation points. As the country is usually of an unvarying sameness, every endeavor to locate and fill in on maps and show prominently points that can be recognized both on the map and ground should be made. Exact location and distance out from the base must be known at all times on a movement map. One man detailed to record paces and report distances will prove of great assistance in relieving the leader who has many duties. This can be checked to a certain extent by time recording. Native guides should be carefully checked, watched and controlled.

Trails not used should be blocked to prevent men venturing off prescribed route and getting lost.

A good luminous marching compass is the most essential part of a lieutenant's equipment.

In close country surprise is always possible, as flank patrolling becomes difficult, and leading covering troops may be allowed to pass unmolested by an enemy determined in his purpose. For this reason the point should be a contained unit able to fight if cut off.

The greatest danger on trails is elongation. Where contact is expected it is vital that the formation be correct and all men close up. Elongation is also the greatest cause of hardship on

the march, and the head should slow down at obstacles and the column shortened consistent with the mission.

The column may often be broken into two or more approximately equal detachments, each with its own covering force. As a rule the detachments should not consist of less than twenty-five men each. With this arrangement of the column, it will rarely be possible for an enemy to close simultaneously with all of the detachments, and one or more will thus be left unengaged and under control to support those engaged, or to inflict severe punishment upon the enemy when he is repulsed.

Lack of depth of formation in thick country should be noted, for as a rule, the endeavor should be to strike hard with all the force.

The "back to back" formation is a good one, either for the halt or in case of ambush. In this formation at the halt men face out, original odd numbers to right, even to left (or some pre-arranged system), until scouts or covering detachment establish safety. On a sudden flank attack, either on the march or at a halt, face out as above, and attack; get off the trail.

The sites for camp or bivouac should be selected with special reference to economical and effective protection against surprise, ordinarily with reference to the immediate terrain, the higher the better.

PRISONERS

Prisoners should be brought before an officer at the earliest moment for instruction as to how they must conduct themselves; what will happen if they attempt to escape, and that they will be treated fairly, etc. This last is important, not only because it is the humane thing to do, but because news travels fast through the underground among semi-civilized peoples. Every effort along this line to influence the enemy still free not to fight to the last, thus inflicting unnecessary bloodshed on both sides and prolonging hostilities, should be made.

If information is to be got from prisoners taken, keep them separated until all desired is obtained.

Prisoners may well be used to lighten the work of your men—consistent with safety of command and supplies entrusted to them.

AS TO THE SECURITY OF PRISONERS—At night secure them in buildings or other inclosures, or in a circle of camp

fires kept up by the prisoners themselves—sentinels in the dark. Prisoners are tied or otherwise secured when necessary.

COMMUNICATION

Communication has proved a stumbling block on many occasions in small wars of the past. Development of the Field Radio has, however, for operations on the "square system," or separate columns with a common objective, largely removed this difficulty.

Pigeons are invaluable, particularly for rapid mobile columns from which the regimental or brigade commander desires timely reports on which the movement depends in whole or in part.

Pyrotechnics (now part of the infantry equipment) have removed largely the difficulty of tactical control in close country, and solved the recognition question for columns approaching a rendezvous or meeting unexpectedly. Signal flags and flash lights may also be used advantageously as recognition signals. Prearranged signals, smoke, etc., are used to call in patrols or to mark their position. Recognition by sound as to whom is firing is important.

INTELLIGENCE

In general, the service of information will be insufficient; adequate reconnoissance will rarely be practicable. This is overcome by unusual effort, patience and judicious expenditure of funds. Usually definite information is wanted—don't buy everything. Name the information you want and pay for it when verified.

Natives invariably, when they talk, tell you what they think you want to hear. Their sense of right and wrong, time, distance, etc., is usually about zero per cent., but by sticking and striking averages fair results can be eventually obtained.

GENERAL NOTES

In general, operations should not be undertaken hastily. Every preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the maximum punishment.

A panic among irregulars is more contagious than among civilized troops.

One disaster, even to a small part of our force, or the capture of a single individual, often counteracts the effect of several previous victories. The enemy magnifies every apparent success of his own, and this brings him recruits rapidly.

Semi-civilized peoples, or "irregulars," will rarely stand for a bayonet charge.

Feigned retreat before strongholds (no guns present to reduce), has often drawn the enemy into the open and defeat.

In certain countries all males are accustomed to carry arms or keep them concealed in their houses and offices.

Rather over-rate than under-rate the enemy in making your plans. Safety of command is the responsibility of commanders.

Failure to take the simple and obvious precautions through despising the enemy are as likely in Irregular as in Regular Warfare to lead to disasters and "regrettable incidents," particularly to small forces. Don't take UNNECESSARY risks.

Constant halts on night marches, even for small patrols, are necessary in order to keep formation, and in particular to have full force in on the dawn attack.

The bush is usually thickest against sides of the trail due to its being piled up from clearing the trail, and sunlight getting in. Flankers can often operate well in the thinner foliage off the trail that many times looks impossible.

Careful lookout for pitfalls, both on trails and in front of defensive works in certain countries is necessary.

The enemy's cattle, reserve of foodstuff, etc., is usually concealed in the bush on the approach of other forces. To find and destroy or capture this is ordinarily more vital than the taking of the town.

Destruction of villages, crops, etc., (if ordered) is ordinarily done on the return march—both in order that your own supply may be maintained and in order to prevent the smoke marking your progress, an advantage to the enemy when he is still unbroken against you.

Fire a town or village from the windward side, but only after your force is clear.

Natives will use every artifice to draw troops along certain routes. Likewise native custom and etiquette of inter-tribal conflict is often fixed. Don't be restricted, but learn these customs and conventions and turn them to your advantage.

When halts are made, cover in all four directions, as this is a favorite time for attack or sniping.

Double sentinels as a minimum are the rule in field operations against irregulars, and always at night.

If forced to camp in thick country for any time; clear by burning, etc., and use obstacles that will both give warning and hold off the enemy.

When natives are employed in a combatant status, they are sent on diverting movements rather than with the main column, to block avenues of retreat, etc. Faithfulness on their part must be rewarded.

The enemy is usually not so artful in avoiding snares as he is in setting them.

Purely passive tactics in Minor Irregular Warfare at any time is suicidal, particularly from the moral standpoint.

The enemy's forces swell and contract according to the moral effect which is produced, and quite apart from losses in action or from the exigencies of the conflict.

The great problem when attacking irregular warriors in position is not so much to decide how to capture the position, for the chances are that this will not prove difficult, but to make the victory a real one, causing maximum loss in killed, wounded, or captured.

A confident air and manner (every second), even with overwhelming odds, has carried many an apparently impossible situation.

The psychology of the weaker peoples is such that they are great respectors of force.

When convinced of the futility of opposition, these peoples (excepting the bandit class) are usually amenable to just and kind treatment.

Never utter a threat or make a promise that is not carried out.

"Small wars, or phases thereof, are fought for persons or continued by persons and not for causes. When the leaders are removed the 'war' is over."

The Golden Rule against badly armed semi-civilized peoples is: "Strive continually for contact, and when obtained don't give the enemy leisure to reload their guns, but keep them on the move and press home the attack with the bayonet if they are fifty to one."

Surprise, Security, Offensive, Health, are the key words.

The following instructions were issued in orders in the operations in Haiti in 1915.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Each American in a column marching at night will wear a broad white rag around his neck, that the man in rear may recognize and follow him.
2. Each native connected with the American forces, guides, packers, etc., will, at all times, wear a broad white rag around his hat or neck, and one around each of his arms above the elbow.
3. Each animal belonging to the American forces will, at all times, have a broad white rag tied around the tail at the crupper.
4. Each squad of the American forces will, at all times, carry two signal flags, semaphore or wig-wag, which will be displayed whenever other American forces are sighted.
5. At night, hand electric flashlights will be flashed for identification purposes.
6. When advancing up Mount Capois or against other forts, when within range of the enemy's fire, move forward on both sides of and avoid using the trails. Fire only uphill, in order not to hit adjoining columns, and maintain touch with columns on right and left if possible. Attempt to cover all trails leading to the fort, having as many men as possible on each, but never put less than one squad on a trail. If possible, keep automatic guns at head of column.
7. Take all wire cutters and machetes available.

MINOR AND BUSH WARFARE

"Hints on Bush Fighting," Major C. B. Morgan. William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 13 Charing Cross, London. (Pub. 1899.)

"Hints for a Bush Campaign," Lieutenant Colonel A. F. Montanaro. Sands & Co., 12 Burleigh St., Strand. (Pub. 1901.)

"West African Warfare," C. Braithwaite Wallis. Harrison & Sons, 45 Pall Mall S. W. (Pub. 1915.)

"Bush Warfare," Lieutenant Colonel W. C. G. Hareker. Hugh Rees, Ltd., 119 Pall Mall S. W. (Pub. 1907.)

"Small Wars—Their Principles and Practice." By C. E. Callwell (1906 3rd St.). Agents—Wyman & Sons, Ltd., Fetter Lane, E. C.

"Scouting and Patrolling." War Department Doc. 772.

NOTE: Street fighting has not been considered in this article or list of books above.

AMERICAN MARINES IN NICARAGUA

BY MAJOR EDWIN N. MCCLELLAN, U.S.M.C.

(Continued)

EARLY in August, 1912, in accordance with instructions from the Navy Department, orders were cabled to Major Smedley D. Butler by the Major General Commandant, to leave a small detachment at Camp Elliott, Panama, and proceed with a battalion of three companies to the City of Panama and there embark on the U. S. S. *Justin* for Corinto, Nicaragua; this battalion arrived at Corinto on August 14th and at Managua on the 15th.

A detachment of Bluejackets from the U. S. S. *Annapolis*, under the command of Lieutenant James A. Campbell, U. S. Navy, had previously been sent to Managua as a guard for the American Legation at that place. It later became a part of and served with Major Butler's battalion throughout the campaign.

PROVISIONAL REGIMENT ORGANIZED

On August 21, 1912, the Navy Department directed that additional Marines be sent from the United States to Nicaragua.

This order, signed by Acting Secretary of the Navy Beekman Winthrop, reads as follows:

1. Confirming instructions by telephone, the Department desires that a force of about 750 Marines, with necessary equipment, be embarked on board the *Prairie* at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, on August 24, 1912, prepared for possible service in Nicaragua.
2. It is expected that the *Prairie* will arrive at Philadelphia August 23rd, and be ready to receive the Marines the following day, after which the *Prairie* will sail immediately for Cristobal and land the Marines.
3. It is desired that the Marines hold themselves in readiness on the Isthmus to embark at very short notice on board the *California*, and possibly *Denver*, which vessel, or vessels, will proceed to Panama for this purpose in case the service of the Marines appear to be necessary in Nicaragua.
4. It is highly desirable that the *Prairie* be free to sail by the afternoon of August 24th.
5. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has been given the necessary instructions to furnish an adequate number of medical officers and hospital corps men with proper equipment.

In compliance with these orders a regiment of twenty-nine officers and seven hundred and fifty-two Marines, gathered from various posts from Portsmouth, N. H., to Charleston, S. C., under command of Colonel Joseph Pendleton embarked on the U. S. S. *Prairie* at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pa., at about noon August 24, 1912, fully equipped for foreign tropical service beyond the seas.

Colonel George Barnett, commanding the Philadelphia Marine Barracks, made the following report to Major General Commandant William P. Biddle on August 24, 1912:

1. I have to report that the various detachments composing the First Provisional Regiment U. S. Marines, reported at this post as per your orders, the times of their arrivals having been reported to you by telegram, as directed.
2. The *Prairie* came alongside the wharf at 7.00 P.M., August 23rd, and completed taking on board stores at 12.30 A.M., August 24th.
3. The *Prairie* was ready to sail at 12 noon, this date, but did not leave until 12.40 P.M., owing to the train conveying the officers and detachments from Washington and Annapolis being thirty-five minutes late.

THE REGIMENT SAILS FROM PHILADELPHIA AND ARRIVES AT CORINTO

- The regiment, having sailed on the *Prairie*, from Philadelphia on August 24th, arrived at Colon Panama, where personnel and stores were disembarked, and were transferred by train across the Isthmus. Stores and personnel were then lightered from Balboa out to the *California*, and by daybreak of the 1st of September that vessel was under way for Corinto. The remarkable speed of transfers of stores and personnel from the *Prairie* to the *California* was one of the big features of the expedition. The *California* arrived at Corinto, Nicaragua, on September 4, 1912.

Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, commanding the First Provisional Regiment of Marines, reported to the Major General Commandant on August 30, 1912, as follows:

1. In obedience to your orders of the 21st instant, and subsequent information received by radiogram, the First Provisional Regiment, U. S. Marines, embarked on the U. S. S. *Prairie* at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pa., for passage to the Isthmus Canal Zone.
2. The organization as prescribed in the above-mentioned order has been carried out with the exception of the changes already reported by radiogram and confirmed this date by mail.
3. The weather and the trip have been most pleasant, and ship's officers have done everything to promote comfort on board. Instructions have been

given the men in the Landing Gun, Mark VII, Benet-Mercie, 3" Broad-side gun, Colt's Automatic, close and extended order.

4. In accordance with a copy of the Department's order directing the formation of the regiment, I desire to report that the U. S. S. *Prairie* left the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pa., at 12.40 P.M., the 24th instant, and that under those instructions the undersigned has received instructions to proceed to La Boca, Panama, for transportation on the U. S. S. *California* for Corinto; further reports will be furnished as opportunity affords.

Upon arriving at Corinto, at 6.00 A.M., September 4, 1912, Colonel Pendleton reported to Rear Admiral Southerland, the Commander-in-Chief. Headquarters was established at Managua—Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long, with two battalions of Marines and Bluejackets, was assigned the district of Leon and vicinity.

On September 4, 1912, Rear Admiral Southerland reported to the Navy Department as follows:

Colonel Pendleton with one battalion Marines and hospital corps entrained at 1.00 P.M. for Leon. The second battalion Marines and *Colorado's* men will leave here tomorrow. Delay was caused by large amount of stores. The delay above mentioned is fortunate, permitting people time to realize what I can do.

MAJOR BUTLER'S BATTALION JOINS REGIMENT

In obedience to orders, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Major Butler reported on September 6, 1912, with the battalion under his command, to Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, commanding First Provisional Regiment of Marines, at Managua, Nicaragua, and the battalion was designated as the Third Battalion of that regiment.

COYOTEPE HILL FIRES ON MARINES

The regiment remained at Managua carrying on the usual drills, practice marches, and parades until Sunday, September 15th, on which date, at 9.00 A.M., the Third Battalion, under Major Butler, including the *Annapolis* company of Bluejackets, left Managua by train en route for Granada.

About 11.30 A.M., the train, as it was approaching Ninderi station, was fired on by the rebel artillery on Coyotepe Hill. Three shells striking near the train, Major Butler moved it back about two thousand yards and sent a note to General Zeledon,

commanding the rebel forces, notifying him of the presence of the American Marines and intentions; also requesting him to appear at the train so that an explanation of the neutral attitude of the American forces might be accorded him. Zeledon replied that he could not visit the train and asked Major Butler to meet him inside the rebel lines at Masaya. So, early on the morning of the 16th Major Butler went into the rebel lines and talked with Zeledon, who requested an interview with Colonel Pendleton, the Regimental Commander.

Colonel Pendleton had arrived at the bivouac of the Third Battalion on the evening of the 15th, and he consenting to the interview, Major Butler escorted Zeledon's representative to Colonel Pendleton's presence. In the words of Colonel Pendleton, "a conference was held and upon the request of General Zeledon's representative the Regimental Commander communicated with the Commander-in-Chief for conference on peace terms."

DISPOSITION OF AMERICANS ON SEPTEMBER 16TH

On September 16, 1912, Rear Admiral Southerland reported the American forces disposed as follows:

The following is the disposition of the expeditionary force:—

At Managua, 1250 men and Marines, a part of which force is on the way to Granada;

At Leon, 570 Bluejackets and Marines;

From Leon to and at Chinandega, 375 men and Marines;

From Chinandega to and at Corinto, 90 men and Marines;

At San Juan del Sur, 25 men.

Rear Admiral Southerland arrived at Managua at 4.30 P.M., September 17th, and left within an hour for Camp Santo, fourteen miles from Managua. There he was informed by representatives of Mena and Zeledon that they would oppose Americans going to Granada. On September 18th, Rear Admiral Southerland reported to the Secretary of the Navy that "Pendleton with two battalions of Marines, one hundred Bluejackets, one company of Marine artillery, will start at daybreak tomorrow morning from Camp Santo for Granada. Zeledon has threatened to oppose this movement. He is supposed to have a force of about eight hundred, occupies a strong position and has machine guns and several field guns. Pendleton has orders to go to Granada, by force, if

necessary, to take, hold and operate the railroad in the same manner as between Corinto and Managua * * * I intend to hold the line between Corinto and Granada, stationing a sufficient guard at the Legation, occupying strategic points and preventing all revolutionary movements * * * the main activities of the revolutionists are along or in the immediate vicinity of the railroad between Chinandega and Granada."

SKIRMISH AT MASAYA

About 7.15 P.M., September 19th, as the train carrying Butler's Battalion was passing through Masaya, it was fired on by the rebels and four enlisted men were wounded, their names follow: Corporal J. J. Bourne, Co. B, in the hand; Private C. P. Browne, Co. A, in the foot; Private Ray Betzer, Co. A, in the head; and Trumpeter W. M. Brown, Co. A, in the hand. The fire was returned. It was learned from a number of reliable sources that this attack had been premeditated and carefully planned, and that sixty-eight rebels were killed and sixty wounded during the fight, which lasted about fifteen minutes. The train then proceeded through the town to the Federal lines, where, several rails being up, the expedition stopped for the night.

About 11.30 P.M., the 19th, a commission from Masaya visited Major Butler with a communication from Zeledon, disclaiming responsibility for the action of his soldiers. Rear Admiral Southerland reported on the 20th that "Butler has his own Panama Marines and is equal to the occasion," and that "Zeledon immediately after the firing last night sent a delegation to apologize and disavow the act."

GRANADA OCCUPIED

After some delay caused by the making of necessary repairs to bridges and the relaying of dismantled track, the train, without further molestation, proceeded to Granada, where Major Butler called for the surrender of and received all railroad property held by the rebels in that vicinity.

Not only did Major Butler's command succeed in opening and maintaining communication by rail with Granada, but it ef-

fecting a disarming of rebel forces in that vicinity and the turning over of the city to Federal authorities; and the various duties, both civil and military, required of Major Butler on this occasion were performed by him in a most creditable manner.

At 4.00 P.M., September 21st Rear Admiral Southerland reported to the Navy Department:

"Butler's force and Red Cross Stores reached Granada yesterday afternoon safely."

On September 22nd, Rear Admiral Southerland reported to the Navy Department:

"Butler entered Granada at 7 o'clock A.M., this morning, encamped near railway station. All his demands acceded to. Railroad property and all steamers turned over except *Victoria* which is not there. She will be delivered up upon her return. All quiet in Granada."

At about 1.00 A.M., September 25th, Mena surrendered and he was sent on to Panama. On this same date the *Victoria* was turned over and Lieutenant Campbell with his company of Bluejackets was placed in charge of this vessel and the *Ninety-three*.

HUMANE TERMS OFFERED ZELEDON

The Naval Forces now held all important points between Granada and Corinto except Masaya and Leon and, in order to insure the security of the several commands and to assist in restoring harmonious conditions, it appeared necessary that control of these localities be obtained.

On October 1, 1912, Rear Admiral Southerland reported to the Secretary of the Navy:

Government forces won victory over rebels near La Paz today. Force of *Colorado* Bluejackets under Lieutenant Wallace in immediate neighborhood at the time with force of Marines under Major McKelvy nearby. The President of Nicaragua has offered humane terms to Zeledon if he surrenders. If he refuses these terms Marines and Bluejackets will storm the Barranca Thursday morning.

In another message on this date Rear Admiral Southerland outlined a general plan to the Secretary of the Navy. This plan called for the occupation by Lieutenant Colonel Long of Leon,

the occupation by Bluejackets of "every railroad town from Quezalguaque to the sea at Corinto. After that simply in order to make a reconnoissance of that section of country and to give a visible evidence of the Power of the United States Government I shall send a mounted force of two hundred and fifty Marines and Bluejackets under Pendleton to penetrate as far inland as Matagalpa and to take about one week to make the trip and return."

REBELS REJECT ULTIMATUM

On October 2nd Colonel Pendleton issued an ultimatum to "General B. F. Zeledon" including the evacuation of the Barranca, Coyotepe and Masaya, which Zeledon in polite words rejected.

On October 3, 1912, Rear Admiral Southerland reported to the Secretary of the Navy:

Zeledon has refused the terms of surrender offered by President of Nicaragua although he has only about eight hundred men against the Government's surrounding force of over three thousand. The Barranca is one of two hills between which the railroad passes and completely controls and menaces the railroad, both hills being fortified. * * * I am demanding that Zeledon vacate his position by eight o'clock tomorrow morning. If he does not comply with this demand, it will be enforced by our Marines and Bluejackets, of whom Pendleton has about five hundred in position on the Managua side of the Barranca and Butler about four hundred in position on the Granada side.

In consequence of the refusal of the rebel forces to surrender and evacuate strongly fortified positions on Coyotepe and Barranca, in the immediate vicinity of Masaya, which, as long as they were held by the rebel forces prevented uninterrupted railroad traffic, and were a source of constant danger, an attack by the Naval Forces, under the command of Colonel Pendleton, was made on October 4, 1912. His command consisted of one battalion of Marines commanded by Major Butler; one battalion of Marines commanded by Major William N. McKelvy; one battalion from the U. S. S. *California*, commanded by Lieutenant Commander George W. Steele.

ORDERS TO THIRD BATTALION

Colonel Pendleton, at Nindiri, at 3.15 P.M., October 3rd, issued the following orders to Major Butler:

MAJOR BUTLER,

Confirming telephone message. Get into position tonight as secretly as possible on east southeast slopes of Coyotepe, near General Seanzs' forces, and as near the summit as possible without discovery. Begin your advance to the attack of the Coyotepe at 5.15 A.M. tomorrow morning, October 4, 1912. The attack will be simultaneous on the eastern quadrant of the hill by the Federal forces and ours. My understanding of the attacking column is Colonel Gracia, from the northeast; Colonel Pendleton, from the east; General Cruz, from east by south; Major Butler, from east southeast; Seanzs from east by south to south. My guns will fire an occasional shot until about 3.00 A.M. on Barranca and well down on slopes of Coyotepe—west side. After we have taken Coyotepe and cleared off Barranca, a force will advance (Federals) through railroad cut to attack Masaya. Admiral wishes all the best of luck. Hoping to see you on Coyotepe.

Sincerely,

PENDLETON.

THE ATTACK ON COYOTEPE

Colonel Pendleton, in his report dated October 11, 1912, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, described the capture of Coyotepe, in the following words:

The Commander-in-Chief, arriving from Managua, arrangements were at once entered into for the unconditional surrender of General Mena and his army and munitions of war to the Commander-in-Chief, which was concluded by midnight of the 24th-25th. Upon conclusion, General Mena—early morn 26th—was taken from the San Francisco church by our forces, placed in a paymaster's car of the railroad company, together with his son and one servant, he was conducted to Corinto, where he arrived on the evening of the 26th and placed on board ship for transportation to Panama, with a solemn promise never again to come to Nicaragua. The rebels throughout the route from Granada to Corinto did not seem to believe that he had surrendered, though the leaders well knew it.

Headquarters, and First Battalion moved by the same train from Granada to Managua which bore Mena and his personal staff. Upon receipt of orders to clear the railroad of all troops occupying menacing positions, Regimental Headquarters and First Battalion left Camp Weitzel, Managua, at 2.25 P.M., Wednesday, October 2nd, plans having been made for the coöperation of Major Butler and the Third Battalion to arrive from the southeast in an attack, if necessary, on Coyotepe and the Barranca. The First Battalion was augmented by two 3" field pieces, under command of Captain Underwood, from Leon, and further, by two companies of sailors from Camp Weitzel, under command of Lieutenant Steele. On arrival at Campuzano, word was sent by the Regimental Commander, Colonel Pendleton, at 4.50 P.M., advising Zeledon as to the declared policy of the United States to open, operate and maintain the railroad, and telegraph communications from Corinto to Granada,

that his positions at Coyotepe and the Barranca were a menace to this plan, and unless by 8 A.M., October 3rd, he evacuated these positions and surrendered himself and army, displaying white flags conspicuously on the two positions, where they would be observed from all sides, march his army to Nindiri station, laid down his arms and surrendered unconditionally, he would be attacked with all our forces and destroyed or driven from his positions; that no application, commission or suggestion as to other terms would be entertained by us. A flag of truce with a letter from Zeledon arrived at 6.30 on the morning of the 3rd, protesting against our demands, and stating that he would not accede to them, but would fight us, if we persisted in assaulting, with all the spirit and dignity and honor of Nicaragua. Promptly at 8.00 A.M. firing was opened by Butler from the southeast, with three field guns, and by Underwood's battery from the northwest with two 3" field guns, at ranges varying in the case of both batteries from 1500 to 2500 yards, with considerable damage to the enemy's earthworks and redoubts on both the Barranca and Coyotepe. On the morning of the 4th, at 2.00 A.M., the First Battalion and the sailor battalion marched from the railroad, along the sunken road around to the flank (east of Coyotepe) where it was to be assisted by two Federal columns, one on our right and one on the left, in the assault on that position. Junction was effected at 5.00 P.M. with Major Butler. The first battalion held the center in the advance on Coyotepe, the two companies of sailors held the right, and Major Butler's battalion the left of the line. The Federals did not materialize, but formed about a mile and a half away, on the east flank of the city of Masaya. Our troops were in position promptly, and began the advance on Coyotepe at 5.18 A.M., and after a spirited assault in thirty-seven minutes captured the position and placed upon it the American flag, drove out Zeledon's forces from Coyotepe, the line of trenches and gun positions connecting it along the ridge to the Barranca, and from the Barranca. The rebels lost about sixty men killed, and fifteen or twenty wounded. Fifteen prisoners were taken, and the rest of the force escaped by fleeing to the westward. Upon the breaking of the American Flag on the Coyotepe, the Federal forces almost completely surrounded Masaya, burst into loud, prolonged cheers, and immediately began the assault, evidently much inspired by our success, as they generally believed that Coyotepe and the Barranca were impregnable. Company C, First Battalion, having been in the van during the engagement, and having encountered the most casualties, was given the honor of placing the flag on the Barranca, and marched out to that duty with colors flying and bugles playing—cheers were plentiful.

Immediately after the clearing of these positions by our troops, the Federal reserve, under General Corea, the vice-president of the country, and General Balanos-Chamorro, advanced from the village Nindiri through the railroad cut to attack the city of Masaya from the north. The fighting was mostly in the streets of the city, the Federals fighting their way through to the big stone church in which Zeledon had taken refuge. Zeledon evidently left the church and the city of Masaya in an effort to escape the Federals, for refuge in Costa Rica. He was later in the day, about 1 P.M., captured about fifteen miles from the city, near a village called Diriamba, with several

of the generals. He was taken to Catarina mortally wounded and died within a few hours after arrival there.

In connection with this action at Coyotepe, I would say that all officers and men participating, did so with willingness and steadiness, and carried out the plans to the letter. It is therefore impossible to refer to any individual instances of extraordinary display of courage in the face of the enemy. All have been thanked and congratulated by the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief in the theater of operations.

The officers and organization composing the force were as per attached list.

One very noticeable point which I wish to invite particular attention to is the harmony and comradeship which has existed during all this time between the Bluejackets and the Marines.

They have worked together in perfect accord, with a friendly spirit of emulation, and without a shadow of discord. They have shown an equal spirit of cheerful acceptance of discomforts and hardships and an equal spirit of readiness, of eagerness, to face the dangers of the campaign.

The following list was attached to Colonel Pendleton's report:

OFFICERS AND TROOPS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ASSAULT ON COYOTEPE AND THE
BARRANCA, OCTOBER 4, 1912

Regimental Headquarters

Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, Commanding.
Captain Harry Lee, Regimental Adjutant.
Surgeon Robert E. Hoyt, Regimental Surgeon.
Pay Inspector Thomas H. Hicks, Aide de Camp.
Captain Russell B. Putnam, Regimental Paymaster.

First Battalion

Major William McKelvy, Commanding.
First Lieutenant Emile P. Moses, Adjutant.
Passed Assistant Surgeon Fletcher H. Brooks, Surgeon.
Captain Edward A. Greene, Commanding Company "A."
Captain Robert Y. Rhea, Commanding Company "B."
Captain Eugene P. Fortson, Commanding Company "C."
Captain Howard H. Kipp, Commanding Company "D."
First Lieutenant Henry M. Butler, Company "A."
First Lieutenant William A. McNeil, Company "B."
First Lieutenant Thomas E. Thrasher, Jr., Company "D."
Second Lieutenant Alfred M. Robbins, Company "A."
Second Lieutenant Robert W. Voeth, Company "B."
Second Lieutenant George W. Martin, Company "C."
Second Lieutenant Charles A. E. King, Company "D."

Second Battalion (Artillery Company)

Captain Robert O. Underwood, Commanding Company "E."
Second Lieutenant Robert E. Messersmith, Company "E."
Second Lieutenant Roy S. Geiger, Company "E."

Third Battalion

Major Smedley D. Butler, Commanding.
First Lieutenant Edward A. Ostermann, Adjutant.
Passed Assistant Surgeon Benjamin H. Dorsey, Surgeon.
Captain John C. Beaumont, Commanding Company "A."
Captain Nelson P. Vulte, Commanding Company "B."
First Lieutenant Edward H. Conger, Commanding Company "C."
First Lieutenant Harold F. Wirgman, Company "A."
Second Lieutenant George C. DeNeale, Company "A."
Second Lieutenant Alexander A. Vandegrift, Company "B."
Second Lieutenant Richard H. Tebbs, Jr., Company "B."
Second Lieutenant Arthur J. White, Company "C."

Fourth Battalion (U. S. S. California)

Lieutenant Commander George W. Steele, Jr., Commanding.
Ensign Francis G. Marsh, Adjutant.
Lieutenant (jg) John M. Schelling, Commanding First Company.
Ensign Kinchen L. Hill, Commanding Third Company.
Ensign Daniel J. Callaghan, Junior Officer First Company.
Ensign Beriah M. Thompson, Junior Officer First Company.
Ensign Robert H. Skelton, Junior Officer Third Company.
Ensign Stanley G. Womble, Junior Officer Third Company.

Major McKelvy, commanding the First Battalion, included the following in his report dated November 15, 1912, to the Regimental Commander:

5. With first battalion left Camp Weitzel on October 2nd, and proceeded by train to Campuzano. Went into bivouac under Colonel Pendleton at 4.00 P.M. At 7.30 P.M. with first battalion proceeded to Nindiri, where quarters were obtained. At 4.00 A.M., October 3rd, 1912, left Nindiri and took position before Barranca, the rebel's fortified hill. With machine guns and sharpshooters, under First Lieutenant H. M. Butler, U. S. M. C., fired on exposed bodies of the enemy during the day. At 6.30 P.M. left position with exception of eight sharpshooters, who remained in pits. The first battalion, with one Colt's gun crew of sailors from U. S. S. *California*, proceeded to railroad track near Nindiri, where it went into bivouac. At 2.00 A.M. left position and under Colonel J. H. Pendleton, U. S. M. C., proceeded to position before Coyotepe, rebel fortified position. At 5.18 A.M. attacked and took

enemy's position. Left Coyotepe at 1.00 P.M., October 4th, and went by train to Managua, thence to Camp Weitzel. Company "A," under Captain E. A. Greene, U. S. M. C., left at Masaya to preserve order.

Major Butler, commanding the Third Battalion, on November 15, 1912, reported as follows to the Regimental Commander:

On October 2nd, at 10.00 A.M., Companies "A," "C," and the sailor company left for Masaya. On October 3rd, Company "A" and a detail of sailors from the U. S. S. *California* with their 3" field gun bombarded Coyotepe hill. Firing lasted from 8 A.M. to about 11.30 A.M.

About 5 P.M. that same date the battalion left the train with a suitable guard, and marched around the federal lines to a point to the eastward of Coyotepe hill, assigned in orders received that day from Colonel Pendleton. At 3.40 A.M., on October 4th, the battalion moved forward on Coyotepe hill, joining Colonel Pendleton and the first battalion at 5.15 A.M., when the assault was commenced immediately and the position carried. After the taking of Masaya the battalion returned to Granada. Company "B" was sent that afternoon to Masaya to preserve order. On October 5th, Company "A" and the sailor company, Captain J. C. Beaumont, commanding the detachment, left for station in Managua.

It is believed that special mention should be made here of the bravery of Private Charlie H. Durham. During the assault on Coyotepe on October 4, 1912, the attacking party encountered barbed wire fences and entanglements within about fifty yards of the rebel position. Reports show that Private Durham, regardless of the danger to which he was exposed, succeeded, under a heavy fire, in cutting the wire obstructions. While performing this duty he was killed by a shell from the rebel lines, and though he sacrificed his own life, he made it possible for our forces to advance and gain the enemy's position with but few casualties.

Rear Admiral Southerland on October 4, 1912, at noon, reported as follows to the Navy Department:

The Barranca and second hill [Coyotepe] were taken by Marines and Bluejackets at daybreak this morning after a most gallant assault lasting thirty-seven minutes. Masaya was later taken by the Government forces and the railroad between Managua and Granada is now absolutely safe and the starving inhabitants of Masaya will be relieved. The insurrectionists' casualties were very heavy. It is with heartfelt sorrow that I have to announce the following American casualties: * * *

Lieutenant Colonel Long will now be given a force of twelve hundred men at Leon, consisting of the First and Second Battalions of Marines and the entire Bluejacket companies of *California* and *Colorado*. * * *

Rear Admiral Southerland reported to the Navy Department at 7.00 P.M., on October 4, 1912, as follows:

Marines and Bluejackets stormed the second hill [Coyotepe], the higher one of the two, at daybreak this morning, and after reaching the summit dislodged rebels from second hill, killing over forty, seriously wounding about twenty and capturing about fourteen. Our loss was as stated in my noon despatch. Rebel loss would have been greater had they not deserted their extremely strong position and ran to the town of Masaya, when the Government troops met them and after serious fighting killed, wounded or captured nearly all of them. There were about five hundred and fifty rebels very strongly intrenched on the two hills. The Government forces lost two hundred dead in Masaya. Zeledon is supposed to have deserted his forces, prior to our attack, accompanied by over twenty of his generals. These were captured by a Government force about 1 P.M. today, Zeledon shortly after dying of his wounds. One company of Marines in Masaya tonight to preserve law and order and to prevent brutal reprisals. * * * The Department and the Country have every reason to be proud of the officers, Marines, and Bluejackets who were engaged in this action today.

The Secretary of the Navy in his Annual Report dated November 20, 1912, wrote, in part, as follows:

Unfortunately it became necessary to use armed force in order to dislodge a band of revolutionists from the Barranca, a fortified position consisting of two hills [Coyotepe and Barranca] near Masaya, between which the railroad passes, and from which the revolutionists controlled and threatened the railroad and held Masaya in a state of pitiable destitution. A short but gallant assault succeeded in overcoming the resistance; in the assault four of our men were killed and five wounded. This occurred on October 4th, and on the same day five Marines were slightly wounded in a skirmish at Chichigalpa. On October 6th, while an American detachment was entering Leon to occupy the town, some resistance was encountered, and our loss amounted to three killed and three wounded.

The loss of seven killed is most deplorable, but the operations in which these lives were sacrificed were necessary in fulfilling the very evident obligations of this Government, and it is doubtful if the results in the interest of humanity could otherwise have been obtained. With the surrender of General Mena to Rear Admiral Southerland and his deportation from the country, followed by the death of General Zeledon, the revolutionary movement quickly subsided, and by the latter part of October practically normal conditions obtained throughout the country, although it was deemed prudent by our Government to keep a considerable force ashore at various important centers until after the presidential elections in Nicaragua in November.

The department feels gratified over the success attending this carefully planned campaign, and has noted with pleasure that the forces of the Navy

and Marine Corps engaged in these operations ashore, under frequently very trying conditions, have by their conduct lived up to the best traditions of the Naval Service.

The General Board of the Navy (published on page 38 of Secretary of Navy's Annual Report, 1913) had the following to say of this operation:

The most notable event during the campaign was the assault and capture of Coyotepe, resulting in entirely crushing the revolution and restoring peace to Nicaragua; this assault lasting thirty-seven minutes under heavy fire from the rebel forces before the position, which was considered impregnable by the Federal forces, could be taken.

During these operations one enlisted man [Navy] was killed and several wounded.

A most commendable feature during the campaign was the perfect harmony and comradeship which existed between the enlisted men and Marines. They worked together in perfect accord under trying hardships and showed an equal spirit of eagerness and readiness to face the dangers before them.

Rear Admiral Southerland on October 5, 1912, reported to the Navy Department:

The Barranca [and Coyotepe] has heretofore been considered impregnable through Central America, and its capture by American Marines and Blue-jackets will have a good effect.

In this connection it is of interest to know that up to a short time prior to the assault on October 4th, all Americans believed that the Barranca had been thoroughly organized for defense and that Coyotepe, which commanded the Barranca, had not been. The true state of affairs was discovered when Major Butler's battalion, about the middle of September, passed between the hills prior to the occupation of Granada. Mr. Ignatius O'Reardon, who was familiar with the country, proved of great assistance during this period.

SKIRMISH AT CHICHIGALPA

In a report to the Navy Department dated October 5, 1912, Rear Admiral Southerland, in the following words described a skirmish which occurred at Chichigalpa on October 4, 1912:

Friday, 9.00 P.M., Managua. Lieutenant Earl C. Long, Marine Corps, stationed at Chichigalpa, in command *Denver's* Marines, in attempting to seize arms and some dynamite bombs early this morning was closed in on by a considerable mob of rebel soldiers and others armed with rifles and

machetes. Several rebels disregarding the orders of their officers fired upon our Marines, which fire was promptly returned, and a skirmish ensued, during which thirteen rebels were killed and quite a number wounded, and five of our men slightly wounded. I am informed that wounded will all recover. Lieutenant Long and force obtained possession of four dynamite bombs, which it is reasonable to believe were intended for use either against the railroad or our force.

CAPTURE OF LEON

Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long reported to the Commander-in-Chief from Leon, on October 22, 1912, as follows:

1. During several days previous to October 6, 1912, the situation here was growing very acute, and it was reported to me several times that it was doubtful if the rebel leaders could control their troops in case of any drunkenness of troops or other disturbances in the city of Leon. Foreigners had asked me if they would be given protection to their lives and property and I informed them that they would.

2. After the defeat of the rebels at La Paz on October 1st and the fall of Coyotepe and Masaya on October 4th, it was reported that the rebel soldiers were suspicious of their leaders, and by this time most of the Liberals here were convinced that it would be useless to fight any longer and they were looking for terms for surrender of Leon to the U. S. forces. They feared very much the occupation of this city by Federal troops. Up to this date I was still treating the rebels as neutrals and simply guarding the railroad and telegraph lines and preventing all disturbances and fighting in the vicinity of the railroad from Leon to La Paz. On the fifth it was noticed that rebel soldiers were getting restless in Leon and in the vicinity of Camp Pendleton and there was considerable discharging of rifles.

3. By the morning of October 6th my command had been increased by the arrival from Coyotepe of Company "E"; by the First Battalion less Company "A" and by the *California* Battalion less one company. Company "A" and *California* company arrived about noon. On the afternoon of October 6th the forces under my command consisted of the First and Second Battalions of Marines; Marine Battalion, Pacific Fleet; *Colorado* Battalion of Bluejackets; and *California* Battalion of Bluejackets; total force about 1300 officers and men.

4. The guard at the railroad station on the morning of October 6th consisted of one company of Marines with two machine guns. During the forenoon of October 6th the Marine Battalion, Pacific Fleet, under Major Charles S. Hill, U. S. M. C., was sent to a position about 600 yards north of railroad station near railroad. This placed them near and opposite the northeast section of the town. The balance of the command was held near Camp Pendleton.

5. In case it became necessary to occupy the city, expecting little opposition from outside, I had decided to enter from the east side with main force; to

move *Colorado* Battalion along south side toward Guadalupe Church, occupying same with one company and then the rest of the Battalion proceed to Subtiaba Church at west end of city. The artillery company was to take position near camp to shell fort and cathedral if necessary, and the *California* Battalion less one company was to occupy rebel position south and east of camp and to seize and hold pumping station and reservoir. Company "F" was to proceed though city east of railroad and reinforce railroad station. One company of *California* Battalion was to follow Company "F" as a reserve for east section of town. This general plan was followed on our entrance into the city on the afternoon of October 6th.

6. At about 9.00 A.M., October 6, 1912, four commissioners—Messrs. Pedro Gonsales, Sebastian Salinas, General Fernando (Jose) Rivas and Frank May—called on me at Camp Pendleton to negotiate for the delivery of the city of Leon to the United States forces. A copy of their authority to act, signed by Leonardo Arguello, the Revolutionary Executive Delegate, is attached marked "A." After a conference with the above-mentioned commissioners and with my Battalion Commanders, I entered into an agreement with them, copy attached signed by myself and commissioners marked "B," also copy of the acceptance of said agreement signed by the Executive Delegate on behalf of himself and the rebel leaders, marked "C." Dr. Salinas presented a letter from President Diaz granting leaders amnesty under conditions similar to those imposed by me.

7. It was reported about noon that the soldiers were getting drunk in town and starting to loot; a fire was seen in town about this time. At about 2.00 P.M. this command was ready to move and shortly before this time the rebel leaders reported that some of the soldiers were drunk and that they might not be able to get the machine guns to the station, but they had sent men to get control of the guns and requested that our troops occupy the city. In view of the disturbed conditions in the city and the possibility of our having to enter at night when our forces would be placed at much disadvantage, I decided that an immediate occupation of the city was necessary and at 2.45 P.M. ordered the advance into the city. I accompanied the First Battalion. The reports of the battalion commanders are hereto attached marked D, E, F, G and H, and these reports are approved.

8. By 6.00 P.M. all important points in the city had been occupied, including the Cathedral, Guadalupe Church, Subtiaba Church and Cuartel, Comandancia, Police Station, Cuartels, Railroad Station, San Juan and Hermitage Churches in northeast section, reservoir, and pumping station and rebel trenches and outpost to east and south of camp. Orders were issued to hold these points for the night and to establish outposts and patrols. The city was lighted by regular city men under our guards.

9. The behavior of officers and men was excellent at all times and reflects great credit to the organizations to which they belong and the handling of the battalions by their commanders was all that could be expected, especially as troops had to be moved through a city with which all were little familiar.

I cannot too highly commend the work done by officers and men. Our casualties were three killed and four wounded as indicated in the reports of the battalion commanders.

10. Four rebel leaders met the head of the First Battalion and accompanied it part way into the city and then two of these leaders went with Major Hill's battalion. I remained with First Battalion until 6.15 P.M., when I joined Second Battalion.

Battalion Headquarters were established as follows:

First Battalion Marines: Police Station.

Second Battalion Marines: Railroad Station.

Colorado Battalion Bluejackets: Subtiaba Church.

Pacific Fleet Battalion Marines: 600 yards north of railroad station.

California Battalion Bluejackets and Company E of Second Battalion: Camp Pendleton.

P. A. Surgeon, William N. McDonnell, U. S. Navy, senior medical officer, of the Hospital Corps attached, established a receiving hospital in car at railroad station, where all wounded were cared for on evening of October 6th. Medical Officers were attached to First, *Colorado*, and Second Battalions with hospital corps men distributed with all companies. A dressing station was established in Commandancia, P. A. Surgeon Fletcher H. Brooks, U. S. N., First Battalion, in charge.

The work of the Hospital Corps was excellent.

11. On the morning of October 7, 1912, a detachment of three squads from Company "F," under First Lieutenant Russell H. Davis, U. S. M. C., proceeded to the fort and occupied same. No troops were found there. The U. S. flag was raised over the fort. Four rebel leaders accompanied and proceeded this detachment to avoid any chance of our troops being fired upon. The city was divided into districts, necessary guards and patrols established, and was placed under martial law.

12. Members of my staff, First Lieutenant William C. Powers, Jr., U. S. M. C., Adjutant, Ensign John C. Thom, U. S. N., Signal Officer and Aide, and Gunnery Sergeant John F. Burnes, acting Sergeant Major, performed their duties in a highly creditable manner. On the evening of the 7th, one or two revolver shots were reported, otherwise the city was quiet and has remained so since that date.

13. Federal troops were outside the city some miles distant on October 6th and at various times since then, but I have always informed them that I would not permit their entrance into Leon nor their approach closer than a two-mile limit.

14. The sale of alcoholic liquors was prohibited and other regulations issued for the proper guidance of the inhabitants. The carrying of firearms by other than the U. S. Forces was also prohibited. No records or papers of any importance were found that belonged to the rebels, almost all records having been destroyed.

Rear Admiral Southerland on October 7, 1912, reported to Navy Department as follows:

I have just been informed by Lieutenant Colonel Long over the telephone that the Marines and Bluejackets under his command had entered Leon yesterday afternoon about three o'clock after arrangements with rebel leaders, who agreed to turn over the city. Some resistance was encountered from an organized drunken rebel band which resulted in the killing of three Americans and the wounding of three others. The killed were as follows: Morgan, turret captain, *Colorado*; Burgess, ordinary seaman, *Colorado*; Bartel, private, Company D. The wounded were Kittsmiller, private, *Colorado*, seriously; Lamper, ordinary seaman, *Colorado*, seriously; Balter, trumpeter, Company D, slightly. These men and the dead were all stricken down in action while serving under the flag. Today the city of Leon, including the plaza, cathedral and fort are in possession of Lieutenant Colonel Long and his forces, who will see that its nearly forty thousand inhabitants are protected. In the resistance above referred to about fifty of the rebels were killed by our Marines and Bluejackets. All is now quiet in Leon. The credit for this successful termination of a most critical condition is principally due to the firmness, good judgment, ability and tact of Lieutenant Colonel Long during the month he has had charge of the situation at that place. The railroad is now safe from Corinto to Granada, and peace will prevail in this country within less than a week. I shall now go to Leon and probably to Corinto by the end of the week to reconnoiter. More complete details later.

The Acting Secretary of the Navy on October 9, 1912, sent the following message to Rear Admiral Southerland:

Referring to your October 7th, 2 P.M., Department is gratified to learn of the occupation of Leon and the near approach of a conclusion of Nicaragua's troubles. It deeply regrets the loss of life and earnestly hopes for recovery of wounded.

THE MATAGALPA EXPEDITION

In obedience to orders issued by Rear Admiral Southerland, a mounted expedition of seven officers, twenty-five Marines, nine Bluejackets, and two American civilians, was assembled at La Paz Viejo, on October 18, 1912. The naval personnel was gathered from Granada, Managua, and Leon, and all three battalions of the regiment were represented. The expedition was commanded by Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, and the following officers and civilians formed a part of it: Major Smedley D. Butler, Pay Inspector Thomas H. Hicks, Second Lieutenants Alfred McC. Robbins, Roy S. Geiger, George C. DeNeale, Ensign Harold C. Train, Mr. Ignatius O'Reardon and Mr. J. A. Willey. Colonels Diaz and Vargas, of the Nicaragua Forces, and six native packers also accompanied the expedition.

The riding and pack animals were furnished by the Nicaraguan

government, and were in very poor condition, having been used by the Nicaraguan troops during the operations.

Rear Admiral Southerland on October 19th, reported as follows to the Navy Department:

A force of mounted Marines and Bluejackets under command of Colonel J. H. Pendleton, U. S. M. C., left on 19th from La Paz for Matagalpa, mounted at the expense of the Nicaraguan Government. Imposed no limits of time for his return, as so much important information will be forwarded; road is impassable from Leon, owing to torrential rains.

The start from Matagalpa was made at 12.30 P.M., Saturday, October 19, 1912, and the first day's march of twenty-one miles ended at 6.30 P.M., at Santa Rosa, where the party camped for the night. Leaving Santa Rosa at 8.30 A.M. the next day, Panama was reached, after a twenty-five mile hike, at 6.00 P.M.

Fresh animals met the expedition at Panama, having been sent by the residents of Matagalpa, which was very fortunate, as most of the animals furnished by the Nicaraguan Government were in such poor condition that they could not have completed the trip. Mules were also sent by Jefe Politico of Jenatega, but as they were not needed they were sent on to Matagalpa for use on the return march.

At 7.10 A.M., the 21st, the expedition left Panama and reached Real de la Cruz, a distance of seventeen miles, at 11.45 A.M. A fine stream of water near the camp at this town afforded an opportunity for bathing and swimming, of which advantage was taken. Starting at 7.45 A.M., the 22nd, from Real de la Cruz, a fourteen-mile hike brought the party to Sebaco by 11.00 A.M., and after a rest of an hour and a quarter left that village for Matagalpa, nineteen miles further on, which was reached at 4.45 P.M.

Colonel Pendleton's party was met outside the town by the Jefe Politico and about seventy Americans and other residents, all mounted; and after a most enthusiastic and cordial reception they escorted the visitors into the town. Colonel Pendleton's report contained the following:

On entering the town the Nicaraguan flag was carried by a squad of Nicaraguan soldiers at the head of the escort. Our flag was carried at the head of the American column by Sergeant Edward Townsend, with a color guard consisting of Private John Kreager of the Third Battalion, U. S. Marines and Seaman Dick Neubauer of the *California*.

Rear Admiral Southerland, on October 25, reported as follows to the Navy Department:

Colonel Pendleton received most enthusiastic welcome at Matagalpa, a large mounted party of officials and foreigners meeting him some distance away and escorting him into city; general effect of the expedition will be excellent.

The Jefe Politico called on Colonel Pendleton and offered every courtesy, and the officials furnished the party with beef, water and firewood, positively refusing to accept any compensation. During the stay at Matagalpa the visitors visited the Leonese Mine, owned largely by Americans, British and Australians, inspected the large coffee plantations, were lavishly entertained in various ways, including a large reception and ball, horse racing, etc.

The expedition left Matagalpa on the return trip at 9.30 A.M., Monday, October 28, 1912, and spent that night at Sebaco. Matapa was reached the next day. Owing to the rainy weather making the trails impassable, Colonel Pendleton decided to change his route and go by the San Francisco trail, which passed over the mountains 2800 feet, and thence by steamer to Managua. At 1.45 P.M., the 30th, Trujillo was reached and San Francisco the next day. The *Managua*, a wood-burning steamer, carried the expedition from this town to Managua, where it arrived at 11.00 A.M., November 1, 1912.

Colonel Pendleton concluded his report dated November 2, 1912, to the Commander-in-Chief, with this paragraph:

I wish to add a word of commendation for all the officers and men engaged on this expedition, their cheerful demeanor under trying circumstances was most noticeable, and their readiness and adaptability would astonish anyone who had not learned by years of experience and association the remarkable characteristics of the American military men, particularly those of the Navy and the Marine Corps. They all fully deserve the confidence that the Commander-in-Chief reposed in them when he planned this expedition, the first of its kind in the history of this country.

Rear Admiral Southerland, on November 1, 1912, reported as follows to the Navy Department:

Colonel J. H. Pendleton's expedition returned today *via* San Francisco and Lake Managua had the most excellent effect. After the revolution terminated, it became evident that this and similar expeditions to other prominent places would prove the most practicable method of paving the way to permanently peaceful conditions in this country.

EXPEDITION TO JINOTEPE AND DIRIAMBA

Complying with orders of the Commander-in-Chief, an expedition under command of Major William N. McKelvy, consisting of Captain Edward Greene, First Lieutenant William A. McNeil, P. A. Surgeon Fletcher A. Brooks, forty-five Marines and one Blue-jacket, left Leon at 10.40 A.M., October 30, 1912, by train for Jinotepe and Diriamba. Passing through Managua the expedition arrived at Masaya at about 8.00 P.M., the 30th.

A delay was caused by lack of wood for the engines, but the party finally left Masaya at 5.30 P.M., the 31st. That night was spent at Masatepe. Masatepe was left at 9.30 A.M., November 1st and Jinotepe entered at 12.15 P.M. Major McKelvy then proceeded to Diriamba with a part of his detachment, where he arrived at 12.50 P.M., the 1st. The party left Diriamba at 11.45 A.M., the 3d, arrived at Jinotepe at noon, where it was joined by the detachment it had left there. The entire expedition left Jinotepe at 12.50 P.M., arriving at Masaya at 2.00 P.M., and reached Leon at 5.00 A.M., November 4, 1912.

The Commander-in-Chief on October 30th reported to the Navy Department as follows:

Expedition of Marines under Major McKelvy leaves for the reconnoissance of Jinotepe and Diriamba District today. Will have very good effect.

ALL BUT ONE BATTALION WITHDRAWN

Rear Admiral Southerland, on November 12th, reported to the Navy Department as follows:

I believe, in view of the previous condition, the extremely bitter feeling existing in both parties, and the necessity for a visible assurance of protection to foreigners and property, that last battalion of Marines should remain until recently elected Government has demonstrated ability to hold out.

As President is able man and is concentrating all arms and ammunition in Managua, where we have a force of Marines, the chances are in favor of his success (but I do not believe the last battalion can be withdrawn with safety within 120 days at least, and even then it may be found desirable to keep a Legation Guard at Managua).

Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long, on November 26, 1912, reported as follows to the Major General Commandant:

1. Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding First Provisional Regiment, Nicaragua, sailed on November 21, 1912, for Panama with the First and Third Battalions, leaving the Second Battalion under my command for duty in Nicaragua.

2. The command is distributed as follows: Headquarters and Companies F and G at Leon. Company E at Managua. Small detachments Companies E and F at Chinandega and Chichigalpa, respectively.

3. The command is quartered in suitable buildings and the health is good.

LEGATION GUARD FORMED

On December 9, 1912, the Senior Naval Officer present informed the Navy Department as follows:

I recommend, if conditions in Nicaragua remain as at present, Marines to be withdrawn about January 15, 1913, retaining at Managua 50 Marines, temporarily as Legation Guard, attached to the Station Ship at Corinto. Long concurs.

On January 21, 1913, Lieutenant Colonel Long reported to the Navy Department as follows:

On January 4, 1913, I received orders by cable for the formation of detachment of four officers and 101 enlisted men to remain in Managua as a Legation Guard, and on January 9th this detachment was formed, Captain Edward A. Greene, U. S. M. C., in command. On January 14th orders for the sailing of the *Buffalo* with the balance of my command were received. Two detachments of eighty and fifty men having proceeded to Corinto on January 10th and 14th, respectively, the balance of the battalion entrained at Leon the morning of the 16th instant, and left that city at 8.20 A.M. At 2.30 P.M. on that date all men and stores were on board the *Buffalo*. The Marine Detachment of the *Buffalo* proceeded the same afternoon to Leon, where quarters had been retained for them. Ten men of the Legation Guard, who are familiar with the city and people, remain in Leon on duty with *Buffalo* Detachment for the present.

The Marine Detachment, American Legation, is quartered in *Campo de Marte*, a government reservation on the southern edge of the city of Managua. A few men are in tents; all are comfortably housed. Their situation is entirely satisfactory from sanitary and military points of view.

The following officers have commanded the Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua: Captain Edward A. Greene, Captain Presley M. Rixey, Captain Hamilton D. South, Captain William S. Harrison, Major James L. Underhill and Major Wilbur Thing.

CASUALTIES

The following were killed on October 4, 1912, at Coyotepe: Privates Ralph Victor Bobbett, Charlie Hays Durham, Clearance Henry McGill and Harry Pollard. Private John Bartels was killed at Leon on October 6, 1912.

The following were wounded at Coyotepe on October 4, 1912: Second Lieutenant George W. Martin, Sergeant Arnold P. Sherburne, Privates Bertram W. Bear, Alfred Lunder, Earl Roth and William Harvey.

The following were wounded at Chichigalpa on October 4, 1912. Sergeant James Smith, Corporal Otto Clement and Private Howard Hudson and Frank L. Harris.

The following were wounded at Leon on October 6, 1912: Private Frank Kittsmiller and Trumpeter Louis Balter.

The following were wounded at Masaya on September 19, 1912: Corporal Joseph J. Bourne, Privates Clive P. Browne, Ray Betzer and Trumpeter W. M. Brown.

Several Bluejackets were also killed or wounded.

COMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT

On October 6, 1912, the following message was received by Rear Admiral Southerland from the Navy Department:

"The President directs Navy Department to extend his thanks to the officers and men engaged in action in Nicaragua for their courageous service, and to extend to the wounded his sincere sympathy."

Rear Admiral Southerland returned this message on October 7, 1912.

"The President's message has given deepest pleasure to the officers, Bluejackets and Marines concerned.

In a letter dated December 2, 1912, addressed to Rear Admiral officers, Bluejackets and Marines concerned."

The happy results of the arduous and responsible duty performed, under your direction, by the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps are no doubt gratifying to all participating, but I desire further to express to you, and through you to those engaged in the recent operations in Nicaragua, the Navy Department's sincere appreciation of their work, which is held to indicate a high degree of efficiency, loyalty and readiness for all emergencies.

THE NICARAGUAN CAMPAIGN BADGE

The Nicaraguan Campaign Medal commemorates the naval expedition consisting mostly of Marines, which went to the aid of the Government of Nicaragua in 1912. A short but sharp campaign ensued in which the revolutionary forces were defeated, order was restored, and our troops withdrawn. It was awarded to all officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and Navy who took part in the expedition between August 28, 1912 and November 2, 1912. The obverse shows the Nicaraguan volcano, Mt. Momotombo, rising from Lake Managua behind a tropical forest. (National Geographic Magazine, December, 1919.)

A letter dated September 22, 1913, signed by President Wilson and addressed to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, reads as follows:

I very cheerfully comply with your suggestion that campaign badges similar to those issued to participants in the Cuban, Philippine, and China-Boxer campaigns be authorized as part of the uniforms for those officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps who participated in the Nicaraguan Campaign, August to November, 1912. (See Court-Martial Order No. 268, 1919, pp. 21, 22.)

On June 25, 1914, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels issued the following order:

Nicaraguan Campaign Badges will be issued to all officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps who performed service ashore in Nicaragua under the command of Rear Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, U. S. Navy, or on board the *California*, *Colorado*, *Denver*, *Annapolis*, *Cleveland* or *Glacier*, between the dates of August 28, 1912, to November 2, 1912, inclusive.

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE

(Continued)

BY MAJOR EDWIN N. McCLELLAN, U.S.M.C.

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES

CAMIONS were boarded by this Battalion about 4.30 P.M., July 16th, and the ride began, which ended the next day about noon.

In the afternoon the march began, which was destined to be one of the hardest of our career. The Battalion being commanded by Major Ralph S. Keyser. The 18th Company under Captain Lester S. Wass, the 43rd having Captain Joseph D. Murray, 51st Captain William O. Corbin, and the 55th Lieutenant E. Cook, N. A.

On every road and across fields, as far as the eye could see, were endless streams of infantry, cavalry, artillery, trucks and wagons, and among them many tanks and armored cars. All moving in the same general direction, forward.

It began to rain, and as night came on it brought such darkness that it was impossible to see a foot ahead. On into the Bois de la Retz the Battalion column struggled, falling into ditches, climbing over overturned trucks, the men holding on to each other's rifles or coat tails to keep from getting lost or mixed with other commands.

✓ At 4.35 A.M., the terrific, deafening barrage opened up.

The Battalion rushed on, and by the rear companies double timing through the forest, and amid the enemy's counter barrage, took up positions in the front line. Immediately the signal for attack was given and the companies all went over the top just at 6.00 A.M., the hour set.

The attack went through the barbed wire laced among the heavy trees and underbrush and carried the enemy's front line, amid machine gun fire and heavy shelling. The shells bursting up in the trees causing many of our losses. The secondary positions were taken, along with a great number of prisoners, and the attack clearing the forest followed the barrage on toward the reserve positions.

The 55th Company on the left following the Paris-Maubeuge highway. The 51st Company acting as liaison company with the Ninth Infantry on the right.

Throughout the attack good liaison with the flanks and rear was always most difficult to obtain. In the enormity and swiftness of the attack many of the fine points had been necessarily sacrificed.

Verte Feuille Farm was taken and working in conjunction with the numerous tanks, which crushed most of the machine gun positions, the first objective was gained.

At the cross roads about two kilometers north of Beaurepaire Farm the direction changed to 115°.

Overhead there was enormous aeroplane activity, the enemy succeeding often in bombing and machine-gunning our lines. Behind, our own artillery was continually pushed forward, and many guns could be seen firing from the open fields just passed over. By now enemy artillery positions were being encountered and many guns were captured by this Battalion.

At the ravine running north out of Vauxcastille strong machine gun resistance was met and the Battalion paused while tanks worked around and broke down the opposition. The companies had now become somewhat scattered, due to the resistance met and the speed of the advance, having hit points as far north as Maison Neuve Farm and south as far as Vauxcastille. The Moroccans with whom we had come in contact were doing great work.

Having taken all objectives the Battalion took up a position late in the afternoon in the ravine running northwest out of Vierzy and reorganized.

FROM THE THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES, HISTORY

On July 16th the Battalion embarked in camions at the town of Citry, at 8.00 P.M., and arrived at Morienvall at 9.00 A.M., July 17th, and marched to Bois de Foret Domiale and rested for a few hours. The march was again taken up about 5.00 P.M., in the evening under the most difficult circumstances to the line and took a reserve position in the woods. The Battalion arrived in its reserve position about a half hour late on account of delays encountered along the road. The road was extremely muddy due to the fact that it had been raining all night, and machine

gun companies, ammunition trains, both French and American troops, cavalry and infantry, were lined along the road moving in both directions. The density of the woods added to the darkness of the night to such an extent that it was impossible for one to see the person ahead of him, and the line was being continually broken. Towards daylight the Battalion drew up to where the divisional ration dump was being established and there rested. After a rest of ten minutes Captain Quigley, who was commanding the 45th Company, received word that the line was broken, and that the Battalion had moved forward. This was due to the fact that the men were so tired and sleepy that when the word was passed to fall in, no one heard it. Runners were sent back to the 16th and 47th Companies, which were in the rear of the 45th, to get the companies in motion, and the Battalion moved forward, being led by Captain Quigley, and arrived at its allotted place in reserve after the barrage had been going for half an hour. About 10.00 A.M., Major Shearer sent First Lieutenant R. E. Knapp and the 45th Company up to reinforce the 55th Company of the Second Battalion, in a front line position, west of Vierzy.

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE 18TH

A brief description of the first attack on July 18, 1918, is contained in the History of the Fourth Brigade, reading substantially as follows:

Late during the afternoon of July 17, 1918, orders were received that the Fourth Brigade of Marines would attack at 4.35 A.M. on July 18, 1918. The Fifth Marines were designated to attack, with the Sixth Marines following in support. After considerable difficulty, due to the darkness and the congestion of the road leading through the forest, the Fifth Marines arrived at the jumping-off position.

The Allied artillery preparation had been going on since 4.35 A.M., increasing in intensity until just before the hour set for the attack, which was 6.00 A.M. when the Fifth Marines attacked under a terrific enemy counter-barrage. The advancing waves burst through the barbed-wire interlaced among the trees of the forest and soon carried the enemy's front line. Overhead shrapnel caused most of the losses that day. The secondary positions were speedily taken and many prisoners and much material captured. The First Battalion, Fifth Marines, occupied the extreme left of the Second Division line with the 49th Company in combat liaison with the Moroccan Division of French Colonials on the left. To the right was the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, with the 51st Company acting as liaison company

✓ with the Ninth Infantry of the Third Brigade on the right. The Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, speedily took Verte Feuille Farm and thus gained their first objective.

Here the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion of Marines arrived after an all-night march, having been forced to carry all its guns, ammunition and machine-gun equipment by hand. Companies of the Machine Gun Battalion were assigned their combat missions. At the crossroads two kilometers north of Beaurepaire Farm the attacking waves of Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, changed direction to 115 degrees and soon had carried the advance so far as to reach the artillery positions of the Germans. The troops were continually subjected to machine-gun fire and bombs from enemy planes circling low overhead. At the ravine running north from Vauxcastille strong machine-gun resistance was met and the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, paused while tanks worked around them and broke the opposition. Owing to the rapidity of the advance the companies of the battalion by this time had become somewhat scattered and stretched from Maison Neuve Farm to Vauxcastille. Late in the afternoon the final objective of the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, had been carried and the night was spent in the ravine running northwest from Vierzy. In the meantime, a company of the First Battalion, Fifth Marines, found its left exposed, swerved to the left, and after stiff fighting captured Chaudun. Late in the afternoon of July 18, 1918, a platoon of the 49th Company of the Fifth Marines, three companies of the Third Battalion of the Fifth Marines, and the Eighth Machine Gun Company of the Fifth Marines attacked and captured the town of Vierzy, after which a line was formed extending north from this village. Following the advance of the Fifth Marines, both the Division and Brigade Headquarters had moved forward, the Division being established at Verte Feuille Farm and the Brigade in a cave in Vierzy. In the meantime, the Sixth Marines had followed the attack and advance of the Fifth Marines about three kilometers in rear of the attacking troops.

FROM THE FIFTH REGIMENT HISTORY

A description of the operations of the Fifth Marines in the first attack on July 18, 1918, is given in the History of the Fifth Regiment of Marines, reading substantially as follows:

On July 16, 1918, at 4.00 P.M., the Second Battalion left Villiers and marched to Crouttes, where it embussed at 7.00 P.M. After travelling all night it arrived at Brassaire at 11.00 A.M., July 17, 1918, and debussed. From here it marched into the western part of the Forest of Viller Cotterets. At 10.00 P.M., July 16, 1918, the First Battalion left Saacy-sur-Marne in camions and after an all-night ride debussed at the railroad station north of Braissaire at 8.30 A.M. By 10.30 A.M. this battalion was bivouaced on the improved road two kilometers south of Taillefontaine. The Third Battalion boarded trucks at Citry at 8.00 P.M., July 16, 1918, and arrived at Morierval at 9.00 A.M., July 17, 1918. From there it marched to the Bois de Foret Domiale.

The Eighth Machine Gun Company left Crouettes at 3.00 P.M., July 16, 1918, and marched to Ussy-sur-Marne, where it embussed on camions at midnight. The machine-gun carts and combat train joined the Fifth Regiment train which proceeded by marching under command of Major Bennett Puryear. On July 17, 1918, this company disembarked at Retheuil at 1.00 P.M. and marched to the woods south of Taillefontaine.

The Second Division was to take part in General Mangin's great counter-attack against the Germans around Soissons. This attack was to be made by the First U. S. Division on the left, the First Moroccan Division in the center and the Second U. S. Division on the right. A division of the French 30th Army Corps was to be on the right of the Second Division. The attack was to be made in three phases in a general northeasterly direction. In the Second Division, the Fifth Marines attacked on the left with the Third Brigade on the right. The Sixth Marines, Second Engineers, and Fourth Machine Gun Battalion constituted the Division Reserve. To assist the Fifth Marines, the 12th Groupment, consisting of about thirty tanks, was assigned. Ten French aeroplanes were assigned to the Division during the attack. One company and one machine-gun platoon of the Fifth Marines were to be used as a combat liaison with the Moroccans on the left and another company and machine-gun platoon as liaison with the Third Brigade on the right.

The First and Second Battalions were chosen to lead the assault of the Fifth Marines. The Third Battalion was held in reserve. The Second Battalion was to attack on the right of the Regimental sector and was aligned from right to left as follows: 51st Company as liaison with the Ninth Infantry, 18th Company, 43rd Company, and 55th Company. The First Battalion was on the left of the Second Battalion and its companies were in line from right to left as follows: 66th Company, 17th Company and 49th Company which was in liaison with the Moroccans. The 67th Company was in support.

The march up to the line on the night of July 17th was made under the greatest difficulties. The men were exhausted at the outset. The night was pitch dark and the pouring rain made the roadbed a mess of slippery clay. But the greatest difficulty of all was due to the fact that the highway was filled with an indescribable mass of infantry, cavalry, artillery, tanks and wagons of all descriptions. These continually cut through our ranks and so dark was the night that when once the single file of men on each side of the road was broken, it was only with the greatest difficulty and the best good fortune that the line joined again and moved forward. Each man held on to the coat tail of the man in front and with grim determination pushed forward eight kilometers to the jump-off line. No sooner had the designated position been reached than our barrage started and the companies had to deploy at once without being given opportunity to rest. The French guides, designated to meet the First Battalion, had failed to show up and the guides for two of the companies of the Second Battalion (43rd and 55th) had led them too far north and placed them in position north of the Paris-Maubeuge highway. The 43rd Company discovered the error in time and changed direction in time to practically cover its sector. The 55th Company advanced

along north of the highway, but were leapfrogged by the 66th Company (First Battalion), who was in its proper position.

435 am The attack started at 6.00 a.m. The advancing waves burst through the barb wire interlaced amongst the trees of the forest and soon carried the enemy's front line. Some resistance was encountered before the edge of the woods was reached and some losses suffered from the enemy's counter-barrage, but, after the tanks had been along the edge of the woods, opposition ceased there and most of the enemy came out of their dugouts and surrendered as our men advanced. By 6.30 A.M. the First Battalion P. C. was established at 171.3-288.5 and by 9.00 A.M. this P. C. had been pushed ahead to 172.3-289. Verte Feuille Farm was captured by the Second Battalion and all companies reached the First Intermediate Objective except the 51st Company, which had encountered stiff resistance on the right. At 9.20 A.M. the P. C. of the First Battalion was at 172.5-289. Here two companies of the Third Battalion came up as support, each man with three bandoliers of ammunition. At 8.00 A.M. the 67th Company had been brought up on the right of the First Battalion to fill in the gap between it and the Second Battalion. The new support of the First Battalion now consisted of the two companies of the Third Battalion and part of the 49th Company. The rest of the First Battalion had pushed ahead with the Second Battalion on the right. The resistance increased as the advance progressed and liaison became more and more difficult to maintain. The 17th Company on the left of the Battalion sector, except for a small detachment of the 49th Company, which maintained liaison with the Moroccans, advanced from the First Intermediate Objective with the 66th and 67th Companies on its right. The advance of the First Battalion was continued between the Maison Neuve Farm on the right and Chaudun on the left.

1st Moroccan P. C. 171.3-288.5 D.V. Chaudun was captured by a bold attack of the 17th Company. The 17th Company now halted about 100 yards in advance of the trenches, which cross the Chaudun-Villemontoire road at about 176.2-288.5. The Moroccans passed over to the right and held the trenches from the right of the First Battalion line to where the trenches turned sharply to the east. This was approximately the designated normal objective of the first attack and was reached about noon. Here the small liaison patrol of the 49th Company, finding satisfactory liaison established between the First Battalion and the Moroccans on both the skirmish and support lines, returned to the P. C. of the First Battalion, which was still where it had been established when the first objective was reached. In the meantime the 66th and 67th Companies had come up and occupied the ravine which extended from Chaudun to Vauxcastille. The 67th Company on the right had gotten in touch with the Second Battalion at 8.20 A.M., just before the Second Intermediate Objective was reached.

In the meantime the Second Battalion had also gained its objectives. When the ravine which runs from Chaudun to Vauxcastille was reached, heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and a halt had to be made until tanks worked around and cleared the way. Shortly after the advance was resumed the Commanding Officer of the 43rd Company was wounded and

? outside
sector

this company joined the 18th and passed under the leadership of the Commanding Officer of the latter. The 55th Company of the Second Battalion became scattered due to the heavy artillery fire of the enemy and by 4.00 P.M. was located on the left of the First Battalion in the trenches near Chaudun. By this time the 51st Company which had clung to the left flank of the Ninth Infantry as liaison company had come up and was with the 18th and 43rd Companies in the ravine northwest of Vierzy.

The Third Battalion, with the exception of one officer and ten men of the 45th Company, which had moved up to Verte Feuille Farm, and two officers and thirty men of the 47th Company who had been assigned as provost guard, had all been assigned to the other two battalions as reinforcements.

FROM THE SIXTH REGIMENT HISTORY

A description of the operations of the Sixth Marines in the first attack of July 18, 1918, is given in the history of the Sixth Regiment of Marines, reading substantially as follows:

On the night of July 16, 1918, the Regiment embussed at Nanteuil-sur-Marne for an unknown destination. The men thought they were going back to some quiet rest area, but they were sadly mistaken, for after riding all night and until noon of the next day the troops debussed at Brassoire in the Soissons sector. From here they hiked to positions in the Villers-Cotterets forest. This was one of the quickly-executed moves, planned by Marshal Foch, which proved to be wholly unexpected by the enemy. The troops were massed in the forest under cover from enemy observation. This Regiment, after marching for twenty kilometers in a heavy rainstorm, over crowded roads, finally went into bivouac in the Bois de Retz. Violent artillery action in the surrounding forest at dawn of July 18, 1918, gave notice that the attack had begun. This Regiment was divisional reserve and followed about three kilometers in rear of the attacking troops. The great number of prisoners we passed on their way to the rear showed that the initial attack had been a complete success. The Regiment bivouaced for the night some two kilometers behind the new line at Beaurepaire Farm. Officers and men were in high spirits at the brilliant success of the drive and were eager to take their part in the advance. Enemy airplanes flew low and attempted to harass this Regiment and other troops massed in the woods behind the lines with machine gun fire.

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SIXTH MACHINE GUN BATTALION

The following taken from the published history of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion described that Battalion's operations in the first attack:

At 4.00 A.M., July 17, 1918, the Battalion, less the Supply Train and gun carts, embussed in camions at the cross roads on the Ussy-Lizy Road with all

machine guns, ammunition and machine-gun equipment, and proceeded to the new area.

The Supply Train with gun and ammunition carts proceeded to the new area by marching.

The combat troops in camions with their machine guns, ammunition and machine-gun equipment arrived at 3.00 P.M., at a point about 1½ kilometers south of TAILLEFONTAINE, debussed and marched into the Bois de la Taillefontaine and halted. At 10.30 P.M., the march was continued, carrying guns, ammunition, and machine-gun equipment by hand through the dark forest under the most trying conditions. The rain was pouring in torrents, and this night in the forest was one of the blackest nights ever experienced. Exhausted men were carrying heavy guns and ammunition, unable to see where they were going, falling, stumbling against trees, against trucks, and every kind of obstacle. Indeed it was a situation that called for the best in a soldier. With stout hearts the men of the Battalion stumbled their way along the Villers-Cotterets-Soissons road, through that black forest, to join the front line in order to support the infantry Battalions when they jumped off at the zero hour on the morning of July 18, 1918.

FOREST de RETZ

The Supply Train with gun and ammunition carts continued its march to join the Battalion, having marched all night, the night of the 16th, and all day and night of the 17th.

The Battalion on July 18, 1918, continued its march, carrying all its guns, ammunition and machine-gun equipment, arriving at the northern edge of Bois de la Retz at 3.00 A.M., where a halt was made owing to the exhausted condition of the men. The march was resumed at 7.00 A.M. to Verte Feuille Farm; at this place the companies were assigned their combat missions. Battalion P. C. was established at Beurepaire Farm.

The Sixth Regiment received the following memorandum, dated July 17, 1918, from the Chief of Staff, Second Division:

The Division Commander directs me to inform you that your regiment is detailed as Corps Reserve. While it will follow the course of the attack, it will not be engaged without authority of the Corps Commander.

ORDER REC'd
AFTER DIV
attach order
was written

The following order, dated July 18, 1918, signed by the Chief of Staff, Second Division, was received by the Sixth Regiment:

1. The Division Commander directs that you move your regiment to the vicinity of Verte Feuille Farm, and there await orders.
2. Bear in mind that you are Corps Reserve and will not become engaged unless attacked, except by order of the Corps Commander. * * *

A DESCRIPTION BY GENERAL HARBORD

The fighting during the first attack on July 18, 1918, was described by Major General Harbord in a "History of the

Second Division," published in the U. S. Army Recruiting News of November 20, 1920:

The official record can but inadequately picture the march through the mud and rain of the ink-black forest of Villers-Cotterets the night before the Soissons Offensive in which the Second Division on one flank of the First French Moroccan Division and the First American Division on the other opened the battles of July 18th and succeeding days. The Moroccans, under the blue-eyed General Dogan, whose Croix-de-Guerre carried seven palms, were reckoned the best shock-troops of France, and the Americans understood that if they did not keep up with the Moroccans or pass them in the assault they would be dishonored.

All night long, the columns of the Second marched through the dank forest in driving rain, making their way through artillery, tanks, trucks, and infantry, the worst congested mass that ever defied traffic regulations. They had had no sleep, and but little food and water followed their wearisome march. Never was there a blacker night. The torrents of rain made the footing insecure. The men had to walk hand-in-hand, single file, to thread their way through the masses of vehicles, maddened mules and skidding trucks, frequently causing interminable delays. Zero hour was 4.35, and at 4.00 o'clock only the Ninth Infantry had reached the jump-off line. The Twenty-Third double-timed nearly a mile and its attacking Battalion reached the position at 4.30. The Marine Battalions came on the run as the attack started, going from column into attack formation without a halt.

Few machine-gun units go into action without guns, but ours did that morning, for the guns had not yet gotten up. Tired, hungry and thirsty, without machine guns, Stokes mortars, one-pounders or grenades, armed only with rifle and bayonet, the troops swept through with an impetuosity and dash that before night carried them far in advance of the Moroccans. The story of their gallantry that day has been told in many Allied lands, and it was worthy of the best traditions of the Army and Marine Corps.

FROM THE SECOND DIVISION HISTORY

The following is taken from "A Short Account of the Second Division in the Great War, 1917-19":

From July 10th to July 16th the Division remained in reserve position near the Marne, awaiting the renewal of the German offensive which was expected to strike at some point between Soissons and Rheims. The attack came, as anticipated, on July 15th. When it was so brilliantly shattered by the Franco-American forces without assistance from the Second, and other divisions in reserve [this is known as the Champagne-Marne Defensive], it was generally accepted that the Second would be given opportunity for rest and training of replacements, and when ordered to embuss on July 16th the majority of the men believed that they were headed for a rest area. They were soon disillusioned, however, when, on the morning of July 17th, after an all-night ride, they debussed and started on a terribly fatiguing march

through the Villers-Cotterets Forest, over a road that was packed with stupendous columns of artillery, tanks and cavalry, all pouring towards the sound of the guns.

All day long the columns swung forward, halting only for the precious ten minutes of rest in each hour. There had been nothing said about attacking, but the men realized that they were to take part in something big. The vast piles of shells, the great naval guns, the numerous tanks, the thousands of Moroccans (real shock troops), presaged more eloquently than anything else could, the nature of the work that lay before them.

Towards evening the troops were halted for a brief rest. Officers were assembled and informed that the Division, in line with the First Division, U. S., and the First Moroccan Division, would attack at zero hour the next morning, July 18, 1918. There was no time for reconnoissance of the jump-off line. Night was falling and the roads were so jammed that not even a pedestrian could get through. Attacking battalions and companies were designated by verbal order, battle packs quickly arranged by the men and the march was resumed.

Never had there been a blacker night. The darkness was impenetrable, intensified by frequent brilliant flashes of lightning. Torrents of rain made the footing insecure and increased the difficulties of march over the torn roads. It was necessary for the men to walk hand-in-hand in single file. They threaded their way laborously through the dense masses of vehicles which were moving up, irate mules or sliding trucks frequently causing breaks which necessitated interminable halts.

Zero hour was 4.35 and at 4 o'clock only one Regiment—the Ninth Infantry—was in position on the jump-off line. The attacking Battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry arrived in position at exactly 4.30, after double-timing for over a mile. The First and Second Battalions of the Fifth Marines came up on the run just as the attack started, going from column into attack formation without a halt.

At 4.30 o'clock day had broken, with all the beauty of clear skies and bright sunlight. The tired men, crouching in readiness along the line from Longpont into the woods near Montgobert, heard nothing but the beating of their own hearts and the songs of the skylarks. It seemed incredible that in five minutes they would be plunged into a great battle. The still lines of the enemy were menacing, yet reassuring, because their very silence indicated that they were not expecting an attack.

There was to be no artillery preparation. The barrage was to start at 4.35 and the infantry was to follow it over instantly. The men were nearly exhausted from their hardships of the previous thirty-six hours, during which time they had had neither food nor sleep, and, worst of all, no water. They were wet to the skin and the long hours of marching had worn down their strength. But when at 4.35 the hundreds of guns burst forth into a vast, thunderous roar, the sound went to the blood of the men like wine, and they stepped swiftly forward, erect and eager. Without machine guns, Stokes mortars, one-pounders or grenades, armed only with rifle and bayonet, they swept through with an impetuosity and dash that was irresistible.

Nothing could stop them. The officers had only one difficult task—that of preventing the men from overrunning their own barrage, and they could not always do that.

Caught unawares, the Germans could not resist heavily at first, their advance units being completely smothered. Beaurepaire Farm, a powerfully organized position, strongly defended with machine guns and artillery, was quickly overcome, the Third Brigade destroying it in a brilliant charge. Here the infantry charged through their barrage, catching the enemy before they could man their guns.

After passing this farm, the direction of advance changed nearly forty-five degrees. This maneuver, hard enough under ideal circumstances, was particularly difficult at this time because the left flank, which had to cover the most ground in the turn, was directly exposed to fire from the German machine guns and artillery at Maison Neuve Farm. Very heavy losses resulted from this fire, but the change was effected without any appreciable halt in the advance.

From Beaurepaire Farm to Vauxcastille the advance was very rapid, not even direct fire from the many batteries of 77's and 150's could affect the magnificent élan of the Americans. Hundreds of prisoners were already streaming back to the rear, hurrying frantically to get away from the shells hurled by their own batteries. At Vauxcastille Ravine the assault waves were halted for a short time. The advance had been so rapid that the units were somewhat disorganized, and losses had been heavy.

At 8.30 A.M., four hours after zero hour, the Division was firmly established on a line from Vauxcastille to Maison Neuve. Strong detachments of the Fifth Marines, Ninth and Twenty-third Infantry, had driven the enemy away from the ravine of Vauxcastille and were holding the eastern edge of this ravine and positions in the western edge of Vierzy and the high ground north of the town.

CAPTURE OF CHAUDUN

The following report, dated July 2, 1919, made by the Commanding Officer, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, to the Historian, Second Division, describes the capture of Chaudun, on the morning of July 18, 1918:

The following is a short account of the capture of the town of CHAUDUN, by the 17th Company, First Battalion, Fifth Regiment, U. S. Marines, together with a few men of the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment, and a small detachment of the First Moroccan Division:

Four-thirty o'clock, on the morning of July 18, 1918, found the First Battalion, Fifth Regiment, Marines, in position ready to "go over." Zero hour was set at 4.35 A.M., at which time the barrage was also to begin. The Battalion had a two-company front with the other two companies acting as combat liaison with a Regiment of the First Moroccan Division on the left and the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment, on the right. The First

Division was on the left of the Moroccan Division. The 17th Company was the left front company of the Battalion and in fact of the Second Division. I was in command of the 17th Company at the time. At the appointed time the barrage started and we went forward through the FOREST-de-RETZ. Our line of attack, as laid down in the attack order, led us northeast from our jumping-off position, through the forest two and a half kilometers, to Le TRANSLORE FERME, thence eastward one kilometer to crossroads (158 on the MAUBEUGE ROAD), and then a little south of east to our objective, which was a line running north and south just east of the town of VIERZY.

The 17th Company, however, did not follow the above path for the following reasons: As we advanced east of Le TRANSLORE FERME the Moroccans kept crowding to the right into our sector, thus leaving the flank exposed. One company of the 18th Infantry, First Division, also crowded to the right and we came in contact with them on the First Intermediate Objective about one kilometer due east of Le TRANSLORE FERME. I informed the company commander that he was in the wrong place, but he disregarded me. Instead, his company dug in at this point (First Intermediate Objective), and that is the last I saw of any First Division Unit that day.

We continued the advance eastward to a point about three-quarters of a kilometer southwest of CHAUDUN. At that time the 17th Company was on the extreme left flank of the advancing lines, the Moroccans (with the exception of a small detachment of about twenty men and one Lieutenant, who remained with us), having passed us in the rear and gotten on our right flank. Considerable machine gun fire was directed at us from town of CHAUDUN, which impeded our further advance. There were no other Allied troops on our left flank, so it fell to our lot to clean out the town in order to permit our further advance. The 17th Company, with the Detachment of Moroccans spoken of above, and a few stragglers from the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment Marines, changed direction to the northeast toward CHAUDUN. We met considerable resistance, but after about three-fourths of an hour's fighting we succeeded in capturing the town together with prisoners and machine guns. The town was captured about 9.00 o'clock on the morning of the 18th of July. I was present at the time of the capture, saw the machine guns captured, and personally sent prisoners to the rear. At no time during the attack on the town were there any other units of troops present than those I have mentioned. After the capture of the town, the 17th Company moved out of town, down the main road leading southeast, to our objective, where it was at the time I left it, having been wounded and evacuated.

FIGHTING ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 18TH

Late on the afternoon of July 18, 1918, the attack was continued under the leadership of the Commanding General, Third Brigade. The First and Second Battalions, of the Fifth Marines, and the 8th Machine Gun Company of Marines, took part in this attack.

Field Order No. 26, Third Infantry Brigade, July 18, 1918, 4.30 P.M., signed by Brigadier General H. E. Ely, reads as follows:

In accordance with letter Headquarters, Second Division, dated 1.30 P.M., July 18, 1918, this Brigade, reinforced as indicated in letter, will attack.

Colonel Malone, Twenty-third Infantry, plus two Battalions, Fifth Marines, and Company A, 4th Machine Gun Battalion, are charged with attack along sector bounded by southern boundary of the Division Sector, on the north by 6867-8360-1053-2650.

Colonel Upton, Ninth Infantry, with First Battalion, Fifth Marines, and Company B, Fourth Machine Gun Battalion, will carry out the operations in northern sector. He will keep liaison on left with French Division.

Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, will take station in reserve near Beaurepaire Farm.

The attack will be made as soon as possible and not later than 6.00 P.M.

The following order, dated July 18, 1918, 4.50 P.M., was issued by Brigadier General Ely to the Commanding Officers, First and Third Battalion, Fifth Marines:

Your regiment has been placed under orders of Commanding General, Third Brigade, by V. O., Commanding General, Second Division. The Commanding General, Third Brigade, directs that your First and Third Battalions support the attack by the Third Brigade. H hour 5.15 P.M., 18th July. Separate orders have been given to the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines.

The history of the Fifth Marines describes these operations substantially as follows:

The second attack of the day was scheduled for 5.30 P.M. This advance was to be made under the leadership of the Commanding General of the Third Brigade. At 4.50 P.M. Major Ralph S. Keyser, commanding the Second Battalion, received verbal instructions from the Adjutant of the Third Brigade at Verte Feuille Farm in regard to the attack. He immediately proceeded to the ravine northwest of Vierzy, where the 18th, 43rd and 51st Companies were, and sent a runner to the 55th Company to notify them of the proposed attack. Before the 55th Company could arrive, it was time to jump off and the three companies, covering a 500-meter front in two waves, started forward. The Ninth Infantry was on the right and the Second Battalion, but the French who were supposed to advance on the left, did not come up. After advancing about 500 meters the Ninth Infantry was held up by severe machine gun fire, and the Second Battalion halted its advance until this resistance would be overcome. The Ninth soon cleaned up the resistance and the attack went forward again. After another kilometer had been covered, the 51st Company on the left of the Second Battalion line encountered heavy resistance from machine guns. While the 51st Company and part of the 18th Company were subduing this opposition, the Ninth Infantry kept on advancing and took with them the right of the 18th Company, which was on that flank of the battal-

ion line. To make matters worse, while the task of locating and destroying these machine guns was in progress, six tanks returned through the lines of the Second Battalion and brought with them an intense artillery fire from the enemy. Many casualties were suffered by the Battalion due to this fire, and, among others, Captain Lester E. Wass, commanding the 18th Company, was fatally wounded. Four of the six tanks were also destroyed. After the artillery fire had lessened, the Second Battalion continued its search for the hostile machine guns, but their crews must have withdrawn either from fear of the tanks or their own artillery. The advance was resumed and shortly afterwards the 55th Company came up and joined the support line and the French were seen advancing on the left. By dusk the Second Battalion had reached the old trenches at point 176.6-287.7. The fire from the machine guns hidden in the tall wheat was growing heavier every minute and Major Keyser, having neither grenades nor tank support, and wisely believing it would be a sheer waste of men to attempt to push forward in the darkness, decided to halt for the night.

In the meantime, the attack order for the afternoon had not reached Major Julius S. Turrill, Commanding Officer of the First Battalion, until 5.15 P.M. his P. C. at that time was at 173-289.2 on the Paris-Maubeuge highway. Knowing he could not get his entire battalion in line in time to attack at the zero hour, he nevertheless gathered together the 150 men of the First and Third Battalions which he had with him in support and hurried towards the jump-off line. Pressing ahead with all speed possible, he marched *via* Beaurepaire Farm to Vauxcastille. On the road to Vierzy from Vauxcastille he met Captain John H. Fay and 8th Machine Gun Company which had but two hours before received its machine guns and ammunition from the Supply Train, which had just arrived, and was now hurrying forward to support the evening's attack. The 8th Machine Gun Company attached itself to the First Battalion and the little company undauntedly pushed ahead in the dusk towards its formidable objective, the strongly held town of Vierzy. Vierzy is practically surrounded by rising ground, which afforded excellent positions from which the enemy could sweep the town with machine gun fire. After about four-fifths of the town had been cleared of the enemy and many had been captured, the Twenty-third Infantry entered from the northwest and passed through the First Battalion lines. The First Battalion and 8th Machine Gun Company took position for the night in rear of a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, on the western slope of the ridge just east of the cemetery, southeast of the town.

The history of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion describes these operations substantially as follows:

At 2.00 P.M., the 15th Company was ordered to Beaurepaire Farm as reserve. At 6.00 P.M., this company was ordered to support the Ninth Infantry in an attack on the enemy north of Vierzy. After the infantry had gained its objective this company did not consolidate the line, as orders were received from the Brigade Commander, Third Brigade, for it to take

up position as reserve, occupying old trenches about 200 yards northwest of Vierzy.

About noon the 23rd Company received orders to move forward with the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines. After locating the battalion the company moved to Beaurepaire Farm, arriving there at 6.00 P.M. Upon orders the company left Beaurepaire Farm at 9.00 P.M. to join the Twenty-third Infantry and support that regiment.

The 77th Company received orders to relieve the 73rd Company (Regimental Machine Gun Company, Sixth Marines), but the orders were revoked, and orders were issued to support the Ninth Infantry, which was going over the top at 6.00 P.M. This company did not go forward to consolidate the position after the objective was taken, but went into reserve adjacent to the 15th Company.

At 5.00 P.M., the 81st Company was ordered to proceed to a field east of Beaurepaire Farm and take position in reserve.

The Supply Train with all gun and ammunition carts arrived and took station in the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, about 200 yards from the cross-roads, where the division ration dump was established.

The advance of the infantry on this day was very rapid, with very little resistance. The companies of this battalion encountered considerable difficulty in keeping up with advance of the infantry, owing to carrying the heavy guns, tripods and ammunition by hand.

The following is taken from "A Short Account of the Second Division in the Great War, 1917-19":

Enemy resistance in Vauxcastille and Vierzy was stubborn. Both towns were held by large garrisons and were strongly protected by thickly placed machine guns. Vauxcastille was not fully cleaned up until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and then only after hours of bitter fighting.

Vierzy was cleared at 8 P.M. * * *

The end of the day found the Division holding a line one kilometer east of Vierzy. The day's advance totaled eight kilometers. Several thousand prisoners, hundreds of machine guns and practically all of the artillery, light and heavy, of two German divisions had fallen into our hands. The large Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road was now in easy range of our light artillery, and our deep penetration into the Boche flank constituted a very serious menace for all enemy troops in the forward part of the Chateau-Thierry salient.

In his book "America in France," Frederick Palmer wrote as follows:

The scene at Beaurepaire Farm was singularly expressive of war, because below stairs an American general [Harbord], who had been a major held in leash on the Mexican border, was in France directing his race horse division for the morning's attack with a confidence worthy of militant

democracy against military autocracy. At 6 P.M. on the 18th, as already stated, the Second Division had not taken the village of Vierzy in its third objective, but it had still six hours before midnight which would be counted the close of the day and it meant to keep to schedule if courage and impetuous application made this possible. There is a deep, broad ravine which formed a Y in the Second's sector of advance. It has many pockets, dips and turns within its irregular folds, with sunken roads and paths and clumps of bushes and trees.

The village of Vauxcastille is at the edge of the western branch of the Y and that of Vierzy is enclosed in the eastern branch, the two villages being separated by nearly a mile of this tricky recess in the plateau. Co-ordination in such surroundings, where detachments must feel their way against machine-gun nests, was difficult even for soldiers who had reached their jumping-off places on the run through the forest of Retz. Before we were sure of Vauxcastille and the western branch some of our men entered Vierzy, where they secured information about the defenses at the expense of a scorching reception.

In these operations units had become mixed; and every unit had been reduced by severe losses. The first tentative attempt on Vierzy had been made without artillery support or even trench mortars or grenades; simply with the naked rifle. We re-formed our lines, and fifteen tanks and some Moroccan troops came to our assistance in an attack which was supported by machine gun fire and a powerful artillery concentration. We knew what we had to do and how to do it, in the second effort at 6.30 P.M. when Americans and French with the tanks swept through Vierzy with amazing rapidity. The high-strung, ambitious Second did not stop until it was well out on the plateau and could report that, at the end of the most terrific and successful day any American division in France had known it was beyond its third objective. Night had come; and the disorganization that had resulted from the speedy determined work of cleaning up machine-gun nests and hidden snipers in that paradise for machine gunners had brought a further toll of casualties, to weaken the units which had to be straightened out in the darkness.

However, we had the ravine. If we had not taken it that night we should not have taken it the next day against the strong reënforcements which the Germans were hurrying up, as General Harbord realized, and the result would have had an unfortunate effect upon the whole operation, with far worse casualties for the Second Division. We did not quite know how we had accomplished the marvel, but the maze of difficulties was at our back with our hospital corps men searching for the wounded, while all night the men in front were kept busy readjusting their line and digging under shell and machine fire.

The Journal of Daily Operations of the Second Division contains the following:

At 2 P.M., the Headquarters of the Division advanced to Verte Feuille Farm. In the meanwhile the troops themselves advanced about two kilometers to the east of Beaurepaire Farm and were still advancing. By dusk the skirmish

line extended north and south through Vierzy. Division Headquarters at 10 P.M. was moved up to Beaurepaire Farm.

Continuous streams of prisoners had poured towards the rear all day long. Wounded also were coming in, but our casualties were not excessive.

The Commanding Officer, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, at 5.00 A.M., July 19th, sent the following field message to his regimental commander:

Five-fifteen P.M. yesterday, rec'd order to support 3d Brig. for an attack at that hour. Took my support consisting of parts of 49th, 16th & 20th cos. to Vierzy. Arrived before 23d Inf. and with 8th M. G. Co. attacked thro' town. When half-way thro' town 23d came up and continued the attack. Now in support to 23d Inf. Need rations. Also would like packs of 30 men of 49th Co. Have here Capt. Platt with 40 men, Capt. Yowell—4 off. 70 men. Hdqtrs. 7 off., 35 men, 30 men of 49th Co.—total 187. Turrill. Note written on this message: "O. K. I have sent rolling kitchens and rations up to where he is. Lay."

FIELD ORDERS NO. 16, ORDERS ATTACK ON JULY 19TH

Field orders No. 16, Second Division, July 19, 1918, 3.00 A.M., ordering an attack on the morning of July 19, reads as follows:

I. The enemy occupies the position in front of our lines. Our troops occupy a position about three (3) kilometers west of the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road and parallel to it from the old French trenches southwest of Charantigny to a point on the Vierzy-Tigny road two (2) kilometers west of Tigny.

II. The Division will attack and take the line Hartennes-Eteaux (inclusive); Bois de Hartennes to Bois de Corncois (inclusive).

III. *Dispositions for the attack:*

(a) The artillery preparation will begin at 6.00 A.M. and will be according to approved orders of the Commanding General, Second Field Artillery Brigade.


(b) The infantry attack will be made by the Sixth Marines and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Lee, U. S. M. C., Commanding.

(c) The First Battalion, Second Engineers, and the Fourth Machine Gun Battalion will constitute the reserve, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, Second Engineers, Commanding.


(d) The troops will effect a passage of our present lines at 7.00 A.M.

(e) The troops now holding the line will remain in place until the attack has attained its objective. Orders will then be issued for their disposition.


(f) All heavy tanks which are at the disposition of the Division Commander will be placed under the orders of the attack commander. Any light tanks available at the time of the attack will be held in divisional reserve.




CHAUDUN, FRANCE, JULY, 1918



OVERLOOKING RAILROAD TOWARD SOISSONS, NEAR CHAUDUN, JULY, 1918



CROSSROADS AT VERTES-PEUILLES, ON THE EDGE OF THE BOIS DE VILLERS COTTERETS, MORNING OF JULY 19, 1918



(g) Liaison will be assured between the right of the attacking line and the French 38th Division by the Sixth Brigade de Dragoons (French).

(x) The position when attained will be consolidated with as little delay as possible.

IV. Headquarters Second Division—Beaurepaire Ferme.

Headquarters Third and Fourth Brigade and initial headquarters of Sixth Marines—at Vierzy.

THE ATTACK OF JULY 19TH

The Sixth Marines bivouaced the night of July 18th-19th, about two kilometers behind the new line formed after the fighting on the afternoon of the 18th, at Beaurepaire Farm.

The attack by the Sixth Marines was scheduled for 8.30 A.M., July 19th. The attack started at 8.30 A.M., with the First Battalion on the right of the regimental sector, the Second Battalion on the left and the Third Battalion in support. The attack was supported by tanks. The advance to the front line, a little more than a kilometer distant, was across open wheat fields. The pace, because of the necessity of following the tanks was slow, and the advance over the entire distance was through a heavy barrage put down by the enemy. When the front lines were passed the enemy machine guns proved most troublesome. A halt was made after a gain of about a kilometer for the reason that the casualties had so reduced the regiment that further advance was practically impossible. From 10.30 A.M., until dark the regiment was subjected to enemy artillery, one pounder and machine gun fire. Early in the fighting it was discovered that an uncovered gap had developed between the First and Second Battalions and the Third Battalion, to which had been attached the 15th and 77th Machine Gun Companies was ordered to fill the gap. The regiment was relieved about midnight on July 19th by Moroccans and withdrew, remaining in reserve until July 22nd, when all the units of the brigade marched to an area a little further to the rear, but still in reserve of the position. Brigade Headquarters established at Taillefontaine.

Following the relief of the brigade from its attack south of Soissons, the troops were billeted on July 24th-25th, in the area around Nanteuile-le-Haudouin. Brigade Headquarters was established at Nanteuil, Fifth Regiment P. C. at Silly-le-Longue, Sixth Regiment at Versigny and Sixth Machine Gun Battalion at Bregy.

The brigade remained in this area until July 31st, resting and cleaning up.

The History of the Sixth Regiment describes the operations of the 19th in substantially the following words:

Battalion commanders were called to Regimental Headquarters and told that the regiment would attack the German line east of Vierzy on the morning of July 19th. This information was given to the battalion commanders at about 4.30 A.M., July 19th. The attack was started at 8.30 A.M. with the First Battalion on the right of the Regimental area, the Second on the left and the Third in support. The attack was supported by tanks. The advance to the front line, a little more than a kilometer distant, was across perfectly open wheat fields. The pace, because of the necessity of following the tanks, was slow and the advance over the entire distance was through a heavy barrage put down by the enemy. When the front lines were passed the enemy machine guns proved most troublesome. A halt was made after a gain of about one kilometer for the reason that the casualties had so reduced the regiment that further advance was practically impossible. What remained of the regiment took shelter in a line of semi-complete intrenchments constructed by the Germans, where from 10.30 A.M. until dark the regiment was subjected to the enemy's artillery, one-pounder and machine gun fire. Early in the fighting it was discovered that an uncovered gap had developed between the First and Second Battalions, and Major Sibley, commanding the Third Battalion, to which had been attached the Fifteenth and Seventy-seventh Machine Gun Companies, one platoon each from the Seventy-third and Eighty-first Machine Gun Company, also the Stokes Mortar and one-pounder platoons of the Headquarters Company without their mortars and one-pounders, was ordered to fill this gap. He ordered the 83rd and 84th Companies to advance into this portion of the line which was uncovered, the remainder of Major Sibley's command following the leading battalion at a distance of a thousand yards. The 77th Company and the platoon of the 81st Company were detached from the Third Battalion later in the day. The following message was sent to all battalion commanders at 3.45 P.M.:

"From: C. O. 6th Regt.

At: P. C.

19 July, 1918—3.45 P.M. No. 10 by runner.

To: C. O.'s 1st, 2nd, 3rd Bns., Hdqrs. Co., 1st Bn. 2nd Engrs.

The Division Commander directs us to dig in and hold our present line at all costs. No further advance will be made for the present. He congratulates the command on its gallant conduct in the face of severe casualties.

Let me have sketch of your position and disposition. Ammunition at crossroads 112 southeast of Vierzy.

LEE."

Conditions were bad throughout the regiment. It was practically impossible to send out water details and canteens were empty. The men dug in as well as possible, but digging was dangerous and the enemy fire increased the

casualties rapidly. The First Battalion lost, in killed, Captain Kearns, 95th Company, Lieutenant Burr of the battalion headquarters, and Lieutenant Redford, and in wounded, Captain Turner, Battalion adjutant, and seven lieutenants. The Second Battalion losses were heavy. Only three company officers remained in that battalion when the regiment was relieved. Of the other officers, Lieutenant John W. Overton and Charles W. Roy were killed while advancing at the head of their platoons. The Third Battalion lost 39 per cent. of its officers. The regiment had entered the battle with an approximate strength of twenty-eight hundred men, three hundred and fifty of these not being engaged. Of the twenty-four hundred and fifty men actually engaged there were thirteen hundred killed and wounded. The regiment was relieved about midnight of July 19th by Algerians and withdrew, remaining in reserve resting. While in bivouac near Translor Farm, July 20th, the regiment suffered several casualties from falling limbs of trees. The forests had been subjected to intense shell fire and branches and trunks of trees had been partly severed, and the breeze which sprang up caused many of them to fall. During the night the troops were also subjected to intermittent long-range shelling from Austrian 130's. Coming after the strenuous fighting the shelling, the downpour of rain and the falling branches added greatly to the mental and physical exhaustion of the troops. The Quartermaster's Department issued some new clothes, while the regiment was resting in the back area. On July 31st the regiment marched to Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, where it entrained for the Toul sector.

The History of the Fifth Regiment describes these operations substantially as follows:

And so by nightfall of July 18th the Fifth Regiment held good positions along the ridge between Chaudun and Vierzy. The enemy had been pushed back over seven (7) kilometers since morning and many prisoners, machine guns and pieces of artillery had been taken. Much equipment had also been captured. In Vierzy alone there was a vast storeroom filled with rifles, bayonets, clothing and food which had been left behind by the enemy in their hurried retreat before the advancing Americans. On the same evening Colonel Logan Feland moved his P. C. to Vauxcastille and the next morning established his headquarters in the large tunnel at Vierzy. The same evening, Major Alphonse DeCarre, who was in charge of the 10 per cent. of each company which had been held in reserve, led these up to Vauxcastille, where they passed that night and the next day. The march up will always be remembered by those who took part on account of the severe bombing to which they were subjected by hostile aeroplanes.

No advance was made by the Fifth Regiment during the following morning. Intermittently through the day, low-flying enemy aeroplanes would either drop bombs upon our lines or sweep them with machine gun fire. At 2.00 P.M. Major Keyser received orders to take station on the steep slope north of Vierzy and report to the Commanding Officer of the Ninth Infantry under whose orders his battalion had been since the attack of the previous afternoon. However, while reorganizing the battalion in the ravine north-

west of Vierzy, Colonel Feland sent Major Keyser word that the orders had been changed and that he should take position at 178.4-287.3. This was done, and from 9.00 P.M., July 19th, to 4.00 A.M., July 20th, the Second Battalion held this line in liaison on the left with the French and on the right with the Sixth Marines.

At 4.00 P.M., July 19th, the Commanding Officer of the First Battalion received orders from Colonel Feland to move his men to the tunnel at Vierzy. Major Turrill immediately went to reconnoiter the location of the tunnel and while there, he received word from Major (then Captain) George Hamilton, that the battalion was being bombed by enemy planes and that the enemy had moved their artillery, that the slope which they were on was enfiladed by their fire. Major Turrill immediately ordered Major Hamilton to bring the battalion to the tunnel. This was accomplished without loss, before dark. At 2.00 A.M., July 20th, the First Battalion moved back to the vicinity of the Carrefour de Fourneaux in the Bois de Retz at approximately 170.1-288.45, where it stayed the day and night of July 20th. The Second Battalion withdrew from its position upon being relieved by the French about 4.00 A.M., July 20th. At 10.00 P.M. on the night of July 19th, the 8th Machine Gun Company, which had remained in position on the slopes north and east of Vierzy, moved back to the neighborhood of the Carrefour de Fourneaux and took up a reserve position. The same evening the Third Battalion moved back from its reserve position at Verte Feuille Farm and joined the rest of the regiment in the woods near Carrefour de Fourneaux. Major DeCarre also marched the 10 per cent. reserve from Vauxcastille to the Carrefour de Fourneaux and here this detachment split up and rejoined their respective companies.

In this manner did the Fifth Regiment take part in the famous counter-attack of July 18th and 19th under General Mangin, which sent the Germans reeling back and started that great movement towards Germany, which did not end until the Army of Occupation was firmly established on the Rhine. The casualties at Soissons were naturally lighter than those in the Bois de la Brigade de Marine. The regiment lost five officers and thirty-nine men killed, eighteen officers and three hundred sixty men wounded and thirty-four missing. On July 21st the movement of the Regiment towards its rest billets started. The 8th Machine Gun Company reached Chevreuille, Aisne, on July 26th, and the Headquarters Company arrived here *via* Perroy, on the 25th. The First Battalion marched *via* Percy to Silly-le-Longue. The Second Battalion left the Bois de Villers-Cotterets on July 25th, spent one night in Boissy-Fresnoy and reached Bouillancy on July 26th. The Third Battalion started from the Bois de Retz on July 24th, billeted in Boissy-Fresnoy that evening and arrived at Villers St. Genest the next day. The Supply Company and the Regimental Headquarters were at Silly-le-Longue. The four days spent in this district were devoted to cleaning up and light drill.

The History of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion describes the activities of that battalion as follows:

At 6.00 A.M., on July 19th, upon orders from the battalion commander, the 15th Company joined the Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, which was in reserve south of Vierzy. At 4.00 P.M. this company received orders from the Commanding Officers, Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, to support the Second Engineers, who were in the support trenches about one kilometer east of Vierzy. Position was reached about 8.00 P.M., their line running practically east-west for 800 yards, and it was found that only six guns were necessary on the line.

The 23rd Company at 9.00 A.M. was ordered to move into reserve position near Vierzy at 9.00 A.M.

The 77th Company at 4.30 A.M. was ordered to move into Vierzy, in reserve of the Sixth Marines. At 8.00 A.M. two platoons of this company were sent in support of the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, near Tigny, where they remained all day. The platoons remaining in reserve assisted in carrying in the wounded.

The 81st Company at 5.00 A.M. moved to Vierzy, where the first platoon joined the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, and the third platoon joined the Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, and moved forward in support of these battalions in the attack on Tigny and its vicinity.

The artillery fire of the enemy on this day was severe, and many casualties resulted.

At 1.00 A.M., on July 20th, the 15th Company was relieved by French troops, marched to the northern end of Bois de la Retz, the assembly place of the battalion, and bivouaced.

The 23rd Company was relieved by French troops at 1.00 A.M. and marched to the Bois de la Retz and bivouaced.

The 77th Company was relieved by French troops at 1.00 A.M. and marched to the Bois de la Retz and bivouaced.

The 81st Company was relieved by French troops at 1.00 A.M. and marched to the Bois de la Retz and bivouaced.

At 6.00 P.M., July 21st, Headquarters, 15th, 23rd, 77th and 81st Companies and Supply Train marched to woods at Carrefour de la Croix Morel, Maison Ferme, and bivouaced.

The following description of this fighting is given in "A Short Account of the Second Division in the Great War, 1917-1919":

Alarmed by the swift, unexpected success of Mangin's army the German high command threw several fresh divisions into the line on the night of July 18th-19th. When the Sixth Marines, who had formed the corps reserve on the first day, supported by the Second Engineers, attacked on July 19th, they encountered a powerful resistance, but by a brilliant effort they penetrated the Boche positions to a depth of two kilometers and captured many prisoners from two fresh German divisions which had come into the line the night before. The remainder of the day was devoted to consolidation of positions and preparation for the continuance of the advance. The men were exhausted by the hardships and utter lack of food and water during the previous 72 hours. When the division entered the attack it was con-

siderably below strength and the men had not recovered from their land tour in the line near Chateau-Thierry, June 1st-July 9th.

The losses on July 18th and 19th had been heavy, totaling 4925.

In view of these facts it was decided to relieve all of the Division, except the artillery regiments, on the night of July 19th-20th. The relief was made by a French division, and the Second Division was assembled near Pierrefonds, the artillery remaining in line to support the French until July 25th.

This attack demonstrated the great value of the element of surprise. So instantaneous and sweeping a success would have been impossible if the enemy had been prepared for the attack. The capture by one division of 2965 prisoners and seventy-five guns in one day's fighting is an astonishing feat. Four enemy divisions, the 42nd, 47th Reserve, 14th Reserve, and 3rd Reserve, were badly cut up by the Second Division in a period of thirty hours.

The attack of July 18th, particularly the attack of the First and Second American Divisions and the First Moroccan Division, marked the turning of the tide against the Germans. In a single day Foch had taken the offensive in such a decisive manner that Ludendorff was never able to regain it. From then until November 11th the Germans were constantly on the defensive.

Field Message No. 12, dated July 19, 1918, 6.00 P.M., sent by runner from Commanding Officer, Sixth Marines to Brigadier General Neville, reads as follows:

The French officers with me have visited the right and left of our line and report liaison on the right with the French Colonial troops and on the left with the Moroccans. My officers have been directed but have not reported. Lee. A note on this message reads as follows: "To Division Commander for his information. Major Keyser with his Battalion has gone out to left as directed. Lay."

Colonel Lee sent the following field message (No 15) to Brigadier General Neville, at 7.00 P.M., July 19th:

Major Waller, Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, informs me that the 23rd M. G. Company at about 4.00 P.M. this afternoon fired on and brought down an enemy plane. It fell forward of the company, but behind our lines. The men saw it fall and others have reported it. The company is located near the cemetery at south of town.

Frederick Palmer in "America in France" describes the operations of the 19th as follows:

The Second was to go on at dawn with the aid of such reserves as the division could muster and we pushed another mile and a half—when every rod was valuable in driving toward the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road—until we were at the edge of the village of Tigny, when there was nothing to do but entrench. The Second had made a distance equal to what the other

divisions were to make. It had held up its end in the fight under inconceivably difficult conditions. A single regiment had taken two thousand prisoners.

From the time that the men left Montreuil they had had practically no sleep and no food and no water, except what they carried. They had gone into the attack on the jump, and they had kept on the jump, fighting on their nerves all through that second night and all the next day until their strength was gone. Their spirits were willing, but their bodies could not respond to their will. France and America might say truly, "Well done!" when the survivors who had swept through all obstacles were relieved by a French division.

The Journal of Operations, Second Division, describes the fighting of the 19th of the Division as follows:

Line held by the Third Brigade following attack of evening of July 18th ran about three kilometers west of SOISSONS-CHATEAU-THIERRY road and parallel to it, from the old French trenches southwest of CHARANTIGNY to a point on the Vierzy-Tigny road two kilometers west of TIGNY. Field Order No. 16, Second Division, 3.00 A.M., July 19th, directed that the attack take the line HARTENNES, ETAUX (inclusive), BOIS de HARTENNES to BOIS de CORNCOIS (inclusive). Artillery preparation by Second Artillery Brigade to begin at 6.00 A.M. according to orders of the C. G. of the artillery brigade. The infantry attack was to be made by the Sixth Marines and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee. The First Battalion, Second Engineers, was designated as support. Passage of the lines was to be effected at 7.00 A.M., the troops then in the line to remain there until the attack had attained its objective.

At 3.15 the afternoon of July 19th the Commanding General sent word to General Ely that he had directed Colonel Lee to dig in where he then was and to hold. "Please let the troops know that their work is considered to be very gallant and that the failure of the troops on our left and right to keep pace with our advance makes it necessary to dig in and hold the line as it now is," General Harbord wrote.

Although the orders for the attack contemplated a passage of the lines at 7.00 A.M., this was not actually accomplished until about 9 o'clock. At 6.46 Colonel Lee reported to his Brigade Commander that he was at the railroad station at Vierzy with his three battalions and three Machine Gun Companies, 6th, 73rd and 81st. Colonel Lee reported favorable progress for the first hour of the advance. The First Battalion, Second Engineers, in line when the Sixth Marines passed through, followed them in the attack. Various reports came in during the morning indicating that Tigny had been captured, but these proved untrue.

Colonel Lee attacked with all three battalions in line, First, Third and Second, from right to left. Heavy casualties were reported from all attacking units, and constant calls for reinforcements came back. At 11.45 Colonel Lee sent this message to the Division Commander: "Reports indicate growing casualties, amounting heavy, say about 30 per cent. Seventy-eighth Company

by runners say have only one platoon left. All are requesting reinforcements and M. G. and Chauchat ammunition. First Battalion reports no French troops on right, and are held up 300 yards in front of Tigny. Have in line from right, First, Third and Second Battalions, Reserves, Battalion Engineers, Headquarters Company and two companies Sixth Machine Gun Battalion have ordered line dig in."

The Chief of Staff sent the following to Colonel Lee at 1.30 P.M.:

"The Division Commander desires that you dig in and entrench your present position and hold it at all costs. No further advance is to be made for the present. He desires to congratulate your command upon its gallant conduct in the face of severe casualties."

The Division was relieved the night of July 19th-20th by units of the French 6th and 11th Tirailleurs.

The following is taken from the above-mentioned Journal under date of July 19th:

Weather: Fair.

At 4.00 A.M. in the morning of the 19th, the skirmish line extended north and south through a point one kilometer east of VIERZY. The Third and Fourth Brigades north had their Headquarters at VIERZY at 10 A.M. By noon, the line advanced to a point running from one-half kilometer west of TIGNY due north. Progress had been very slow. Casualties were heavy. Ammunition was scarce; food and water were lacking. The enemy artillery very active. Also the entire supremacy of the air was held by the enemy and repeatedly flew to the rear as far as BEAUREPAIRE FARM at a very low altitude.

At 5.00 P.M. word arrived that the Second Division was to be relieved by the 58th Colonial Division [French]. The troops were notified at once and by midnight the relief of the elements had begun.

On July 19, 1918, Major General Harbord reported to the Commanding General, French 20th Army Corps, in part, as follows:

1. The order of the 20th Army Corps to the Second Division to attack at 4.00 A.M. this date was received at 2.00 A.M. It was impossible to comply with the order to attack at 4.00 A.M. due to the delay in receiving this order.

2. With the exception of the Sixth Marines, kept out of the fight as Corps Reserve yesterday, and the Second Regiment of Engineers, which are armed with rifles, every infantry unit was exhausted in the fight yesterday. It was necessary therefore to make the attack this morning with one regiment, the Sixth Marines, supported by a battalion of the Engineer Regiment,

a force considered by me as inadequate to the task, but no other was available. The attack has progressed favorably until the line has come to a north and south line approximately through TIGNY. It is held up on the right from the direction of PARCY-TIGNY, a place previously reported to us as being in French possession. On the left it is being held up and our left flank threatened, due to the fact that the First Moroccan Division had not apparently advanced as far as CHARANTIGNY.

3. I do not anticipate any great danger to my right flank, having a brigade of the Sixth Dragoons constituting the liaison between my right and the left of the French 38th Division. The effect, however, of this cavalry is principally a moral one, as I have been informed by their General and by the Brigade Commander himself that he preferred not to be used in the actual fighting unless a gap occurred in the line. On the left I have sent a fraction of a battalion which was in VIERZY and which suffered the least of any battalions employed in the fight yesterday. This battalion has been sent to occupy the former French trenches along the front southwest and south of CHARANTIGNY.

4. The Tank Commander, who employed this morning twenty-eight tanks, just now reported that eleven of his tanks have been put out by German artillery fire.

5. * * * Due to the congestion of the roads through the FORET de RETZ, the regulation of which was not under our control, and the circumstances of our arrival from the VIth Army without information as to destination or manner of employment after arrival, the troops in the fighting line of the division have many of them been without water or food for over twenty-four hours. This statement applies practically to the whole division, including the animals of the Second Field Artillery Brigade.

6. * * *

A Report of Operations of the Second Division prepared some time after the close of the Aisne-Marne Offensive reads, in part, as follows:

Early on the morning of the 19th, the Sixth Marines passed through the front east of VIERZY and occupied the line running just west of VILLE-MONTROIRE and TIGNY. The regiment had been held in reserve until now, its advance from Beaurepaire Ferme to the "jumping-off" line east of VIERZY was under hostile shell fire. It was about 4.30 A.M. when the orders to attack were received. The Germans had air-superiority. The movement of the regiment at once attracted attention and brought down shells and bombs. Many casualties were suffered before the front lines were reached. The advance to the front lines was a severe test of the morale and discipline of the Sixth Marines. The attack caused about 40 per cent. losses.

The Division was relieved from the front lines on the night of July 19th-20th and then moved back to the forest, where they had jumped off on the 18th, thence was marched back to a new area for billeting.

From the time the troops left the vicinity of CHATEAU-THIERRY

region they received no food and had no sleep. They went into the fight without reconnaissance of any kind and were compelled to move through unknown terrain during the night, which was intensely dark and rainy. The roads to the jumping-off place were blocked with traffic of all kinds and the roadside ditch, slippery with clay, was their only path to the front. Considerable wire entanglements and barbed wire strung through the woods and machine gunners in trees hampered the first progress of the troops at the "jump-off." After exit from the woods machine-gun nests were found distributed in the wheat field and were difficult to locate. Groups of French tanks were of great assistance in overcoming these nests and assisted the rapid advance. Whole batteries were captured, and the guns were turned on the retreating Germans. The Second Division made an advance of more than eight kilometers and captured sixty-six officers and 2899 enlisted prisoners and much material, including nine pieces of heavy artillery, sixty-six light, two Trench Mortars and over 200 machine guns.

This attack, a complete and overwhelming surprise, was a stunning blow to the German High Command. The German Army was engaged in a grand offensive on the eastern side of the RHEIMS-SOISSONS salient. Four hundred thousand Huns were packed there waiting to break through the Allied lines and to smash on to PARIS. Suddenly under this Allied blow the Boche line buckled on a broad front and to a depth of ten kilometers, and a necessary artery of communication—the CHATEAU-THIERRY-SOISSONS Road was strangled. Important lines of communication and large forces packed in the salient were endangered.

This opportune attack on the vital point so rapidly and unexpectedly delivered, created a dangerous situation. The German Command was compelled to withdraw troops from the whole salient at once. The situation was so critical that he could not depend on the reserves which he had thrown in to stop the advance.

This attack relieved the tremendous enemy pressure on PARIS. Now the Allies' reserves were free to deliver hammer blows along the Western Front until the Hun forces were completely demoralized and defeated.

On July 19, 1918, 3.15 P.M., Major General Harbord sent the following letter to the Commanding General, Third Brigade:

1. Instructions have been sent to Colonel Lee that the line is to be dug in where it now is and held.

Please let the troops know that their work is considered to be very gallant, and that the failure of the troops on our left and right to keep pace with our advance makes it necessary to dig in and hold the line as it now is.

2. Please send at once the Marine Battalion which you report as available to come in on the left of Colonel Lee's present line, extending along the old line of French trenches facing CHARANTIGNY, and complete the liaison with the Moroccan Division, whose right will be found somewhere in the head of the ravine south of LECELLE. It is extremely important that this liaison be made. In case the Moroccan division finds it necessary to fall

back, it will occupy the old line of French trenches. In such event, your line should conform to theirs.

3. Every effort is being made to get food, water and ammunition to the front, and to get the wounded evacuated to the rear. Please counsel all to be patient and to believe that everything that is possible is being done. The troops are standing very manfully the necessary hardships of war.

4. Pending the opportunity to rearrange the line you are charged by a responsibility for the defense of the whole line held by this Division. At dark tonight it is desired, if possible to rearrange the line in two sectors, the right to be held by the Third Brigade and the left to be held by the Fourth Brigade. Your recommendation is desired as to the best line of division between the two sectors. The division into sectors should be accompanied by a withdrawal of the necessary reserves from the troops now occupying the line. Pending the opportunity to withdraw troops now in the line for reserves, a French regiment is being sent to me which I intend holding in the vicinity of VIERZY. It should arrive this afternoon. Engineers now believed to be in line should help to consolidate the position.

The Commanding General, Second Division, on July 20, 1918, sent the following memorandum to the Commanding Generals, Third and Fourth Brigades:

The Division Commander desires that every possible effort be made to reorganize your command without regard to hours. Patrols will be sent out to round up absentees; regiment field and combat trains assemble with the regiments; steps taken to secure the necessary supplies and a report made showing strength in officers and men present.

Indicate on map location of units embraced in zone under your command.

The artillery remains at FARM BEAUREPAIRE for a few days, possibly to take part in pursuit of the Germans who are retreating across the Marne and may possible retreat in our front.

The Division Commander is especially desirous of re-forming the infantry brigades at once to enable them to take up the pursuit, and continue to establish the record they have already gained.

GETTING OUT THE WOUNDED

Field Message No 14, July 19, 1918, 6.40 P.M., sent by runner by Colonel Lee to Brigadier General Neville, reads as follows:

Am enclosing you two sketches of positions First and Third Battalions and a statement of the C. O. Second. It is impossible to move from one position to another without drawing all sorts of fire. Losses are placed by Battalion Commanders at from 40 to 50 per cent. Their appeals for doctors, ambulances and stretcher bearers are pathetic. Cannot the ammunition trucks, and any other transportation that may appear tonight, be used to evacuate the 200 or more cases now in the Regimental D. S. under Doctor Boone? Some may be saved by prompt removal.

I am just informed by my French officers that the 19th and 38th French Divisions are to attack tonight at 6.45 P.M., relieve Parcy-Tigny, then strike east and have as their objective a line further east than our objective this morning. I think our troops should be warned. A note on this message reads as follows: "Ambulances are blocked in the jam on the roads. It takes three hours to go distances which before took one-half hour. They can make only one trip a day on that account. I have sent runners and messages to Division Headquarters to get transportation for wounded and will have ammunition trucks filled with wounded, and sent to rear. The shell fire and machine gun fire is so heavy that many trucks and ambulances have been hit and destroyed. Everything in God's name is being done to get the wounded out. Lay."

In a "History of the Second Division," published in the Army Recruiting News, November 20, 1920, Major General Harbord wrote as follows:

The losses of July 18th and 19th were 4925, but they balanced against the capture of 2965 prisoners, seventy-five pieces of artillery and several hundred machine guns. The attack of July 18th by the two American and one French Division marked the turning of the tide against the Germans. In a single day Foch had taken the offensive in such a decisive manner that Ludendorff was never able to regain it, and from then until the Armistice the Germans were on the defensive.

COLONEL AYRES' DESCRIPTION

In "The War with Germany," Colonel L. P. Ayres, U. S. Army, describes these events as follows:

The moment chosen by Marshal Foch for launching the first counter-offensive was July 18, 1918, when it was clear that the German Champagne-Marne drive had spent its force. The place chosen was the uncovered west flank of the German salient from the Aisne to the Marne. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second American Divisions, together with selected French troops, were employed. When the operation was completed (August 6th) the salient had been flattened out and the Allied line ran from Soissons to Rheims along the Vesle.

GENERAL PERSHING'S DESCRIPTION

The American Commander-in-Chief in his first report stated:

The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on July 18th was given to our First and Second Divisions, in company with chosen French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, the massed French and American artillery, firing by the map, laid down its rolling barrage

at dawn while the Infantry began its charge. The tactical handling of our troops under these trying conditions was excellent throughout the action. * * * The Second Division took Beaurepaire Farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance, and reached a position in front of Tigny at the end of its second day,

General Pershing wrote as follows in his final report:

The Second Division advanced eight kilometers in the first twenty-six hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 300 prisoners and sixty-six guns. It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division. The result of this counter-offensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our First and Second Divisions the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies.

* * *

In the hard fighting from July 18th to August 6th the Germans were not only halted in their advance but were driven back from the Marne to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The force of American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed.

FROM THE FRENCH VIEWPOINT

The following is taken from "The American Army in the European Conflict," by Colonel De Chambrun and Captain De Marenches:

The Second Division, on the contrary, had been fighting steadily for forty days and had hardly been relieved and concentrated near Montreuil-aux-Lions in order to proceed to the rear when, on the fifteenth, it received orders to remain in the vicinity of its former battle-ground, and to hold itself in readiness for a strong enemy attack. This could not therefore be considered a fresh division. Moreover it had just changed hands, General Harbord, the victor of Belleau Wood, having recently replaced General Bundy, appointed to the command of an army corps.

* * *

The general situation may be summed up as follows: The American command had at its disposal to begin and carry on the attack nine divisions. One fresh and that had already given an excellent account of itself in action: *The First Division*, *Two* very good divisions which had just been subjected to hard fighting: *The Forty-second* and *Twenty-sixth*. *Two* which were incomplete, lacking cohesion and training: *The Fourth* and *Twenty-eighth*. *Two* still suffering from hard and recent fighting: *The Second* and *Third*. *Two* others which had occupied quiet sectors but had not yet been engaged in active fighting: *The Thirty-second* and *the Seventy-seventh*.

* * *

General Mangin had at his disposal the First and Second American

Divisions, which he assigned to the Twentieth French Corps, whose commander, General Berdoulat, organized his front from left to right as follows: *The First American Division; the Moroccan Division; the Second American Division.*

General Pershing had requested that the American divisions might be maintained side by side. * * *

But the commander of the Third Corps was only able to arrive in the zone of concentration on the 16th of July and with a greatly reduced staff; furthermore, General Pershing's desire could not be carried out on account of the rapidity of events. General Bullard therefore acted as assistant to General Berdoulat and was placed in administrative control of the First and Second American Divisions.

It was on the sixteenth of July that these two units, then in process of transportation, got their orders from the Twentieth Corps. The First Division, coming from the Froissy-Beauvais region, was being concentrated behind the French line, the infantry having been transported in motor trucks. The Second Division, which had been brought from Montreuil-aux-Lions, the mounted troops by road, the dismounted troops on trucks, was only assembled on the dark and rainy night of the seventeenth to the eighteenth of July. By a curious and picturesque coincidence of war time, these trucks were driven by Anamite soldiers. Thus the ancient civilization of Asia was conducting young America to the battlefield.

The placing of the attacking waves was effectuated with great difficulty. Several battalions belonging to the Marine brigade were forced to take the "double quick" for a mile or so in order to get ahead of the blocks of ammunition trucks which encumbered the paths through the forest. On the evening of the seventeenth the crossroads of Nemours, in the Villers Cotterets Forest, afforded a curious spectacle. On the torn-up roadway three files of wagons, caissons, ammunition trucks, lorries, and tanks moved slowly and heavily forward. The American infantrymen in their yellowish tunics, much darker in color when the troops belonged to the Marine brigade, clambered in Indian file along the embanked ditches which border the roadway or pushed through the undergrowth of the adjacent forest. At every crossroad, serious blocks occurred in this multifarious traffic, testing the patience and address of the French gendarmes and the American military police.

As for the artilleryman of the American forces he displayed an initiative quite equal to that of his infantry comrade. While the latter pressed on through the woodland bypaths, the gunners pushed their cannon forward across country, reconnoitered the positions prepared the previous day and got ready to open fire according to maps, plans, and calculations made on paper, strict orders having been issued that not a shot must be fired before the general attack.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that no ranging had been possible, when the hour of the assault came the artillery was ready with a rolling barrage, thereby assuring the early success of the day. In fact, all the difficulties

incident to the taking up of these positions were quite forgotten when, at 4:35 A.M., July 18th, the entire front of the Tenth Army began to push forward.

The Second Division also ^{*} was ^{*} reinforced ^{*} by a seventy-five-mm. regiment and had fifty-four *St. Chamond* tanks. The brigades were placed one behind the other and took the field in splendid order. A few units which had not been able to collect their machine-gun sections, nowise embarrassed by the lack of their own weapons, threw themselves upon those of the enemy and fought through the entire day with the material they had so dashinglly conquered!

The intention of the Twentieth Corps commander had been to advance in three successive bounds from the line of departure, situated on the fringe of the Villers Cotterets Forest to a line running approximately from north to south and passing through the villages of Saconin, Missy-aux-bois, and Chaudun. Thus the Soissons-Paris highroad would have fallen into our hands, while that of Soissons-Chateau-Thierry would have been seriously threatened.

At 7:45 A.M. the two American divisions on the right and left wing, with the Moroccan division occupying the center, had attained the second objective, each division covering a front of a mile and a quarter.

In the course of the day [18th], as the offensive went on, the Americans succeeded in everywhere keeping their line level with that of our valiant Colonial troops when they did not get beyond them. At an early hour they were ready to carry the guns forward in support of the infantry advance which now bit deep into the enemy line.

In the evening General Summerall's soldiers had reached the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road and General Harbord's men were on the western outskirts of Villemontoire and Tigny.

On the following days the attack was resumed along the entire front of the Tenth Army and the American divisions once more distinguished themselves by the ardor of their fighting spirit.

The Second Division in its turn reached the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road southeast of Villemontoire.

* * *

It is estimated that 10,000 men and officers were killed, wounded, or evacuated. But in spite of the fact that the losses were numerous this fight may be considered one of the most brilliant of the entire war, especially when we compare the casualties with the trophies wrested from the enemy.

* * *

The American soldier had fully justified the confidence of his commander-in-chief; the infantry had been splendid in attack, obstinate in its sustained effort, and excellent in marksmanship. But the passage of the lines had been difficult and arduous, the long pauses upon ground freshly conquered and subjected to sharp enemy fire had been trying to these inexperienced troops, more especially to the Second Division, already severely tested by a long night march before entering into action. To sum up, each new experi-

ence proved that the American army possessed increasing qualities of audacity and skill; its aptitude for attack was more and more evident.

MARINES WITHDRAWN

Early on morning of July 20, 1918 Brigadier General Neville left Vierzy and after a considerable search found La Jardiniere, a completely destroyed farmhouse, where he had been directed to establish Headquarters for the Fourth Brigade. He notified Headquarters, Second Division of the condition of the buildings, and they told him he might establish Headquarters at St. Pierre Aigle. Upon arriving here he found it more destroyed, if that were possible, than La Jardiniere. Brigadier General Neville then notified Headquarters, Second Division, that he had moved his headquarters to that of the Fifth Marines in the Bois de la Retz about one kilometer back of the original jump-off of morning of July 18, 1918. On July 21, 1918, the Fourth Brigade was moved to woods south of Taillefontaine, with headquarters at Taillefontaine.

FIELD ORDERS NO. 17

Field Orders No. 17, July 20, 1918, 10.00 P.M., reads as follows:

I. The Second Division, less the Fourth Brigade and the Second Field Artillery Brigade with attached medical units, marches to the vicinity of PIERREFONDS.

II. (a) Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, First Field Signal Battalion, to PIERREFONDS. Route of march: TAILLEFONTAINE-RETHEUIL-PIERREFONDS, clearing VIVIERES and vicinity by 10.00 P.M.

(b) Twenty-third Infantry to ST. ETIENNE, marching *via* TAILLEFONTAINE-RETHEUIL-PIERREFONDS-ST. ETIENNE, clearing VIVIERES and vicinity by 10.45 P.M.

(c) Ninth Infantry to RETHEUIL, marching *via* VIVIERES-TAILLEFONTAINE, clearing VIVIERES by 11.30 P.M.

(d) Second Engineers and Second Engineer Train to the woods south of TAILLEFONTAINE comprised between the lane d'EMEVILLE on the west, the lane of CROIX MOREIL on the east, and the FAITE road on the south, with Headquarters at TAILLEFONTAINE, marching *via* SOUCY-VIVIERES-TAILLEFONTAINE, clearing VIVIERES by 12.00 P.M., July 20th.

(e) Headquarters Trains and Military Police to PIERREFONDS, marching *via* TAILLEFONTAINE-RETHEUIL, clearing VIVIERES by 12.10 A.M., July 21st. Company "B" Military Police remains in place.

(f) Fourth and Fifth Machine Gun Battalions to the woods with the

Second Engineers, marching *via* VIVIERES-TAILLEFONTAINE, clearing VIVIERES by 12.15 A.M., July 21st.

(g) Sanitary Train will remain in place. Ammunition Train, less Small Arms Section, at the Disposition Commanding General Second Field Artillery Brigade. Small Arms Section to woods with Second Engineers.

III. Fourth Brigade, Field Artillery, Ammunition Train, M. O. R. S., Mobile Veterinary Unit, and other units remaining in present area, will draw rations July 21st at ration dump on SOISSONS road. Third Brigade and all other units of the Division marching to new area will draw rations July 21st at PIERREFONDS railway station. Field Trains will be sent in every case to the proper dump for rations.

IV. Second Division Headquarters—PIERREFONDS. Third Brigade Headquarters—RETHEUIL.

FALLING TREES KILL MARINES

Colonel Lee at 2.45 P.M., July 20, 1918, sent Field Message No. 1, by motorcycle, to Brigadier General Neville, reading as follows:

Recent shelling of woods in present position has detached many branches of trees which are falling frequently from the high wind as to render the occupancy of these woods dangerous. Casualties from the falling limbs, amount to one killed, two seriously injured, causing men to flock to edge of woods and the open space beyond, thereby exposing them to view of avions which might result in artillery fire from the enemy. It is requested that a more favorable spot lacking these undesirable features might be found a little further in the rear. Lee.

FOURTH BRIGADE MOVES TO TAILLEFONTAINE

The Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, received the following letter, dated July 21, 1918, from the Commanding General, Second Division:

1. The Commanding General, Second Division, directs me to transmit to you the following instructions:

(a) You will move your brigade to the woods south of TAILLEFONTAINE in the area bounded by the MOREL LANE on the east, EMEVILLE LANE on the west, ROUTE-du-FAITE on the south. Map showing location enclosed herewith.

(b) One-half of your brigade will march *via* MONTGOBERT-PUISEUX; the other half by road south of MONTGOBERT-PUISEUX.

(c) Your brigade must be west of a north and south line through PUISEUX before 11.00 P.M. There is no objection to the brigade marching in daylight providing it can do so under cover of the woods.

(d) You will send immediately one (1) officer from the Fifth and Sixth Marines and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, who are to reconnoiter the ground and lead their organization to their camp.

- (e) Fourth Brigade Headquarters at TAILLEFONTAINE.
2. Instructions for drawing rations on the 22nd will be issued later.
3. Report will be made to these Headquarters as soon as the movement has been completed and your brigade is in its new area.

The Journal of Operations of the Second Division contains the following:

July 20, 1918. Weather: Fair.

From midnight, July 19th-20th, to well after dawn, the infantry continued in a steady stream to march by Division Headquarters towards the rear and by 5 P.M. practically the entire Division, less the artillery, was concentrated in the woods just east of VERTE FEUILLE FARM.

Division Headquarters at 5 A.M. moved to VIVIERES.

Troops bivouaced in the woods west of VERTE FEUILLE FARM.

Late in the afternoon information was received which detached the Division from the Twentieth French Army Corps and placed it in the Army Reserve of the Tenth Army. Division Headquarters immediately moved to PIERREFONDS and the Third Brigade, the Fourth Machine Gun Battalion, and the Second Engineers were ordered to proceed to the woods south of TAILLEFONTAINE and to the vicinity of PIERREFONDS, ST. ETIENNE, and RETHEUIL.

July 21, 1918. Weather: Fair, with occasional showers.

The movement of the Fourth Brigade from the woods south of ST. PIERREAIGLE to the woods south of TAILLEFONTAINE was made. Fourth Brigade Headquarters was established at TAILLEFONTAINE.

The Second Field Artillery Brigade still remained in the line east of BEAUREPAIRE FARM.

July 22, 1918. Weather: Fair, with occasional showers.

The total number of prisoners taken by the Second Division for the period of July 18th-19th is: Sixty-six officers and 2810 enlisted men. This total is exclusive of wounded prisoners.

During the early morning of the 22nd, an aerial bombardment of PIERREFONDS occurred. About nine bombs were dropped. No damage was done to property or personnel of the Second Division.

The day was spent by the troops in reorganizing and rest.

July 23, 1918. Weather: Fair, with occasional showers.

During the morning of the 23rd, advice reached Division Headquarters that the Division was to proceed to the area of NANTEUILLES-HAU-DOUIN for a period of rest and recuperation.

Officers were at once sent to the new area to investigate conditions of the billets, water supply, etc.

The Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, reported the occurrences for July 22, 1918, to the Commanding General, Second Division, as follows:

1 General aspects of the day: Quiet.

2. Events of the day: Nothing of importance. The Fifth Regiment, Sixth Regiment and Sixth M. G. Battalion marched to woods south of Taillefontaine last night and went into bivouac. Brigade, Fifth Regiment and Sixth Regiment Headquarters established in Taillefontaine. Sixth M. G. Battalion Headquarters in woods south of Taillefontaine. Day spent in reorganizing and resting.

3. Enemy artillery: Not observed.

Aviation activity: Enemy planes dropped bombs on Vivieres and Pierrefonds last night.

FIELD ORDERS NO. 18

Field Orders No. 18, Second Division, July 23, 1918, 11.00 P.M., read as follows:

1. The Division (less Second Field Artillery Brigade and attached units), moves to the NANTEUIL le HAUDOUIN area.

2. Movement by march. ANNEX 1.

3. The Artillery Section of Second Ammunition Train, Artillery Repair Section of M. O. R. S. and the Mobile Veterinary Unit remain at the disposition of the Commanding General, Second Field Artillery Brigade, whose Headquarters are at BEAUREPAIRE FERME.

4. Rail Head—CREPY.

Administrative details by G-1.

5. Advance echelon Division Headquarters opens 9.00 A.M., 24th July, 1918, at NANTEUIL le HAUDOUIN. Rear echelon closes 12.00 noon 25th July, 1918, at PIERREFONDS.

CASUALTIES

The following named officers were killed, or died of wounds received, in action in the Aisne-Marne offensive: Captains, Lester S. Wass, Allen M. Sumner and John Kearns; and Second Lieutenants John M. McClellan, John W. Overton, David A. Redford, Carleton Burr, David P. Colvin, Donald S. Gordon, Scott M. Johnson, William H. Mack, Charles H. Roye and Walter J. Tigan.

The following named officers were wounded or gassed in action in the Aisne-Marne offensive: Captains, William LaF. Crabbe, Leroy P. Hunt, Frederick W. Karstaedt, Robert E. Messersmith, Joseph D. Murray, Arthur H. Turner, Robert W. Voeth and Wethered Woodworth; First Lieutenants, Felix Beauchamp, Henry E. Chandler, Robert L. Duane, Charles A. Etheridge, Frederick I. Hicks, Davis A. Holladay, Edward D. Kalbfleisch, Charles Z. Leshner, Horatio P. Mason, Clyde P. Matteson, Clive E. Murray, John H. Nichols, Daniel J. Readey, James F. Robertson,

Mark A. Smith, Carleton S. Wallace, William N. Wallace and Frederic C. Wheeler; and Second Lieutenants Harry H. Barber, Lloyd E. Battles, Daniel W. Bender, Irving F. Bigelow, George Bower, Charles W. Brooks, Henry P. Cottingham, William F. Dummer, George Ehrhart, Jr., Walter S. Fant, Jr., Bernard L. Fritz, Arnold D. Godbey, Joseph C. Grayson, Jacob H. Heckman, Carl P. Hedberg, Harold B. Hoskins, Charles A. Ingram, Samuel T. Jackson, Ralph C. Judd, Hugh P. Kidder, John McHenry, Jr., Delos D. McKenzie, Herman L. McLeod, Jacob Offeckman, Harold T. Palmer, Allan C. Perkinson, Blythe Reynolds, William E. Riley, Ray Rindfleisch, John G. Schneider, Jr., Marvin Scott, Amor L. Sims, Albert G. Skelton, Ben L. Taylor, John T. Thornton, Louis F. Timmerman, Jr., Alfred Wilkinson and Herman A. Zischke.

The enlisted battle deaths suffered by companies in the Aisne-Marne offensive are as follows:

Organization	Killed in Action	Died of Wounds	Total
Headquarters Company, Fifth Regiment	1	..	1
Headquarters Company, Sixth Regiment	9	9	18
8th Company	4	..	4
15th Company	1	1	2
17th Company	6	3	9
18th Company	5	16	21
20th Company	1	31	1
23rd Company	1	2	3
43rd Company	1	1	2
45th Company	1	1	2
47th Company	1	2	3
49th Company	7	..	7
51st Company	4	2	6
55th Company	5	2	7
66th Company	4	6	10
67th Company	3	3	6
73rd Company	4	2	6
74th Company	9	10	19
75th Company	10	8	18
76th Company	18	18	36
78th Company	9	7	16
79th Company	21	11	32
80th Company	10	13	23
81st Company	8	7	15
82nd Company	7	10	17
83rd Company	6	2	8

Organization	Killed in Action	Died of Wounds	Total
84th Company	8	17	25
95th Company	11	23	34
96th Company	9	17	26
97th Company	12	15	27
Totals	196	208	404

The battle deaths as divided among the three organizations of the Fourth Brigade as follows:

Organization	Killed in Action	Died of Wounds	Total
Fifth Regiment	43	36	79
Sixth Regiment	143	162	305
Sixth Machine Gun Battalion	10	10	20
Totals	196	208	404

This information concerning casualties was secured from the Casualty Section on May 19 1921. Data regarding wounds and gassing has not been completed, and for that reason cannot be published.

MAJOR GENERAL HARBORD'S GENERAL ORDER

On July 21, 1918, Major General Harbord, commanding the Second Division, issued the following general order No. 46.

It is with keen pride that the Division Commander transmits to the command the congratulations and affectionate personal greetings of General Pershing, who visited the Division Headquarters last night. His praise of the gallant work of the Division on the 18th and 19th is echoed by the French High Command, the Third Corps Commander, American Expeditionary Forces, and in a telegram from the former Division Commander. In spite of two sleepless nights, long marches through rain and mud, and the discomforts of hunger and thirst, the Division attacked side by side with the gallant First Moroccan Division and maintained itself with credit. You advanced over six miles, captured over three thousand prisoners, eleven batteries of artillery, over a hundred machine guns, minnenwerfers and supplies. The Second Division has sustained the best traditions of the Regular Army and the Marine Corps. The story of your achievements will be told in millions of homes in all Allied lands tonight.

MAJOR GENERAL BULLARD'S GENERAL ORDER

On July 23, 1918, Major General Bullard, commanding the Third Army Corps, published general orders No. 9, reading as follows:

On the morning of July 18th, after forty-eight hours of exhausting, continuous, almost sleepless movement, the Third Army Corps joined battle with the enemy. In your first great offensive you stood beside the best veteran French troops, our allies, and sustained, nay, did honor to the name American. Our allies, your commanders, the Army of the United States and the whole nation are proud and will boast of your deeds and the deeds of those brave men, our beloved comrades, who at your side in the last five days have fallen, paying the last sacrifice of soldiers. Now and for the future let us resolve that these our allies and our people shall not trust in us in vain, and, in the words of Lincoln, that these our comrades shall not have died in vain.

PRaise BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

In his Annual Report for 1918, the Secretary of the Navy wrote as follows:

On July 18th the Marines were again called into action in the vicinity of Soissons, near Tigny and Vierzy. In the face of a murderous fire from concentrated machine guns, which contested every foot of their advance, the United States Marines moved forward until the severity of their casualties necessitated that they dig in and hold the positions they had gained. Here, again, their valor called forth official praise, which came in the following (here follows General Orders No. 46, Second Division, July 21, 1918):

The Secretary of the Navy in his Annual Report for 1919, expressed himself as follows:

On July 18th, in spite of two sleepless nights and forced marches through rain and mud, the Fourth Brigade of Marines, under command of Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, participated in the surprise attack south of Soissons, one of the greatest strategical successes of Marshal Foch, and which marked the beginning of the "drive" which never ended until the retreating Germans sued for peace.

COMMENDATION OF GENERAL MANGIN

General Order No. 318, of the Tenth French Army, signed by "MANGIN" on July 30, 1918, is self-explanatory:

Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers of the Third United States Army Corps.

Shoulder to shoulder with your French comrades, you were thrown into the counter-offensive battle which commenced on the 18th of July. You rushed into the fight as though to a fête. Your magnificent courage completely routed a surprised enemy and your indomitable tenacity checked the counter-attacks of his fresh divisions. You have shown yourselves worthy sons of your Great Country and you were admired by your brothers in arms.

CITATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS BY THE FRENCH

The Aisne-Marne Offensive was one of the greatest strategical successes of Marshal Foch, and that the part played by the Marines was appreciated by the French is illustrated by Fifth and Sixth Regiments and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion being cited in French Army orders. (See *The United States Marine Corps in the World War*, p. 46, for the text of these citations.)

THE FOURRAGERE

The above-mentioned citation was one of the two upon which the French Government based its award of the fourragere, in the colors of the Croix de Guerre, to the Fifth and Sixth Regiments and the Machine Gun Battalion.

INDIVIDUAL DECORATIONS

For acts of courage and gallantry during the Aisne-Marne Offensive two Marines were awarded the Army medal of honor, and many Army Distinguished Service Medals and Crosses, and foreign decorations were received by Marines.

The citations of the two Marines receiving the medal of honor read as follows:

Louis Cukela, lieutenant, Fifth Regiment, United States Marine Corps. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy near Villers-Cotterets, France, July 18, 1918. When his company, advancing through a wood, met with strong resistance from an enemy strong point, Lieutenant Cukela (then Sergeant) crawled out from the flank and made his way toward the German lines in the face of heavy fire, disregarding the warnings of his comrades. He succeeded in getting behind the enemy position and rushed a machine-gun emplacement, killing or driving off the crew with his bayonet. With German hand grenades he then bombed out the remaining portion of the strong point, capturing four men and two damaged machine guns.

Matej Kocak, sergeant Company C, Fifth Regiment, United States Marine Corps. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy near Soissons, France, July 18, 1918. When the advance of his battalion was checked by a hidden machine-gun nest, he went forward alone, unprotected by covering fire from his own men, and worked in between the German position in the face of fire from an enemy covering detachment. Locating the machine-gun nest, he rushed it, and with his bayonet drove off the crew. Shortly after this, he organized twenty-five French colonial soldiers, who had become separated from their company, and led them in attacking another machine-gun nest, which was also put out of action.

PROFESSIONAL NOTES

RECRUITING AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARINE CORPS

RECRUITING for the Marine Corps was carried on for the months of February, March and April with the following results:

FEBRUARY, 1921

	Reënlt	Applicants	Acpt.	Total
Eastern Division	111	0		111
Central Division	29	0		29
Southern Division	15	0		15
Mountain Division	4	0		4
Western Division	9	0		9
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	168	0		168

PERIOD OF ENLISTMENT

	2 years	3 years	4 years	Total
Eastern Division	43	6	62	111
Central Division	23	2	4	29
Southern Division	10	0	5	15
Mountain Division	1	1	2	4
Western Division	5	0	4	9
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Total	82	9	77	168
Total enlistment recorded in February, 1921.....				173
Loss in strength in February, 1921				424

MARCH, 1921

	Reënlt	Applicants	Acpt.	Total
Eastern Division	107	50		157
Central Division	52	39		91
Southern Division	25	19		44
Mountain Division	6	4		10
Western Division	20	18		38
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	210	130		340

PERIOD OF ENLISTMENT

	2 years	3 years	4 years	Total
Eastern Division	20	90	47	157
Central Division	9	70	12	91
Southern Division	8	32	4	44
Mountain Division	1	8	1	10
Western Division	5	27	6	38
	—	—	—	—
Total	43	227	70	340
Total enlistments recorded in March, 1921				255
Loss in strength in March, 1921				320

APRIL, 1921

	Reenlts	Applicants	Accept.	Total
Eastern Division	180	138		318
Central Division	119	105		224
Southern Division	22	34		56
Mountain Division	26	20		46
Western Division	39	54		93
	—	—		—
Total	386	351		737

PERIOD OF ENLISTMENT

	2 years	3 years	4 years	Total
Eastern Division	0	276	42	318
Central Division	0	209	15	224
Southern Division	0	52	4	56
Mountain Division	0	41	5	46
Western Division	0	82	11	93
	—	—	—	—
Total	0	660	77	737
Total enlistments recorded in April, 1921				654
Gain in strength in April, 1921				80

NOTE: All two (2) year enlistments were discontinued March 31, 1921.

RECAPITULATION OF STRENGTH OF THE MARINE CORPS

	Authorized strength	Strength on April 30, 1921	G.C.M. Pris. sick and Jd by S/R	Re- serves.	Available
United States	17,995	11,496	11	698	10,798
Foreign	6,286	6,386	..	288	6,098
Ships	1,822	1,910	..	1	1,909
Aviation	957	968	..	40	928
En Route, Pool, etc.	340	509	509
Grand Total ..	27,400	21,269	11	1,027	20,242

MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE MARINE CORPS

HEADQUARTERS of the Marine Corps has now completed the outline of a scheme of Military Education for the commissioned personnel of officers of the Marine Corps. The system will be but briefly described, though officers of the Marine Corps are familiar with many of its features.

For the senior officers of the Corps the Field Officers' School at Quantico has been established. It was originally intended to have classes of twenty-five field officers for each course, but it has been found that it is impossible to detail that number without injury to the interests of the service, so a few of the senior captains have been detailed to take the course. The next class will probably assemble about October 1, 1921.

For officers in the grade of captain and lieutenant the Company Officers' School will give a course of approximately nine months' duration beginning probably next October and continuing until the following June. In view, however, of the large number of officers in the grade of first and second lieutenant who are now due for promotion to the next higher grade, a special nine weeks' course was provided by the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. This course began May 2, 1921. About fifty-eight officers are in this class. It is hoped to detail at least seventy-five officers for the ensuing long course, but due to the large number of vacancies existing in the commissioned personnel of the Marine Corps it may be impossible to detail that number.

The general outlines of these courses have already been printed in the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. A few modifications will, however, probably be made in both courses.

Marine Corps Orders Numbers 6 and 16, Series 1921, are concerned with the subject of military education for those officers of the Marine Corps who are not attending the Quantico schools or Army or Navy schools. Field officers are required to solve three map problems a year, the faculty of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico preparing the problems and also commenting on the solutions.

Post Schools are provided for officers of company grade, the principal difference between these schools and the garrison schools formerly held at Marine Corps posts being that written examinations are required quarterly, the questions being prepared and the examination papers marked by the Quantico school faculty. The regular course for Post Schools will begin on October 1, and close at the end of June each year. It was decided, however, in view of the present large number of recently commissioned junior officers in the Marine Corps, to require a special two months' course for May and June of this year, covering only the subject of Administration. Only officers serving in the United States were required to take this course.

In addition to the educational facilities furnished by our own branch of the service, Marine Officers are detailed to several schools controlled by other arms. Among these are the Infantry School at Camp Benning, the School of the Line and the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, the Signal Corps Schools at Camp Vail, New Jersey; the Army General Staff College at Washington, and the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. Officers are also sometimes sent to the Army Chemical Warfare School, and the Motor Transport School at Camp Holabird.

It will thus be seen that the military education of officers of the Marine Corps is very thoroughly taken care of at the present time.

STATUS OF OUR COMMISSIONED PERSONNEL


The Board of Selection of junior officers for permanent commissions in the Marine Corps, of which Major General W. C. Neville, U.S.M.C., was senior member, has made its report, and this report has been approved by the Secretary of the Navy. The readjustments in rank required by this report have at this writing been practically completed. There were, however, a number of

vacancies which the Board could not fill, such as those which occurred after June 4, 1920. In addition a number of individuals selected for permanent commissions were unable to pass the physical examinations, while others have declined appointment. Several resignations among the permanent officers have taken place since the Board made its report. The net result, therefore, is that the Marine Corps at the end of the present fiscal year will be about one hundred and fifty short in its commissioned complement. A few of these vacancies will be filled by graduates of the Naval Academy, others by meritorious non-commissioned officers, and it is possible some will be filled from civil life by graduates of distinguished military colleges.


MARINE CORPS AVIATION

Marine Corps Order Number 8, Series 1921, authorizes a commissioned strength of six field officers, sixteen captains and seventy-nine lieutenants for Marine Corps Aviation, all of whom are to be qualified pilots. There are at present only thirty-five officers so qualified, leaving sixty-six vacancies to be filled. The quota of officers in the grade of captain has been filled, but there are many vacancies in the rank of lieutenant, and it is from officers of that grade that applications are particularly desired. Such applicants should not be over twenty-eight years old (though in exceptional cases the age limit is waived) and should of course have all the necessary physical qualifications. Unmarried officers will be given preference over married officers.

Field officers will be eligible for aviation regardless of age.







EDITORIAL NOTES

THE Editor takes great pleasure in making the following announcements:

The Board of Control of the Marine Corps Association has awarded the annual prize of \$100 for the best original article on a professional subject published in THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE for the year 1920 to Captain E. H. Jenkins, U.S.M.C., for his article entitled "The New Marine Corps," published in the September issue.

The board appointed to review the essays submitted in the competition for the prize of \$250 offered by the Major General Commandant for the best essay on "Esprit de Corps," has awarded the prize to Captain George B. Lockhart, U.S.M.C., whose essay is printed in this number.

Honorable mention is made of the essay by First Lieutenant Sydney J. Handsley, U.S.M.C., which we hope to print in a later issue.

The Editor wishes to express to the readers of THE GAZETTE his regrets at the delay in the appearance of this issue, which has been due to labor difficulties in the establishment of our printers.

APPLICATION FORM

Place

Date.....1921.

THE SECRETARY-TREASURER,
MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION,
Headquarters, Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C.

SIR:

I desire to be enrolled as a member of the Marine Corps Association. I enclose herewith a check (or money order) for \$5 covering the first year's dues from July, 1919, to July, 1920.

Until further notice please forward the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE to me at the above address.

Name

Rank.....

(All checks or money orders to be made out to "Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association.")



MAJOR SAMUEL NICHOLAS
SENIOR MARINE OFFICER OF THE REVOLUTION.